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ABSTRACT

KNOWLEDGE UNDERGROUND:

GOSSIPY EPISTEMOLOGY
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KAREN
Ph D
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C.

.

,

ADKINS, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by:

Professor Robert

J.

Ackermann

This dissertation is an attempt to loosen what
a

I

see as

chokehold by which two paramount assumptions constrict our

epistemic endeavors.

These Enlightenment assumptions

-

that

we accept or refute ideas as true based on transparently

clear and orderly methods and criteria, and that individuals
accept or refute truth claims

-

are still central in

epistemology, despite their many critics (for the first,
Kant,

Hegel,

James, Quine,

Bayes; for the second,

postmodernism, Deleuze and Guattari, Gilbert).

Thinking

about gossip as an epistemologically productive concept

provides us with the means to critique those assumptions,
and further attempts to broaden our notion of an

epistemological foundation.
Gossip at first appears to be an unlikely candidate for
such a resurrection, mainly because its treatment by

academics has been dismissive; this dismissal is in part due
to Enlightenment

conceptions about truth and falsehood.

Chapter One surveys the social science literature on gossip
and rumor, revealing that social scientists begin with such
vi

restrictive definitions of what gossip is that their

conclusions amount to little more than tautology.

Chapter

Two shows that humanists have a slightly different approach
to gossip,

but with roughly similar results.

The handful of philosophers who deal directly with

gossip or rumor almost as a unit accept uncritically a

division between "purposive" conversation and "idle"
chatter.

To do so,

I

think, perpetuates a limiting

epistemic foundation on a linguistic level.

In contrast,

I

argue in Chapter Three that the very existence of something
like gossip proves the inadequacy of the

myth

(at

least in its current form)

understand and use gossip with
simply a wrong fit.
this central fact:

,

f oundat

ionalist

and that to attempt to

f oundat

ionalist tools is

My understanding of gossip is based on
we undertake the activity of gossip or

rumor- spreading because we are trying to make sense out of

something

--

we need to collect knowledge socially.

originates from dissonance; it acts as

a

Gossip

(necessary)

counterweight to more official information, and can't be

considered apart from official knowledge.
rumor,

We use gossip and

along with more orthodox sources of information, to

formulate our understanding of ourselves and the world

around us.

The extent to which gossip and rumor are spread

is the extent to which the analysis is shared,

individualized.

Gossip is both

speculative tool.

Vll

a

and not

genealogical tool and an
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INTRODUCTION
GOSSIPING YOUR WAY TO KNOWLEDGE
"A self is a set of reputations"

— F.G.
1.1

Bailey, Gifts and Poison

Some Preliminary Commentary
I

gossip a lot.

Indeed,

remarked to friends that
this project, because

I

I

have only half- jokingly

I

am the ideal person to carry out

have been practically training for

gossip research all my life:

when

I

was ten,

I

began the

first (no doubt only, and certainly short-lived) Gossip Club
at my elementary school; we met every afternoon at recess on

the parallel bars to evaluate fellow schoolmates, teachers,
and siblings.
I

begin this "serious" project so apparently

flippantly, first as

a

warning for those seeking out

objective analyses of gossip.

While

I

hopefully have succeeded) in sketching

am interested (and
a more complete

portrait of gossip than currently exists in the academic
literature,

I

do so not as an impersonal crusader for

science, but as an unabashed defender, as well as habitual

practitioner, of gossip.

While some readers will no doubt

this
turn away from my evidently hopelessly biased work on

statement alone, let me assure readers that other gossip

writers who aren't as explicit about their personal
prior
attitudes towards gossip, nonetheless make their

excessively
prejudices equally as clear in their subsequent,
1

.

hostile,

treatments of the subject.

am merely trying to

I

lay my cards out on the table before we begin the analysis
game,

rather than feigning objectivity at the start, only to

have scabrous invective creep into my "neutral"

investigation as it proceeds

(I

like my scabrous invective

out in plain sight)
Indeed,

let me quickly enumerate those initial

assumptions with which
get too far in.

I

champion of gossip.

I

began this project now, before we

began this work as

straightforward

a

"Of course it is always right,

of

course it is never petty or malicious, anyone who thinks

otherwise is a craven Puritan,

"

of my attitudes towards gossip.

is a pretty fair assessment

Reading the vast assemblage

of gossip- and rumorology has challenged those assumptions,

but only partially.

I

now think that gossip is an

infinitely more complicated social manifestation than ever
before,

and that no one functional reading of gossip (it

makes truth,

it distorts it,

it is just a tool for values)

I

While

I

fear that in this

still retain too much of the flavor of my original

evangelical attitude towards gossip,
feigning of neutrality or a frowning,
I

it is bad,

can hope to capture its

inherently multifaceted nature.
work

it is good,

it lies;

I

still prefer it to a

"judicious" criticism:

think a blast of unabashed enthusiasm towards gossip's

virtues and functions is probably the best way to prod
others to appreciate gossip as complicated.
2

,

And

do think that gossip is complicated,

I

in striking

the bulk of the extant academic literature on

the subject.

While researching and writing this project has

been startling in a variety of ways, foremost among them was
the discovery that an activity that had provided so much

insight and discovery for me was either ignored or dismissed
by so many theorists on human behavior.

dissertation almost on

While

I

began this

dare (as the ultimate moment of an

a

extended gossip-conversation with my dissertation advisor)
my rapid discovery of the widespread, and largely
trivializing,

literature on gossip propelled me to explore

more deeply questions of language and knowledge.
gossip,

it seems to me,

"safe" zone

Writers on

are able to cordon it off into a

(affecting only "trivial" personal relations or

being wildly destructive, but in identifiable and

predictable ways)

,

because they have similarly cordoned off

notions of how language works, and how it is we come by

knowledge

--

since language is either transparently rational

and purposive or idle and emotional, and since we can

determine what is "really" knowledge versus what is merely
opinion, gossip can easily belong to its own separate

certainly unequal) arena.

(and

Rethinking gossip as in part a

constructive epistemic force entails rethinking how it is we
communicate, and come to knowledge, with each other.
Of course,

rethinking gossip is no small task; for well

over 200 years gossip has almost without exception been
3

i e d,

dismissed, and trivialized in both academic and

popular media.
evils,

Sermons are delivered detailing gossip's

samplers are embroidered counseling sagely against

its practice -- indeed,

I

even ran across an old trivet in

a

junk shop decorated with a female exhorting the user in

bowdlerized German not to "talk so dumb."
dissertation will consist of

Largely,

then,

my

critical reading of the

a

academic literature on gossip which explains why these
theories (almost without exception) fail to capture the

complicated and convoluted nature of gossip.
A partial reason that

I

see this happening is evidenced

by the large amount of meta-writing that occurs in writing
about gossip.

To be precise,

reading, with few exceptions,

the gossipists

I

have been

spend more time writing about

the difficulties in writing about/theorizing about/studying

gossip,

than they do in actually reporting and analyzing the

gossip they collect (Sarah Miller, Ori Bet Or, Jorg
Bergmann, and John Beard Haviland come to mind)
true even in cases

(Bet Or and Miller)

.

This is

where it's clear that

the authors have an enormous amount of primary information

that they have not only collected but analyzed; one writer
(Bet Or)

even explicitly discusses how he could spend 100

pages alone discussing one particular gossip-episode.
this phenomenon suggests to me, among other things,

What

is that

gossipists are so intent upon credentialling themselves as
doing something legitimate (with something so apparently
4

illegitimate)

possible,

that they constrain themselves as much as

so as to retain credibility for themselves.

seems impossible, then,

It

if we consider the bulk of the

literature on gossip, to write about the topic seriously

without simultaneously reducing the topic to complete nonseriousness

.

Of course,

skeptics might contest my more generous

approach towards gossip as being exactly non-serious; to
wit,

that my straightforward enthusiasm amounts to an

uncritical assertion of truths to gossip that

cannot

I

justify, given my lack of disciplinary fidelity.

Detractors

could argue that, like the social scientists

I

energetically attack, by my own definition

am simply

setting myself up for success

--

I

so

if gossip is always already

everywhere and in everything, well then of course it's
part of knowledge.

a

My dissertation then becomes an amusing

exercise in circularity.
I

have two responses to this criticism.

First,

I

think

it's important to recognize that contextualizing approaches
to social science

(and more generally,

to knowledge-

gathering)

are a legitimate and widespread intellectual

movement.

Bruno Latour's We Have Never Been Modern (1993)

and Jacques Ranciere's The Names of History (1994) are

simply the most recent (and elegant) examples of this
approach.

To crudely summarize, Latour and Ranciere, while

working from vastly different frames of reference (Latour
5

writes about science, politics, and history, using
Hobbes
and Boyle as his lenses; Ranciere appraises literary
criticism, politics, and history, using Michelet and

Braudel

s

European histories and Auerbach

1

s

literary

criticism commentary) are both attempting to demonstrate not
just that history is never simply a story-telling, or that

scientific revolutions aren't simply happenings; but that

openly and actively combining or contextualizing our

QB ly
-

fields of knowledge or inquiry can we make any sense of
for in their very structure fields,

them,

ages,

and

frameworks contain elements of the fields, ages, and
frameworks they are apparently conceived to refute or
differentiate.

Their claims best illustrate this notion:

historical science is still and always written as narrative;
the postmodern era is neither postmodern or an era, but

simply

a

failed attempt at modernity (neatly cleaving into

differently functioning and limited intellectual ages, whose
products themselves are variably and similarly functioning
and limited); scientific advances are political changes; we
have always been premodern (rather than following

a

linear

development of ages, including "the postmodern"); the

history of the anonymous is written as
character ("the people").

history of

a

To generalize about these claims

in the most reductive terms,
yes,

a

Ranciere and Latour argue that

we always are trying to focus on just one object of

examination at

a time

(whether it be a person, an event, a

6

.

revolutionary change, an object), and that focusing
isn't
itself a problem.
The point is that focusing on one

thing

is focusing on the world,

writing the story of the airpump

is writing the story of the Enlightenment,

just as writing

the story of gossip is writing the story of the world.

The

problem comes when we attempt to convince ourselves that we
need only look at narrow concepts, that we can simply ignore

certain facts or works because they don't "fit" the
paradigm, that we can construct paradigms to describe the

world that are consistent, complete, self-contained, and
absolutely refuting or denying earlier paradigms.
These are just a few of the conceptual sea changes that

Ranciere and Latour, in their different ways, adumbrate.
Those who would argue that such apparent raving relativism
leaves us with no method by which to come to systemic

beliefs about things or events or people
to the point,

(and,

perhaps more

no pre-approved or -legitimized method for

conducting Rigorous Intellectual Inquiry) miss the point.
Our beliefs, our ideas about people and events and changes
and structures, are already pluralistically constructed.
is we who discredit our own attempts to gain knowledge by

rigidly confining ourselves to tightly circumscribed
domains.

We are always inventing anew our own frameworks

for how we think,

so our limits are at once nothing and

everything

7

It

All this rhapsodizing is simply to say that gossip
and

rumor don't just occur as isolated or isolatable phenomena.

While the prose of many gossipists (Rosenbaum and Subrin,
Bergmann) might suggest that gossip is still a highly

cloistered, clandestine activity

--

preselected subversive

cells scurrying off to safe spaces to trade dirt in their

own highly technical and impenetrable language

—

gossip as

it actually happens is simply one activity among countless

in a day.

Indeed,

gossip is so indistinct as an activity

that many people do not even tag it as an activity (or a

separate activity)

.

Therefore, it can hardly make sense to

study gossip as a narrow phenomenon that can only have

a

strictly defined content or relevance.

For such restraints

do not reflect how we live with gossip,

and as gossips,

every day.
To use Ranciere's language, then,

narrative of gossip as knowledge.

I

want to write a

In one sense my task is

similar to my predecessors in gossipology, who wrote

narratives of gossip as an anti-rational community-def iner
and -destroyer.

But in another sense,

substantively different

--

my narrative

our tasks are
(I

hope)

will show

my character of gossip being changed, interacting with other
well-developed, three-dimensional characters.

I

would read

the others' works on gossip as morality plays, where

characters are absent
(The Gossip,

--

the stage is populated by types

The Truth) who clash, misunderstand each other,

8

stay separate and opposed, and affect the audience only by

boring it or provoking moral qualms.

1.2

Outline of the Work
Some precision might now be in order.

The dissertation

consists of three chapters, the first two being critical
reviews of the extant literature on gossip and rumor, with a

particular consideration of theorists' views on gossip
epistemologically.

Chapter One reviews the social science

literature, Chapter Two the writings in the humanities.

divide the review chapters thus because

I

I

discovered, during

the course of my much less disciplinarily organized search

through gossip matter, that apparent similarities in field

training and convention led to roughly similar kinds of
assumptions authors made about their work.

To speak

plainly, social scientists tended to get bogged down by

methodology, producing ethnographies that demonstrate

empirical soundness coexistent with primitive, judgmental

notions of gossip.

The seventies revolution of thick-

descriptiveness in social science (revealing initial biases
and assumptions, so as to be able to construct

a

more

complicated portrait of the society or subculture one wishes
to present) seems for the most part to have escaped those

social scientists wishing to study gossip and rumor.

science studies of gossip tend to focus only on

a

Social

very few

types of conversation (explicit, condemnatory, backbiting
9

talk of others
'

genital or imbibative activity)

and their

,

studiers tend to advocate more and less explicitly for
the

regulation of, if not the outright censure of, gossip.

To

the extent that these writers consider gossip as

epistemically valuable, then, it is only as an object lesson
in falsity.

For their part, humanists tend to focus less on

methodology and more on narrative:

what are the stories

gossip tells, and more particularly, what are the stories we
tell about ourselves as we tell these gossip stories?

While

this approach promises more complication to gossip (the

practice becomes less singlemindedly about articulating
moral and social rules to each other, using those not

present as pawns)

,

the downside to this approach is that

gossip retains relevance as story only; humanists insist,
with depressing regularity, that gossip is essentially an
individual, or intimate community, activity, and has bearing
on the wider world only in the sense that every human has

versions of these communities.

This means, though, that the

matter of gossip becomes irrelevant; its function is purely
generic

(a

version of talk therapy)

.

Gossip may contain

epistemic truth, but so privately and particularly that it
surely cannot be a further interest.
I

certainly dispute these methodological assumptions

(and argue these assumptions as

though they are, and indeed

I

I

present them)

,

divergent

unite both chapters together

10

in at least one fashion -- virtually every
writer on gossip

and rumor (save the small circle of innovative writers
from

each discipline, presented at the end of each chapter)

mechanistically reproduces dictionary definitions of gossip
and rumor as valid tools for understanding their topics, and
in so doing drastically restrict the scope and import of

their analyses.

The work in Chapter Three,

then,

begins

with a presentation and defense of an alternative definition
of gossip,

as a way in which to open up our field of

consideration.

This definition becomes relevant when

I

consider issues in epistemology that encourage such an
attitude towards gossip; namely, that justified beliefs
still can have at least some independence from the

communities in which they occur.

chapter is to argue for

The primary goal of this

a more informal,

community-dependent

understanding of epistemology, and subsequently to
demonstrate how gossip contributes to such an informal
epistemology.

If gossip is more than simply negative,

necessarily false or distorted tittle-tattle about our
neighbors; if,

in other words,

gossip is

the informal conversation of friendship,

(as

I

argue)

simply

then traditional

understandings of epistemology, which rely on highly
formalized,

retrospective accountings of what certitude and

proof are may inaccurately represent how we actually go
about collecting knowledge.

11

.

I

see this realignment of epistemology through gossip

occurring in two ways

--

first,

the informal conversations

we have with friends are a playground for ideas; we
can

collect and combine intuitions, observations, analyses, more
randomly, more creatively, and more loosely than we do in
other, more rigid settings.

As such,

assemble analyses in a way that

a

gossip helps us

constantly retrospective

analytic epistemology cannot recognize or document.

Second,

these traditional understandings of epistemology miss

important preliminary stages of knowledge -gathering

--

where

we decide what we will not pursue in a field of hypotheses,

areas of interest, etc.

Gossip importantly helps us to rule

in and out some options,

in a unique fashion.

After this analysis,

I

then practically challenge my

predecessors' habits of writing about gossip and rumor as if
they are either necessarily wrong or necessarily irrelevant
by invoking gossip examples that illustrate knowledge

creation that are both demonstrably true and not bound by
tight community lines.

I

conclude by suggesting

applications of and further directions for this sort of
research
An important methodology note:

dissertation, as
substantial,

I

the bulk of this

indicated before, consists in

a

and often painstakingly close reading (perhaps

irritatingly so to readers) of theoretical and empirical
texts on gossip.

While

I

acknowledge the length of what
12

might seem to be only secondarily relevant material,
like to justify its inclusion for just a moment.

I

would

In the

first place, no really inclusive review of this literature

exists of which

I

am aware -- those scholars who as a matter

of course produce literature reviews while preparing
their

gossip or rumor monographs have tended to focus only on the
literature from within their disciplines.

Hence,

the more

strictly literary commentary is typically ignored by the
social scientists, and vice versa.

Despite their

di sc ipl inar i ly influenced differences,

think)

(I

there are many

important crossovers in these writers' approaches and

conclusions regarding gossip, and hence

I

important to have this material collected.

think it is
However, and

much more pointedly for me, in the course of my reading this
material

I

came to the realization that the vast majority of

writers on gossip and rumor seemed to have none but the most
unsophisticated, judgmental conceptions to their subjects,
and that indeed most of this literature really was not

deserving of future serious study.
serious

(not to say audacious)

I

realize that this is

scholarly claim to make, and

in wishing to make it as responsibly as possible,

I

attempted to provide as exhaustive argumentation as
how to support this contention.

have
I

know

Since in many cases

evidence of the sorts of bias, inappropriate inferences, or

circularity had to be teased out of several passages in
particular texts (or the aggregate of one long argument in
13

a

the text) rather than in one overt passage, both

presentation of material and criticism are substantial
endeavors.

1.3

I

apologize for my garrulousness.

One Final Mote
If my already-evident passion for gossip has limited my

ability to analyze and argue its nature and function in any
capacity, the following is the only limitation

regret (for any overenthusiast ic argument

I

I

genuinely

would defend as

a necessary counterweight to the overwhelming existence of

vituperative dismissals of chat)

:

that my genuine

irritation at simplistic and reductive analyses of gossip
has often left me incapable of appreciating, and more

importantly recalling to readers, the sheer pleasure of
gossip.

Speaking personally, while

I

definitely gossip in

part because it enables me to uncover facts, ideas,

speculations to which

I

might not in other arenas have

access, and because it permits a freer, more elaborate

analysis than many supposedly more "serious" channels
provide,

I

know that chief among its attractions for me is

the enjoyment it provides.

Gossiping is fun, because you

can talk about anything, in unrestrained fashion, at any
length.

you

It's fun because you can have fun doing it

be goofy.
can be playful, you can be explorative, you can

analyses of
One of the primary limitations of academic
aspect
gossip is that they so typically ignore this
14

of

gossip, or if they acknowledge it, by the very
structure of

academic writing, they make fun and gossip seem distantly
related, and certainly distant from the reader (recall
E.B

White

s

analogy of humor analysis to frog dissection)

is an appropriately "non- serious

this introduction,

"

note with which

I

.

This

close

in part because it recalls my opening

anecdote and subsequent remarks.

The purpose of juxtaposing

"serious", weighty academic reflection and "silly",

frothy

gossipy (womanly!) chatter here in part is to remind us of
just how unfairly these two terms are constantly and

absolutely juxtaposed; how having fun can be serious
(indeed,

may be the only way to be serious in some

situations)
I

.

I

regret that in my enthusiasm for my project

too have done less than

I

might otherwise have to repair

that deficiency in gossip analysis; my weakness as a gossip,
indeed,

is that

I

cannot gossip about academics in these

pages seriously enough.

15

s

.

CHAPTER

1

WHY GOSSIP IS ALMOST ALWAYS WRONG IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES
For almost a century, gossip has been one of the

measures by which social scientists gauge how well they
know
the societies they study

social psychologists,

1

Since one important task for

.

sociologists, and anthropologists

alike is to be able to understand the function of a society
(or one of its subsets)

as its inhabitants do,

having access

to and understanding the gossip of locals is incontestable

proof that the social scientists has established herself as
an insider -- that she knows the scoop.

As Max Gluckman

recognizes in his groundbreaking 1963 article, gossip is an
important component of social and community life

--

it is

crucial to maintaining cohesion in a community (308)

understand

a

community, you must understand its gossip.

Since Gluckman'

s

article,

consciously taken up with

a

social scientists have self-

vengeance the challenge of

understanding gossip in its social context 2

1

To

See Gluckman (1963)

.

Gluckman 's

for citations.

2

While social scientists have written about gossip or rumor or
included them in their work for most of this century, Gluckman is
the first to recognize gossip explicitly as a critical factor in
understanding how members of a society, or any of its subgroups,
To use a crude analogy, prior to
see themselves and each other.
Gluckman, gossip and rumor were relied-upon, if unacknowledged,
social scientific tactics. Gluckman s article "outs" the study of
gossip and rumor as necessary methodological tactics; Gluckman
article legitimates the (subsequently more open) usage of and
reliance upon more "informal" data collection through chat.
1

'
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article legitimizes the study of gossip.

Already

a

well-

respected anthropologist, Gluckman produced an
elegantly
written, creative essay that acknowledged what
should have
been transparently obvious to everyone.

Gluckman

lesson for his fellow ethnographers is simple:

'

s

object

if you are

trying to assess/record/document a group of people, the
less
intrusive and formal you are, the more complete your
knowledge.

So clearly,

not simply passive,

less formal talk

(e.g.

talk that is

artificial responding to survey

questions) encourages broader and more exhaustive knowledge
for the ethnographer; as Gluckman says,

the very blood and tissue of

Gluckman

'

s

essay,

in part,

"[gossip]

[community]

life"

is part of

(1963,

308)

encourages a breaking free of

reliance simply on survey techniques for doing social
anthropology,

in lieu of a more difficult

more productive)
conversation.
concludes,

(but ultimately

informal collection of informal

Collecting informal gossip, Gluckman

is critical for attaining more nuanced portraits

of societies,

because it is only through gossip that the

more ambiguous lines of social distinction can even be
perceived.

Without gossip, Gluckman suggests, we miss

critical social data, and our resulting social

interpretations are oversimplified (1963, 312-313).
While this proposal would seem liberatory and exciting,
the fact is that academic social science work has responded
The basic flaw of pre-

sluggishly to the suggestion.
17
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.

Geertzian social science

--

assuming the objectivity and

neutrality of the scientific observer, and his

(yes)

unimpaired ability to "read" correctly and fully any society
he chooses to enter

(phallic imagery fully intended, thanks)

flourishes unabated in the social science of gossip and
rumor.

The flaw of social science researchers' assuming

neutrality and objectivity, as Geertz so elegantly
demonstrates, is that it encourages a lack of selfref lexivity amongst its practitioners

(22-23)

In other

words, ethnographers rushing to study the now-acceptable

social factors of gossip and rumor do not pause to examine

their own assumptions and preconceptions, and to reflect

upon the ways in which those assumptions might be coloring
the data they collect

(causing them simply to miss things,

or draw only certain conclusions, or, more predictably,

draw conclusions that

[magically!]

match the initial

hypotheses with which they began their projects)

Certainly there is

a

to

3
.

range of the kinds of error

gossipists and rumorists make when examining their
While it is true that after The Interpretation of
Culture anthropological methodology changed both dramatically
and for the better, there are still clear holdovers within the
field (and more broadly within social science) who ignore
challenge and continue to study and write from their
Geertz
Harold Pepinsky
own assumed omnipotence and omniscience.
(1991) provides a useful debunking of one such broad lack of
Geertz himself
reflexivity, in the field of criminology.
provides a useful reminder that anthropologists' goals should
not be simply to examine all assumptions and preconceptions
(and therefore, implicitly, arrive at a truer omnipotence),
but that instead we should simply compare the interpretations
that ethnography necessarily produces.
3

'
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(admittedly unwieldy)

topics.

But with depressing

regularity, the social scientists whose work

I

analyze here,

with two exceptions, all produce one facet or another of
that pre-Geertzian methodology; that is, each in his or her

own way seems to have a

admittedly smaller than pre-

(n

Geertz) general list of

(social,

conversational,

interpersonal) qualities s/he looks for when researching
gossip; and this or that particularly society or substratum
is simply so much raw data to be processed by the magic

Anthropology Machine, and reproduced as one more
interchangeable analysis.
a

The researcher typically assumes

complete understanding of the nature of gossip.

process, though,

less clearly resembles genuinely productive

academic work than Calvin's

Transmogrif ier

--

The

(of

Calvin and Hobbes)

an empty cardboard box into which variant

amounts of imagination and expectation are piled, so as to
convert the simple box into an all-powerful transformative
tool

(Calvin's Transmogrif ier turns him into various fish,

fowl and beast regularly)

terminated only by the appearance

,

of one of Calvin's parents,

cutting short the fantasy and

resuming the infinitely less interesting (less malleable,
less spectacular)

reality.

So how exactly do these Bekins boxes of ethnographic

analysis (claiming grandiose analyses of the nature and
function of gossip while merely reproducing one ordinary
statement after another:

"gossip is mean,"

19

"gossip is

petty,

"gossip is manipulative")

f ^snsmogri

attain their

tying status; and how, correlat ively if less

pleasantly, do

I

see myself in the role of crabby parent to

these over imaginat ive

,

if underproductive social scientists?

Of the social scientists whose work is my primary focus

here,

I

see three rough groups of the degree and kind of

overdetermining generalization they perpetuate.
put,

Crudely

the extent to which each writer accepts the dictionary

definition of gossip or rumor as setting the appropriate
range limits to the information for which s/he will look,

is

the extent to which the gossipist in question produces

unreflexive and uninstructive analysis.

I

will divide this

crude observation into a typology with four possibilities.
The first comparison along one axis that defines that

approach social scientists use are these:

Do they see

gossip and rumor as primarily passive or active phenomena
(in other words,

do gossip and rumor simply reflect a

predefined reality or conception, or do they themselves help
us define how we see things)?

The second comparison traces

the writers that treat any kind of truth element, or even

relation to truth,

in gossip and rumor

(e.g.

does it simply

go unconsidered because they're clearly unrelated; does the

thinker consider gossip and rumor to function only to
distort or outright falsify truth conceptions?; or does the

20

thinker allow that gossip and rumor could sometimes
be
accurate?).

Let me illustrate 4

Passive

:

Truth

Falsity-

see footnote

1

4

Active

Gossipy
Voices

1.3

.

1 Social
Meteorologists

1.2

Spin Doctors

Let me note that these categories are ahistorical; in each

category writers from eras throughout the history of gossip
and rumor social science
present)

(roughly,

the 1920s through the

are represented.

My procedure is as follows;

I

will begin with the most

egregious (most antiquated, most generalizing) gossipists,
and work up to the most promising.

Meteorologists

,

First we have the Social

who are able to understand gossip only as an

entirely passive notion.

Gossip reflects social reality and

ranking for these writers; more particularly, gossip is only
One of the four possibilities is empty; that gossip, can
be both a purely passive phenomena and yet contain meaningful
My assumption is that writers cannot imagine
truth content.
In other
gossip in such a seemingly paradoxical context.
words, researchers are able to contradict the reputation of
gossip, but only minimally -- something so reputat ionally
suspect can either be manipulat ively truthful (truthful as an
or beyond manipulation
active object of construction)
It
(passive)
but only so because of intrinsic falsehood.
truthful.
cannot be both beyond manipulation and
4

,

,
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of interest indirectly

(i.e.

content tells us nothing.

its reflection of society);

Gossip is

take the temperature of a society.

a

its

device by which we

As such, gossip and

rumor have no real relation to truth or falsehood

--

their

interest or merit stems entirely from their status as social
products.

Amusingly enough, this most antiquated group

includes the most recent research.

Holding a more nuanced view of gossip and rumor are the

—Doctors

Spi- n

,

who regard gossip and rumor, ultimately, as

hermeneutic devices.

These writers grant gossip status as

both interesting and active, and they acknowledge that it's
not simply flatly wrong or malevolently destructive.

However,
--

value

they stop short of saying it has significant truth
for them,

gossip functions to interpret social

rules, values, norms.

This can mean disputing, adapting,

individualizing, rejecting, evaluating, or comparing often

important social rules; but ultimately, gossip becomes more
about managing information (e.g. manipulating it, distorting
it)

,

and so here too a

(subtler)

distinction between truth

and falsehood is maintained, with gossip and rumor

continuing to inhabit the wrong side of that distinction.
With most of the writers in each of these two categories,
observe the striking continuity of one particular metaphor
or allusion

poison

--

--

that of gossip and rumor as a kind of

invoked over and over again.

While it is true

that F.G. Bailey explicitly refers to gossip as "Gifts and
22

I

Poison

in his book of the same title,

remarkable that so many writers
citing Bailey
accurate,

--

it is nonetheless

many of whom without

return to this imagery as

if emphatic,

a

somehow

description of the trajectory and

method of gossip and rumor.
Finally,

scientists

and most intriguingly

(Sarah Elizabeth Miller

Steve Woolgar

[1978]

,

are the social

,

[1992]

Peter DeBenedittis

Gluckman of the 1963 article

5
)

,

Bruno Latour and

[1993]

,

and the Max

who manage both to accord

gossip power as an active entity, and to bestow upon it a

productive (if shadowy) relationship with the truth.
I

have some criticisms of each author,

I

While

still regard them

as clearly having the most creative approaches to gossip and

rumor in the social sciences.
One final note:
one,

I

in this chapter,

as in the following

consider the literature on gossip and rumor

integratively (theorists on each are to be found in every
section in this chapter)

This is not because

.

rumor and gossip are interchangeable terms

I

think that

(though they are

often used as such, and indeed, several of the writers here
use them interchangeably)

.

Rather,

I

do this mixing first

because the relevant literature often does not draw (or even

will make clear in part 3 of this chapter, the
reason I refer to "the" Max Gluckman here is because there are
two Max Gluckmans - sadly, the Max Gluckman who writes about
an
inspires
article
initial
1963
his
after
gossip
than
a
more
little
Man
is
academic spat within the pages of
Spin Doctor himself.
5

As

I
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.

notice)

.

sharp distinction between gossip and rumor.

a

The

fact that thinkers on rumor and gossip have in fact used

their terms interchangeably (and indeed, cite the

correlative works when writing their own studies; e.g.,
Bergmann's book on gossip cites Allport and Postman's book
on rumor)

,

I

think indicates an important conceptual

blurring that takes place in these fields

6
.

In short,

since both gossip and rumor are traditionally defined as
what they are not

(gossip

=

non-serious talk; rumor

=

propositions without evident justification) rather than what
they are, such derivative definitions lead to the conceptual
confusion.

Both are simply different species of non-truth

(assorted versions of "loose talk"); indeed,

scholars often

make the close relationship between the two explicit 7

clarity's sake here,
I

I

.

For

will try to make it explicit whenever

am referring to observations about rumor or gossip

(if

they seem to be used in an exclusive fashion)

There is a distinction to be drawn between gossip and
though I do not think it follows the standard lines
(differentiated by channel, degree of truthfulness, topic)
Chapter Three will discuss this
commentators observe.
distinction in greater detail.
6

rumor,

0ne easy example is in Brison's (1988) dissertation,
where she refers to " [rumor that is] allowed to circulate in
Clearly, gossip is the
the ambiguous realms of gossip" (146)
essential conversational channel carrying the content of
rumor
7

.
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1

.

1

Social Meteorologists

Despite their often painstakingly self-conscious
methodology, and their divergent foci within the general

subjects of rumor and gossip, what unites the social

scientists

I

think of as social meteorologists is their

fundamentally reductive attitude towards the topic when they
invest their time in it.

Ultimately, for these writers,

gossip and rumor can never be more than

phenomenon whose presence they mark.

a

simple social

Its meaning and

significance is transparently clear from the start
malicious,

false,

--

it is

distorting, and creates havoc among

otherwise peaceable people (for it is among these writers
that invocations of "poison" and viral imagery are most

common 8

)

Because their initial presuppositions about

.

gossip and rumor are so clear, and so diminished in
character, their analyses are similarly reductive and

diminished.

My task here will be to show how this is so.

Jorg Bergmann's Discreet Indiscretions:

The Social

Organization of Gossip (1993) is the most recent treatment
of gossip directly contrary to Gluckman's

(1963)

in terms

of an attempt to understand gossip and appreciate it on many

levels.

Indeed, Bergmann himself is unabashed about making

this attack on Gluckman part of his own project; he ignores

Gluckman's article until his final chapter, then presents
See Adkins (1996) for more detailed analysis of the
implications and conceptual looseness this metaphorical usage
represents
8
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what he sees as the decisive rebuttals of Gluckman's

approach to gossip.

Generally, my criticisms of Bergmann

boil down to this: the narrowness of his conception of
gossip, and his methodology, produce an uninformat ively

diminished analysis of gossip and its effect.
Bergmann'

s

Since

treatment embraces the work of earlier

scientific" studies,

I

will make it the major focus of my

treatment of the social meteorologists.
Discreet Indiscretions
is to justify gossip

.

Bergmann

(by demonstration)

'

overarching aim

s

as an object of

social analysis -- it is a social interaction like any
other,

and it has its own quirks and characteristics that

merit analysis (indeed, that have to be analyzed for the

notion of communication to make sense)

9
.

Bergmann seeks to

achieve a certain realignment of communication theory that
takes into account its disparate elements

In this

(31)

sense Bergmann would seem to be rather straightforwardly

following the direction of Gluckman (albeit in
--

field

Bergmann is a social psychologist)

.

a

different

However, while

Gluckman's essay recognizes that notions of social

organization must change to accommodate the content and
function of gossip, Bergmann thinks that gossip has to be

analyzed according to preexisting norms within the field of
communication; gossip must fit existing methodology.

He

0ne might wonder how Bergmann can consider gossip a form
communication like any other, given the value judgment
implicit in the title of his work.
9

of
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sees as his exciting breakthrough elevating gossip
to the

rationally analyzable terrain of social science

-

showing

how the irrational can be considered rationally (and all
of
its irrationality revealed)
a

.

see his breakthrough as not

I

breakthrough at all, but rather

a

stagnation

--

Bergmann

confines gossip (and communication) to the ever- rat ional

terrain of science, which fails to assess either
course,

science itself)

as a complicated,

(or,

of

not clearly

rational or irrational phenomenon.

Bergmann
Gluckman

'

s

's

attempt stands in clear contrast to

essay (which

I

will discuss in more detail in

section 3); for where Bergmann'

observations on methodology and

book is overloaded with

s

a

narrow confinement of work

to appropriately preordained bounds of social science,

Gluckman

1

s

short essay is a freewheeling,

creative analysis

of previous social science that is colored by Gluckman

observations, and Gluckman'

s

own experience.

'

s

own

Gluckman 's

frank subjectivity, which lends authenticity to his remarks,

suggests not only that Gluckman is alert to more (and more
variant)

details in his anthropological work, but ultimately

that Gluckman has a basic interest in writing about gossip
that Bergmann cannot honestly share.
as cattily as possible,

To phrase all of this

if the tone of Bergmann 's book is an

appropriate indicator, than apparently he himself has never

recognized any indulgence on his part in

27

a spot of gossip;

or if he has,

this book is either curious penance for his

transgression or an attempt at covering his tracks.
Bergmann's inability to adjust communication theory
to
reflect its subsumption of complicated social occurrences
such as gossip is reflected in his moralizing attitude

towards gossip, which he makes plain throughout the book.
To begin, Bergmann has a conceptual quarrel with Gluckman;
he doesn't like Gluckman s article because "instead of
'

acknowledging gossip's social disrepute as an empirical
feature and explaining it,

[Gluckman]

treats it as

a

scientific statement about gossip that needs to be
disproved"

(144)

.

Bergmann finds this disregard of such

a

"fact" about gossip irresponsible and distorting; he has

harsher words for Gluckman later, chastising Gluckman for
"overlook [ing]

the fact that gossip,

private affairs of others,

is,

morally disreputable practice"

since it repeats the

and in principle has to be
(145,

emphasis mine)

clear, when we juxtapose these two statements,

.

.

a

It is

that for

Bergmann the social disreputability of gossip isn't simply
an 'empirical'

feature of gossip that can't be disputed,

only explained; but that gossip's moral disreputability is
an essential characteristic of gossip that can only color

and inform treatments of it 10

The neutral language of the

.

10

The strict reliance upon dictionary definitions a
statement like this belies -- for gossip is commonly defined
"sensational," "tattling," "idle"
in dictionaries as
supports my earlier comment that the more closely writers
the more restrictive
cleave to dictionary definitions,
28

earlier statements is misleading

--

one can think of many

"empirical features" of a subject under study (for
example,
the hypothesis that only gay men contract AIDS)

,

the

explanation of which would be rather less critically
important to even pretending

a

knowledge of the subject than

Bergmann's opinion of gossip's disreputabil ity seems to
indicate about "empirical features"; in particular, given
that

empirical features" are often revealed to be somewhat

less than empirically true of their supposed objects,

as was

the case in the early 1980s when the phenomenon of "GRID" as
a

gay male disease was replaced with the (still partially

contentious)

theory of AIDS as

anyone is susceptible,

a

viral disease to which

this language is too strong.

Bergmann's slippery use of language here gives away an

ulterior agenda.

Notice how the "social" disreputability of

the first passage evolves into the much stronger, more

evocative "moral" disreputability of the second passage.
More pointedly, Bergmann's attempt to foist upon Gluckman an

unthinking admiration of gossip is simplistic

--

Gluckman

makes it quite clear, at several points in his article, that
he is well aware of gossip's socially insecure status
314,

315).

Morality aside, Gluckman

'

s

(308,

argument rests on the

contention that, while gossip may have one status overtly,
in actuality,

its function is quite different.

Why Bergmann

chooses to ignore this collection of complicated remarks in

analyes of gossip they produce.
29
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.

Gluckman's (brief) article goes unexplained.

But,

as the

rest of Bergmann's book amply demonstrates,
multi-layered

readings of events and texts seem anathema to Bergmann's

analytic style 11
Of course,

.

Bergmann makes

mul t iper spec t ival approach.
,

a

good show of endorsing a

His definitional starting

as he repeatedly reminds us,

its own terms."

its own terms?

is to take gossip "at

But what exactly is considering gossip on

For Bergmann, such a consideration seems

chiefly to consist of one thing

conceptions of gossip.

--

taking seriously everyday

This sounds good to start with

--

for how productive is a social science that entirely

functions to ignore or dispute the practices of the society
it claims to annotate?

Bergmann deals lengthily and

seriously with such everyday conceptions of gossip as its
status of social disrepute, and its status as the occupation
of women,

the elderly and the idle.

He also spends a fair

amount of time considering past social theories of gossip:
as a means of social control,

a

mechanism for preserving

social groups, and as a technique of information management.

“Bergmann's ultimately trivializing and dismissive
attitude towards gossip becomes clear when he describes the
nature of gossip (starting in his "Gossip Triad" chapter)
It s clear that he always thinks that there is a kind of
invasive nature to gossip, and that it's a kind of coldblooded, laissez-faire operation where the participants are
constantly dealing with each other for private benefits and
public disadvantage (43, 58, 66, 67, 68, 85, 126, 136-138).
Indeed,
the only good effect gossip can have, Bergmann
paradoxically claims, results from its illegitimate moral and
social status (153)
'
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His basic criticism of those theories is his
criticism of
those who created the theories; they don't consider

seriously (i.e. as also a thing to be studied) the
everyday
conceptions of gossip (16-17)
Clearly, taking what gossipers themselves think about

gossip seriously is

a

critical issue, and one that is often

neglected in social science studies.

Bergmann correctly

points out that not doing this is part of what perpetuates
the absolute split between theory on gossip and gossip

itself

--

you don't need the former to do the latter, and

the latter isn't really a critical part of the former

His task,

then,

(3-4).

is to improve science on gossip by bringing

the two together; by examining intuitions about gossip

carefully to understand why they are formed (and hence why
we think what we do about gossip)

.

Bergmann'

s

professed

task is something that may seem so admirable as to be self-

justifying

--

writing authentically useful science.

Unfortunately, while Bergmann admits that there are

differences in intuitions about gossip, he doesn't allow
that there might similarly be a pluralism in conceptions of

gossip (or more importantly, that the pluralism in
intuitions of gossip might extend to different kinds of
notions of gossip; i.e., not simply different particular

intuitions about gossip but more general disagreements about
what it means to gossip, or conceptions of gossip that do
not all cohere to one basic theme -- gossip is bad)
31
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In

.

other words, Bergmann avoids what would seem to be
a

book as methodology-obsessed as this

gossip,

--

a

crux of

actually defining

so that instances of it can be reocgnized by

scientific

means.

More particularly, he avoids

articulating his own everyday attitudes and conceptions of
gossip.

Such an absence might simply be seen as an attempt

to be a neutral scientific observer

(!)

;

but

I

think that

even if this is the apparent motive, the real effect is far
broader,

and skews his work far more extensively 12

To take these issues one by one:

.

Bergmann argues that

since we all have preconceived ideas about what gossip is,
we don't have to begin investigations of gossip with

definitions, because "empirically proven determinations"
(39)

of what gossip is will appear in the course of the data

collection.

And Bergmann'

s

point here is not only that

12

In particular, when we consider how Bergmann s text
rather transparently displays his unusually rigidly moralistic
and condescending attitudes towards gossip -- it is, in turn,
"a toy for adults" (2), "a completely broken relation with
moral rules and values" (146) a kind of hypocritical mania in
which its practitioners preach moral order but by gossiping
act chaotically
marked by coarse or obscene
(134-135),
language (101)
"morally contaminated" (99, emphasis in text)
akin to "radioactive" substances in that it can "pollute
anyone who reaches out for it unprotected" (91), storytelling
"without specific measures of care and neutralization" (73),
and ultimately, an unimportant part of our lives (6) -- the
likelihood that Bergmann s assumptions do in fact seriously
should seem
distort his data collection and analysis
inarguable. Ultimately, then, Bergmann s admonitions to "take
gossip on its own terms" must be highly suspect, for by these
slips of language in the text Bergmann reveals himself to be
writing from an outsider, non-gossiping perspective (who
therefore would have a difficult time figuring out what
gossip's "own terms" might be)
'

,

,

,

'

'
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empirical determinations will appear, but that they
will
actually replace and improve upon preconceived notions
(science will triumph over prejudice!)

What Bergmann is saying here is that how we define

gossip is irrelevant; that the only thing that matters is
the result we get when we apply our science to our

observations, at which point

a

rigorous,

gossip will become absolutely clear 13

.

sound definition of

This is a pleasant

and seductive point, but unfortunately Bergmann'

s

actual

work doesn't give it any legitimacy.

Bergmann

's

technique by which he proposes to determine

gossip's definition, manifestation and function empirically
begins with his criticism of the standard social scientific
tool of the variable grid -- the result of analyzing a

complicated social formation according to several factors or
variables, a graph of a social group.

grids are finite, Bergmann argues

--

Because variable
one can only analyze a

certain number of variables in any social analysis (when we
examine the UMASS student population to predict student
success we'll take into account family income, gender,
racial background, religious history, town of origin,

graduation rate, and

t

ime- to-degree

,

while ignoring family

educational background, extra-curricular activities, majors

13

This achievement, of course, would stand in sharp
contradistinction to much of the history of science, such as
Galileo's discovery of the orbits of the solar system; see
Feyerabend (1975) 121-125.
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[number of majors a student has throughout
his or her time
at UMASS]
class size, academic advisor)
-- the shape of
,

any variable grid will in part determine the
result.

Because only data that fits into the variable grid
will be
noticed [or noticeable]
Bergmann argues (16-17)
,

,

some

observations about the subject will naturally escape the
observer's notice.
This is why it is important to talk about

preconceptions so as to understand how the preconceptions
determine the final product 14

Bergmann makes this point

.

with regards to ethnographies, to demonstrate how

ethnographies are lacking in the ways in which they consider
gossip.

But Bergmann

this respect.

1

s

work itself seems lacking in exactly

To make this plain,

simply consider:

how do

you know where and in what fashion to apply your science to
gossip,
is

if you already don't have a pretty clear idea what

(and more importantly,

isn't)

When we look at

gossip?

the transcriptions of the gossip-conversations Bergmann

analyzes, his preconceptions become clear (gossip is always

personal,

its topics are traditional personal vices like

drinking,

infidelity, bankruptcy [46-47,

96,

102-103,

noting only

113-114,
a few

124-125,

127,

84-85,

131]).

87-88,

95-

He starts out by

everyday conceptions that are clearly

important to him (that gossipers are socially disreputable,
that gossipers are women and the idle)
14

This point, of course,

,

and lo and behold,

is drawn from Geertz.
34

his data
facts.

(transcriptions)

empirically reproduce those

By the conclusion of the book, he's still
trying to

talk about why gossip is socially disreputable

(i.e.,

he's

yet to examine whether or not gossip actually is
socially

disreputable)

,

and he's never really focused on gossip in

corporations, gossip by men, rich gossips, gossip in

governments or about governments, gossip by scientists,
gossip by priests, non-personal gossip, non-negative gossip,
etc.

(though he mentions a few of those possibilities in

theory,

his case analysis is always about people living in

housing projects, primarily women, carping about the
personal habits of others)

.

So the replacing of intuitive

preconceptions by hard data that he's talking about is empty
--

the only data Bergmann sees is the data that confirms his

preconceptions, the data that his own variable grid

magically produces.
Because of this, Bergmann

's

argument that actually

defining gossip at the beginning is irrelevant rings false.

Bergmann sets up the belief that hard science will in fact
be hard

(immovable, neutral, nonf alsif iable)

,

so that

prejudices are ultimately irrelevant because the data will
have their way.

In other words,

conceptual movement

he sets us up for a

(we start at the literal and conceptual

beginning, with crude belief -- we jump to the end, with

scientifically verified determinations)
occurs.

,

when none really

We do not need to define gossip because we only

35

.

hear conversation that fits neatly stereotypical
dictionary

definitions of the word.

As Bergmann would have it, we

still wouldn't believe anything different about gossip
than
we d already thought, we'd just believe it with more
force.
In one sense,

of course,

Bergmann presages his

conceptual non-movement when he talks more directly of

definitions 15 of gossip.

When Bergmann talks about

preconceptions of gossip, he's only talking about
reduced field of what gossip
about it are.

is,

a

very

and what preconceptions

As his dictionary definition of gossip makes

clear (he follows up that early dismissal of the need to

define gossip by tossing off

a

dictionary definition as

adequate enough for our purposes)

,

Bergmann only thinks of

gossip as "bits of news about others"

(39)

16
.

He adds a

few clarifications of that definition throughout his book,
but it's clear that for Bergmann, gossip is talking about

someone who isn't present, and talking about that person's
15

Throughout this chapter and the next, many of my
criticisms of many of the secondary sources I will cite here
will revolve around their unreflective adoption of what I
consider to be the uselessly judgmental, innacurately narrow
dictionary definition of gossip:
as negative, evaluative
conversation about some absent person's non-public behavior.
I would like to include as a general reminder over this entire
discussion of definitions that in Chapter Three I propose and
defend an alternative definition of gossip, which broadens its
scope without reducing the notion to complete nonsense.
"Others", of course, refers to people only -- the
possibility of gossip about institutions or buildings is
automatically ruled out (so when we speculate about the
reasons as to why Michael Hooker gives UMASS a grade of C+ we
can be gossiping about Hooker only, and have nothing to say
about UMASS?)
16

36

;

private life.

Of course,

reduced like that,

if the terrain of gossip is

it's more believable that Bergmann would

come to the conclusions that he does -- that gossip
is

something to be controlled, that only women and the idle
gossip,

that gossip can only be socially useful

(e.g.

reveal

social rankings) because of its continued dim moral position
(153)

.

In other words,

conclusion.

Bergmann

1

s

focus determines his

This is a point he never comes close to

noticing (even though he makes precisely this point about

Gluckman when he condemns Gluckman as
146]

)

a

functionalist

[145-

.

The reductiveness of Bergmann’

s

definition also makes

itself manifest when Bergmann gives his account of how

gossip happens. He reproduces
gossip

--

a

narrative conception of

someone tells a story, someone else appreciatively

listens and comments

(97)

in short,

a

completely one-sided,

individualist, non-meaningfully- interact ive relationship.

Even when Bergmann pretends that narration isn't the model
of gossip

(he says that there is a

metanarrative and

interpretation going on at the same time as the storytelling
[98]),

the roles are clearly divided -- the producer

provides the metanarrative and sets the tone for the
interpretation, the recipient merely listens and fills in
gaps.

This narrative approach cannot help but to restrict

the domain of gossip-activity to the content of the stories.

While perhaps one story may lead to another related one, and
37

.

hence an entire gossip-conversation may be larger
than the
sum of its individual stories (i.e., an entire
conversation

could be a summation of a particular person's character,
or
a

conflict between many people in

department or whatever)

,

a

town or academic

Bergmann only considers the

conversation in terms of the individual stories, and what
the stories were "about".

Utilizing such narrowly realist

literary techniques precludes the possibility of
tiultiplicity of meaning to gossip, or indeterminacy of

interpretation, or of agency to multiple actors.

simply can't hear multiple tales in

Bergmann

conversation, or

a

multiple tellers in one apparent tale.

Bergmann 's choice of communication theory methodology
sets him up for such reduced conceptions of gossip.
clear,

It's

from the amount of space and analysis he gives to the

subject of methodology and science, that Bergmann is very

concerned that his book and study have legitimacy

-

it's

important for Bergmann that his readers think that his

method is the best possible method for studying gossip
contrasted to, say, Gluckman's more carefree method).
reason why is a topic for later discussion.

(as

The

Right now I'll

discuss the ways in which Bergmann holds his own method
(gossip is a genre of communication)
the ways in which

I

in highest esteem,

and

think his method doesn't deserve such

esteem

38

;

a

..

.

Bergmann sees the theory of genres of communication
as
happy medium between the competing interests
in gossip

study.

For Bergmann,

the trouble with studying gossip (as

with studying communication as
science

--

a whole)

is that of social

trying to fit human patterns of behavior into

more rigid,

scientific patterns (variable grids)

of Gregory Bateson's metaphor of a dance

(26-28)

His use

.

well

expresses his faith in the communicative genre method as

productive compromise.

a

Bergmann begins his book

articulating rather neatly the conflict between the
universal and particular in theory (the conflict between

theory and subject, each of which bears no relation to the
other)

and the conflict between science and the social

grid that loses its subject, 3-4)
a

(the

Communicative genres are

compromise between rigid science and indiscriminate

particular observation because they contain both within
their frames.

Bergmann uses the metaphor of
nature of this compromise (26-28)
are structured,

,

dance to articulate the

Genres of communication

have a basic ordering (just as a dance has

steps to be learned,

and tempo)

a

is selected based on the music's style

but at the same time have freedom of

interpretation (music doesn't always determine that just one
dance must be danced
His metaphor of

a

--

every dance has its own variations)

dance frames my dissatisfaction perfectly.

Bergmann really likes to think of communicative genres as
39

--he likes

dances

to think that we can sort of figure
out

what's appropriate and inappropriate to say
all the time if
we just listen to the hum and watch (follow)
our

interlocutors
heels)

(do what they do,

Of course,

.

just backwards and on

he's aware of "spontaneous" dances, but

even these are turned into a genre, even these are
limited.

Bergmann's impossible desire to have it both ways
(unpredictable and yet categorizable

individualized while

!

perfectly transparent!) amounts to perennially adding
more dances to the list.

another genre 17

a few

Ultimately, then, gossip becomes

.

There are general reasons why gossip doesn't seem to

work as a genre of communication.

Gluckman

'

s

In the first place,

in

article, when he discusses professional gossip,

he astutely demonstrates that there are many times when the

boundary between technical, professional remarks and
personal gossip is impossible to draw (either during the

conversation or afterwards upon reflection, 309)

.

While

Bergmann's metaphor of a dance is perhaps more rigid than he
means it

(because it seems that only in the case where

someone wasn't doing a dance properly

.

moving the right way

to the right music, would we say that it was difficult to

say whether they were tangoing or waltzing or just shuffling
17

In short, Bergmann's attitude towards dance perfectly
replicates his attitude towards gossip; he presumes that it is
transparently previously clear whenever someone is or isn't
ignoring the obvious confusion present in our
dancing,
observations of what "dance" is, as in any social phenomenon.
40

around)

,

it

is still the case that Bergmann is
assuming a

uniformity and univocality to gossip

--

that all of its

manifestations must be markedly the same in terms of
form,
tone,

content,

categories)

.

(or at least divisible into broad

And indeed, when Bergmann gets into the

detail of how gossip happens further along in the book
100)

(80

-

we see that he in fact is making exactly those

,

assumptions.

By his narrative construction, there is an

invitation to gossip, then the gossip happens via

a story,

a

story-teller, an appreciative listener, and finally

evaluation and condemnation of the subject by the gossipers.
As the selection of Bergmann'
of intuitions,

s

conversations, his evaluation

and his theory of gossip demonstrates,

Bergmann can only see gossip happening in one particular
And it is only if one can ascribe this kind of

way.

homogeneity to gossip that using genres of communication to
confine and discuss gossip makes sense.
gossip,

it seems to me,

And this notion of

surpasses simple homogeneity, and

approaches simple, useless tautology.
To his credit, Bergmann does make some attempt to give

some play to his notion of gossip.

He sums up his self-

defense by saying that we can't overcategorize gossip (and
18

While Bergmann himself stoutly denies such a possibility
(genres are not "'merely' heuristically relevant conceptual
construction of the scientists' but empirically effective
orientational and productive models of everyday communication"
his actual use of the notion of genres, as fixing the
[28]
details of how gossip happens rather than simply "orienting"
our observations, belies this notion.
)

,

41

that the concept of communicative genres is
not such an

overcategorization), because ultimately we theorists
aren't
in control of the categories (the actors control
the

categories and their contents [29]).

But if that's true,

why then does he start with the (over categorization
)

;

why

not just present the goods and let the categories and
their

actors 'empirically determine' themselves?

As becomes

apparent later, when he describes the moments of a gossip-

conversation (80-81), Bergmann's notion of "actor agency" is
sharply limited

--

he will recognize variance only in the

small details of the predetermined subject

(in the gossip-

conversation, he recognizes that different participants can
start or finish a gossip-conversation, but its fundamental

path remains static)

.

Bergmann's commitment to the tenets

of the scientific method seem very much provisional,

tactical,

for decorative purposes only 19

.

Several conclusions Bergmann reaches in this study are

oddly shaped by his methodology.

One interpretative task

is to explain the everyday conception of gossip,

to which only women gossip.

according

Bergmann employs some truly

wacky etymology to explain that women have been labelled as
gossips for a long time.

In brief,

original German word for gossip,

19

the theory is that the

"klatz", was originally an

In short, Bergmann's apparent "play" shows only the
retention of his model -- "adjustments" are made for odd
cases, otherwise gossip is a straightforward and noncomplex
social issue.
42

,

interjection that was the sound of the crack of

a

whip or a

slap; and that this word carried with it the
connotations of
a wet

stain (62-63).

Bergmann's creative conclusion from

this is that "klatz" invokes up a scene of washerwomen
doing

their chores, and gossiping during the process.

"The

washing place is symbolic birth place of (female) gossip,"

Bergmann concludes 63
(

)

.

Bergmann is pleased with his

linguistic reconstruction of the word, because he suggests
that this gives some substantive evidence for why it is

women have been labelled the gossiping sex, rather than the
label simply being "empty" or "analytically obtuse"

(63)

.

His contention is clearly that once we know why and how

women got this defamatory label, we can freely reject it
(61)

But Bergmann actually moves in a different direction.

.

More trivially,

in the presentation of the etymology

itself, Bergmann misses an obvious point 20

klatsching historically (71-74)

.

He presents

developing as a female

response to the overwhelmingly male coffeehouses of the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

While Bergmann is

quick to ascribe dramatically serious purposes to the coffee
houses

("

function [ing] primarily as places of business

...centers of communication in early bourgeois economic and

20

Of course, Bergmann misses several obvious points here,
not the least being that his etymological explanation doesn't
account for why women are castigated as gossips in non-German
where the roots of gossip are
languages (notably English)
both not clearly gendered as distinct from the roots of the
His explanation cannot be accurate.
German klatsch.
,

43

cultural history ... serv [ing]

the editors of the London moral

weeklies as editorial locations and... business
addresses
.

.

.

exercis [ing]

no small influence on literature"

[72]

)

their female counterparts get dismissive, and quick

treatment as centers of gossip talk only.

Indeed,

Bergmann

chiefly characterizes them as "the butt of men's jokes"
(ibid)

.

Now,

while it is certainly true that serious

business did (and does) get conducted in coffeehouses and
bars,

it is nothing short of disingenuous not even to

su 99 es t that non- " serious " activities like gossiping also

occurred,

to say nothing of the possibility that business

sometimes 4s gossiping.

Bergmann 's description suggests

that coffeehouses weren't so much sites of socializing as

early business guilds, or oral newspapers.

Indeed,

as

Mickey Hellyer's dissertation makes clear (see Chapter Two),
even august personages like Benjamin Franklin, engaged in
serious tavern business like adult education, were wont to
do little else with their "purposive" bar time than gossip.

Bergmann 's initial, moralizing prejudices against gossip,
then, produce this incomplete reading of gossip,

and

reproduce the assumption (if displacing it to an earlier

historical moment) that indeed, only women really do gossip.
More broadly,

the etymology gets applied when Bergmann

makes it clear that the reason why women (and old people,
and working-class people) get saddled with the pejorative of
"gossips" is that gossiping is
44

(was)

done by the working

.

classes, by the

classes

(female)

(their masters)

.

domestic servants, about the upper
The whole scenario is remindful of

his treatment of celebrity gossip
of envy,

adoration, resentment

(we do it out of a

[51]

)

--

mixture

his examples and

description make that clear.

This is a condescending,

reductive treatment of gossip

--

reasons,

it's done for shallow

it's done from resentment,

lower-class people do it

about upper-class people, and certainly never the other way

around
gossip,

.

Again,

it suggests a reductive univocality about

and a pretty negative univocality at that.

We

gossip to express our base lower natures, and clearly only
certain of us

(the poor,

women,

the unemployed,

need to express those lower natures
(rich active men)

—

rich,

the elderly)

active people

lead too interesting lives to be able or

interested to waste time nattering.
Of course,

it could be that Bergmann is simply raising

this specter as a vision of the past
is the myth about gossip

—

in other words,

this

(these are the presuppositions that

arise out of those old, outdated intuitions we all have
about gossip)

,

to which he will now contrast the clearer

reality (everybody gossips, regardless of class position,
employment, gender, activity level, etc.).
before,

As

I

said

this is an ineffective tactic in the first place,

because its historical siting of gossip as a female, lower21

Indeed, at one point Bergmann quite explicitly says that
gossip between "superiors and subordinates, namely, between
persons of unequal rank, is generally rare" (68)
45

class activity still carries with it stigma

(since class

boundaries exist, and many women still do in
fact launder
clothes)

But more unfortunately,

.

to dispel this cliche as a cliche

if he ultimately wishes
(as

something with no

claims to accuracy) he certainly doesn't do it
in this book,
because he doesn't give us one reason (theoretical
or

empirical)

to believe why anyone other than women,

unemployed, old folks,

the

and working-class folk gossip.

He

doesn't show us or talk to us about upper-class gossip
(whether or not they do it and what characterizes their

gossip).

Aside from the fact that he's also clearly

suggesting that gossip can be typified in a really broad way
(you gossip and thus you reveal your social,

position)

,

class or gender

remember again the cliched gossip transcriptions

Bergmann presents us with, women in project apartments
sifting through neighbors' carnal and venal sins.

In other

words, Bergmann doesn't show us rich or occupationally

successful people, or many male people, engaged either in
these

(or other)

other)

kinds of behaviors, discussing these (or

kinds of behaviors.

So his evidence presupposes the

conclusion he never has to make explicit
idle,

--

that women,

the

the elderly really do gossip more than other folks.

Indeed,

Bergmann closes the chapter with the limp

statement that women are simply characterized as gossiping
more because structurally they fall into the positions seen
as gossip-producers more than men

46

(67)

--

here he's talking

.

about the kinds of jobs women often hold
(i.e., domestics,
launderers, secretaries, child care)
But even this
.

conclusion simply reinforces the outdated intuition,
regardless if via a different justification.
first conclusion of Bergmann

conceptual movement
minimal

--

'

s

So,

as this

makes clear, his interest in

(let the facts present themselves!)

is

both his methodology and his prose serve only to

reinforce churlish privately muttered but perhaps more

widely held stereotypes
After having contended that only certain kinds of folks
gossip, now Bergmann moves on to conclude that only certain

kinds of situations lend themselves to gossip.

Bergmann

introduces the continuum between active and inactive gossip
--

(71-80)

active gossip is klat schincr

.

where gossip is the

activity, and inactive gossip is diversionary gossip, where

you're gossiping to pass the time on the way to something
else

[class,

work,

appointments]).

Of course,

given his

attitude and tone towards gossip earlier in this book, it's

surprising that he didn't align terms to type oppositely.
The fact that inactive gossip is also characterized as

"diversionary" should alone make this point clear

--

Bergmann really doesn't think diversionary gossip has

a

point other than the diversion itself, filling up "empty"
time

(75)

Bergmann

'

.

s

And the entire continuum is overshadowed by
assumption of the social disreputability of

gossip (and how that is

a

thing not to be questioned)

.

.

.

s

,

Gossip at work, which Bergmann considers as
different from
diversionary gossip but really isn't (the only
difference is
that it's intentionally diversionary gossip -you could be
doing other things but you're choosing not to),
is discussed
as the most surreptitious kind of gossip -Bergmann

suggests an entire complicated set of behaviors by which
work gossipers gossip so as to appear to be just about to,
just finished with, or in the middle of work 22

.

So both

hslvGs of the continuum are tainted by the notion that

gossiping is something not to be done, to be castigated.
Bergmann

'

s

only attempt at being slightly less than rigid is

when he says that sometimes particular conversations can be
active or inactive

(76),

but this qualifier hardly does much

to alter the context of his analysis.

Again,

I

think it is a plausible thesis that Bergmann'

overarching presupposition of the social and moral

disreputability of gossip produces this restrictive
analysis.

Bergmann lists elaborate sets of behaviors as the

only protection workers have against lavish punishments for
their sloth (e.g., gossiping while standing, holding files,
etc.

[77-78]

)

But

I

think the issue to consider here is

why are workers punished?

Is it because

22

(as

Bergmann

0f course,
a
reasonable alternative hypothesis is
presented by Gluckman (1963) that the working gossipers quite
well might be working by gossiping (obvious examples: Walter
Winchell,
Hedda Hopper),
but such a simple thesis is
inconceivable to Bergmann, who not only ignores such a
possibility, but replaces it with a more elaborate, socialsciencey argument
48

.

.

suggests)

they are doing something socially disreputable?

He analogizes gossip to drunkenness as a
means of

demonstrating precisely this point (77-78)

;

he argues that

drunkenness is only acceptable at work under certain
conditions (winning lottery, birth of a child)

,

because

otherwise it's seen as social disreputabil ity
As before with the dance metaphor,

I

think he picked

exactly the analogy that refutes his point.

Bosses don't

care if you're drunk at work because it's socially

disreputable

(notice that Bergmann never gives us a reason

for why it is that bosses only care about drunkenness

sometimes because of social disreputability)

--

they care

because it makes you less productive (you're less profitable
for them)

.

If you can hide your drunkenness,

if you can get

your work done, they don't care about drinking.

I'm sure

anyone reading this piece can think of many functional
drunks, who are able to get through most workdays with

steady drinking or excessive lunchtime drinking.

Those

unable to recall functional drunks should recall the John

Tower confirmation episode, or the aborted Thomas Eagleton

Vice-Presidential nomination 23

.

The point here is not that

simply Tower and Eagleton eventually lost their political
plums because of fear of public disapprobation, but that

[as

testimony and public record around each episode makes clear]

23

Cf

.

White,

chapter

for

8,

episode
49

a

full

account

of

this

their respective indulgences were transparently
obvious to
their coworkers, constituents, for years before
the

respective contretemps.

Indeed,

the retracted political

prizes were initially offered precisely because of
each

politico's spectacular success at functioning despite what
according to Bergmann would be

a

debilitating weakness.

Even the gestures towards disguising or minimizing the

drinking (e.g. only drinking at lunch at restaurants away
from the worksite, or drinking in a private location at
work)

don't make the drunkenness any less apparent

--

astute

observers can read the signals of regular secretive
behavior.

Most functional drunks are in no threat of losing

their position, precisely because they can still do the work

they are expected to do.

gossip

--

The same corollary follows with

employers don't care about gossip if it means you

can still get your work done and it doesn't interfere with

your performance in other ways (i.e., if it doesn't foment
your anger at your job).

Lots of 'socially disreputable'

things are easily tolerated in workplaces

manipulation, certain kinds of drug use)

(lying,
--

don't hinder productivity (and in some cases

stocks is the obvious recent example]
are

[perhaps only tacitly]

constraining,

if not more so.

because they
[trading in

clearly help it, and

encouraged)

so clearly not social disreputability

cheating,

,

.

Productivity, and
is at least as

Owners, bosses, and managers

are not in the business of making business decisions rest on

50

moral judgements

--

unless, of course,

those moral

judgements happen to coincide with increased
business or
better public relations.
In other words, to return to the
Tower /Eagle ton examples, had Congress confirmed
Tower or the

Democratic party supported the Eagleton nomination,
certain
business fallout -- unseating of incumbents, calls for
reductions in Department of Defense budgets
been probable.

Clearly,

--

would have

if morality were the real issue,

with such widespread knowledge of each's habits prior to the
icts

,

neither Tower nor Eagleton should have been put

forth in the first place; and indeed, their political

careers should have been aborted at much earlier points in
time.

Of course,

Bergmann ignores this fact in lieu of

making grand moral statements like: "gossip is viewed as
sociable inactivity and is therefore incompatible with work"
(

77

)

.

I

suspect that part of the reason Bergmann makes

a

case

for gossip being socially disreputable is because he is

still fascinated with the phenomenon of gossip on

voyeuristic level 24
a

.

a

Bergmann wants to think of gossip as

clandestine, subversive activity that depends on

secretive, private networks of trusted compatriots trading

24

More evidence supporting the thesis that Bergmann is
either a voyeuristic gossip-phobe or an ashamed, secretive
gossip seeking to repress his vicious past.
51

secrets no one would dare express in public 25

I

,

think a

moment of reflection on the nature of gossip
easily

demonstrates that it is far from having such
character currently.

a

clandestine

Bergmann makes his covert attitudes

overt when he distinguishes between gossip and
rumor

mam

--

the

distinction for Bergmann is that rumor doesn't depend

on preexisting networks of trusted interlocutors

spread or receive a rumor)
this notion, again,

,

whereas gossip does

is outdated.

(anyone can
(70)

.

But

Gossiping doesn't require

significantly greater levels of trust and intimacy than
rumor.

Granted,

in an Enlightenment world,

where physical

appearances and statements were considered to be eminently
confirmable or falsifiable, and where there was

a truth to

be known, making verboten connections and thinking in an

unseemly way did require trust and intimacy (why else was
gossiping evidence for the practice of witchcraft?
16]

)

In that world,

.

[Bergmann

gossip is a frontal attack on

rationality and logic.

But in a century where the theories

with most common purchase revolve around perspective
(relativism, pragmatism, existentialism, postmodernism)

there are no stakes

(sic!)

in gossiping.

25

,

You don't

Hence his fascination with the cof f eeklatsch itself;
which he describes as unique because, unlike other social
settings, "gossip occurs here within the context of -- we
could also say under the cover of -- socially accepted
sociability" (74)
In other words, klatsching is interesting
to Bergmann (not simply because it's a world he clearly
couldn't enter but) because its practitioners courageously
defy the sure-to-be-applied label of moral disapprobation;
klatsching is gossip uncloseted.
.
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s

.

challenge anything epistemologically,

;

(Everyone but the

professional philosophers knows that you can't
believe
everything you hear or read.)
That's why now

you can gossip

with relative strangers, and in relative comfort.

Indeed,

the clear collapse of the public-private
distinction in

journalism

which was certainly apparent as Bergmann

,

wrote his monograph, is fair testimony to the only

increasing legitimacy of gossip.

Bergmann views his own work as
earlier scientific works on gossip 27

a
,

drastic improvement on

because he is the

only scientific researcher willing to consider gossip "on
its own terms"

(a

claim he frequently repeats)

general conclusion about Bergmann

'

s

.

However, my

book is that when an

approach to gossip as careful, self-conscious and extensive
as Bergmann

'

s

nonetheless still ignores many basic aspects

of gossip and rumor,

and when the methodological departure

from its prior studies such a work promises not only fails
to emerge,

but indeed,

reproduces stale old chestnuts for

conclusions, then perhaps it is time for gossipists to look
for new approaches to analyzing gossip.
is not,

Perhaps the problem

as Bergmann repeatedly reminds us,

that only some

26

A few examples of this are Signorile (1993)
the
Harper
forum (1986); cable channel El's "Gossip Show,"
broadcast daily; and the thriving of gossip magazines and
newspapers in this country and in Europe (Meiser [1995]
;

'

)

27

Some of those he speaks disparagingly about that are
relevant here include not only Gluckman but Haviland (1977)
Shibutani (1966); Goffman (1963); Lumley (1925); Philadelphia
Institute for the Study of Human Relations (1958).
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.

scientists are considering gossip on its
own terms, but
rather that social science as we think
of it actually
prohibits a consideration of gossip on its
own terms.
It is important to document the ways
in which less

tightly academic analyses of gossip perpetuate
the same
straitened analysis.
While Deborah Tannen s You

Just Don't

'

U nderstand

(1990)

is

(unlike Bergmann)

not centrally

focussed on gossip, the approach she uses to consider
gossip
as one of the many indicators of gender differences
in
language is revealing.

Tannen makes many of the same

definitional assumptions Bergmann does when theorizing about
gossip.

For Tannen, gossip is simply (and again)

reporting

on an absent third party's personal life; and it is

something only (or primarily) women do (96-97)
then,

Tannen,

is also writing from a univocality of perspective on

gossip (only recognizing

a

very few things to be gossip or

particular people as gossips)

;

her univocality differs from

Bergmann in its gender-specificity.
For those unfamiliar with Tannen

'

s

book,

she argues

that American women and men are raised differently

--

that

as boys and girls we learn different means and values of

communication, and that this split continues through

adulthood
language.

argument

--

men and women simply don't speak the same

My quarrel here is not with the book's overall
(though

I

think that argument more generally

restates the criticisms

I

make in this section)
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.

More

.

.

particularly, Tannen

'

s

,

,

assumption of gossip as something

gals do that boys just can't understand
strikes me as
naively overgeneralizing.

Tannen believes that gossip is something girls
learn

very young.

While boys are off roughhousing and playing

games, girls sit in each others'

rooms and just talk; that

is an acceptable play activity for girls that
boys must

repudiate

Like Bergmann, Tannen is making an

(80)

assumption about the simplicity and univocality of human
behavior here
rooms,

--

she is assuming that when girls talk in

that they are only talking (and that they are only

talking about the content of their talk)

,

and she similarly

assumes that when boys play games, they are only playing
games and not communicating (indeed gossiping) on some other
level)

.

When boys

(and later men)

do talk,

is about topics like sports and politics,

or talk to impress,

inform, or persuade

Tannen avers, it

and

'

report -talk

Tannen (like

(85)

Bergmann)

ignores the argument that talk about sports and

politics,

that talk about non-personal issues,

(can be personal,

'

can be gossip

among other things); and correlatively

that apparently "personal" gossip can also be about

impersonal topics, or have layers of meaning that extend

beyond the individuals in question.

For Tannen,

conversation is either good (expressive, intimate, revealing
=

feminine)

masculine)

.

or bad (non-expressive

,

impersonal,

Her locution makes it clear
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(83,

combative

84,

91)

that

=

.

women are naturally more expressive than
men, that they are
expressive because they talk clearly and
directly about
themselves and their personal lives, and that
this is the
ideal both sexes should strive for in their
conversation.

Tannen grounds her sociolinguist ic program in

series

a

of dichotomies about conversation that are
based on her

reduced notion of what gossip is and who does it.
Tannen,

bad

(

gossip is either good

talking-against

[96]

)

(

talking-about

,

For

intimate)

or

Any particular item of gossip

can be either one or the other, but never both at once.

Intimate gossip is valued over non-intimate gossip on many
levels.

Not only is intimate gossip better than morally

disreputable talking-against, it is also clearly valued over
political gossip (which isn't really gossip in any

interesting way for Tannen [101]

)

.

Men only gossip about

politics with each other, and cannot gossip about personal
lives.

private,

Tannen maintains this split between public and
intimate and impersonal, even in the face of

counterexample.

When she acknowledges that public and

private get blended, that news and government reports are

becoming gossipier, she argues that this is only about style
("off the cuff,"

"informal"), not substance

(105).

Remarks

are "made to seem" gossipy; the implication here is clearly
that news can never really be gossip, because it's not about
the right subjects

(it's not personal,
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it's about "big"

.

issues

--

objective, universal topics that affect all
of us

directly)

While much of Tannen

'

s

chapter on gossip is simply

advice for men and women on different strategies
to come to
conversational detente with each other (in essence, she's

suggesting that men need to learn how to gossip more, and
that women need to learn to do 'report-talk' more

her concept is subsumptive.

I

like Tannen

'

s

[121]),

advocacy of

gossip here, but it's done for the wrong reasons.

Women

nee d strategically to learn about assertiveness, but men

need to adopt feminine values of intimacy and
connectiveness, and gossip (the right kind of gossip) is the
tool with which to do this

.

Since gossip is simply a

component of her argument, and not the argument itself, it
is impossible to tell how

(or why)

she maintains the

assumptions towards gossip that she does.

Suffice it to say

that she, again like Bergmann, restricts her notion of

gossip

(it

is either good or bad,

topics only,

it must be about certain

it can only be between individuals and have

relevance in interpersonal relations, only women do

it)

,

ultimately to restrict the applicability or interest of her
analysis; while gossip can be "appropriated" by men,

inherently it remains

a tool

for women,

for essentially

private purposes.
Even when writers on gossip and rumor expand the realm
of their analysis from the strictly personal to structurally
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.

.

.

.

political, their analyses do not correlat ively expand
in

insight or sophistication.
R ace and Riots

(1975)

,

Terry Ann Knopf,

in her Rumors

very much writes about rumors as

political entities, exceedingly charged political

manifestations that can help signal the onset of race riots,
or civil disorder

(153).

But more broadly, whereas Tannen

is enough of a social constructivist to argue that at least

some facets of gossip are malleable
to gossip too)

,

Knopf depicts

(e.g.

,

men can learn how

rumor as an even more

immutable social occurrence
Knopf's project is very narrowly defined; she's trying
to determine why it is that racial riots are so frequently

precipitated or accompanied by rumors; in particular, she's
concentrating on race riots occurring in the United States
in this century only

(19)

.

Knopf rejects the previous

theories of rumor occurrence, as either too individualistic
(13),

or so generally socially determining that they fail to

explain the uniqueness of rumor formation
rumors about civil disorders (86-90)

--

in particular,

The model Knopf

eventually constructs combines structural factors, local
causes,

and some psychological theory, to explain why and

how race rumors can occur (107-109)
The complexity of Knopf

'

s

model stands at odds with the

narrowness of her treatment of rumor.

To her credit, Knopf

acknowledges the limitations of rumor study.
accepts that standard definition of rumor
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(a

While she

proposition

.

.

without sufficient evidential proof

[

1

]

)

,

she acknowledges

that it's difficult to study rumors in part because
only

those rumors that are false tend to be documented or

remembered as rumors; rumors that turn out to be true are

documented simply as fact
throughout Knopf

'

s

But unfortunately,

(62)

study the stain of rumors as necessarily

false and counterproductive social ills remains 28

.

Knopf,

by very legitimately trying to de-emphasize the all-

determining power of rumors she sees in the contemporary
social science literature

(she energetically argues against

the naively empirical belief that by refuting the rumor you

solve the social problem 29
this task

--

)

,

by my reading goes too far in

rumors simply become one of a host of blips on

our social screen, to be read accordingly.
To explain in more detail, Knopf's model presents two

kinds of features that pave the way for racial disorders:

28

Because
this
argument
has
been
so
exhaustively
demonstrated in my discussion of Bergmann,
I
will not
elaborate on it here. Suffice it to say that Knopf's language
throughout her book (rumors are associated with lynching
because both rely on assumptions of belief rather than strict
standards of proof [19] rumors are defined as the proof stage
for [generally false and hostile] beliefs [158-159; rumors
increase polarization while strengthening solidarity "in a
negative sort of way" [164]
combined with her lack of
particular analysis of the concept of rumor, justifies a
negative
and
of
her
as
presupposing
a
reading
counterproductive image of rumor.
;

)

,

29

Knopf names the Philadelphia Institute study and
I disagree with her placing
Shibutani as two of her examples
accept her
camp,
this
but otherwise
Shibutani
in
of
who
study the
within
those
characterization of this tendency
gossip)
(and
indeed,
social phenomenon of rumor
.
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larger,

changes,
[146]

)

,

structural characteristics (e.g. demographic

ideology changes, urbanization, industrialization
and immediate circumstances

can touch off conflagrations

[150]).

(local incidents that
In this model,

rumor

acts as kind of a shuttle -- it can simply
act itself as an
immediate circumstance (a particular rumor about
a

particular local incident), or it can represent or make
particular general ideological convictions (Knopf observes
patterns to rumors people spin around racial incidents,
having to do with continually held stereotypes [119-130,
134-142]).

Additionally, Knopf is critiquing the literature

on rumor, which defines it either as a strictly individual
or social problem -- the roots of rumors, particularly race

rumors,

remarks,

Knopf argues, are manifold.
"

[community]

[rumors]

Ultimately, Knopf

are an extension as well as expression of

conflicts"

(243)

But the problem this

.

argumentation raises is that if one phenomenon called
"rumor" arises in all sorts of kinds of situations, has

different kinds of origins, and functions in opposing ways,
then the explanation of and description of that phenomenon
must account for those myriad characteristics.

To simply

point to a wide variety of explanations, theories,
phenomena, and say "look,

there's rumor," while appealing

only to the most general of definitions, brings us no closer
to an understanding of what rumor is,

and why and how it

functions in the complicated, seemingly contradictory ways
60

.

it does

In other words,

Knopf sheds no light on the issue

of why rumors in particular are one of the many
signals of

racial unrest

--

indeed,

an almost inevitable one.

Witness Knopf's language:

"

[rumors are]

one of a

number of determinants which enhance the prospects for
collective outburst"

a

rumors are often simply

(153),

crystallization of already-held hostile beliefs, or the
last straws" before violence

(151,

153,

154)

,

"rumor closes

the gap between a hostile belief and its embodiment as a
'fact'"

(159).

While it's true that at least technically,

these lines refer to rumor as an active phenomenon (no

passive verb voice here)

,

the fact remains that using

analogues like "crystallization" and "last straws" suggests
that rumors are significant for Knopf less because of what

they actually do (in other words, how they change or make

manifest violence that was simply imminent previously)
for what they represent.

,

than

More particularly, this usage of

"crystallization" connotes a kind of inevitability or

overdetermination to rumors
prevented.

Rumors are one

imminent political crisis

--

they cannot be controlled or

(perhaps the last)
(a

sign of

riot); where a rumor occurs,

riot is a serious possible consequence.

Rumors are less

a
a

phenomenon to be understood, than one simply to be marked,
noted,
It

and countered.
is because rumors are such a passive phenomenon that

the policy recommendations with which Knopf ends her study
61

seem to have so little to do with rumor itself;
the

recommendations are all about avoiding the consequence
of
rumor:

riots.

Knopf's lack of real analysis of the concept

of rumor means that ultimately,

she doesn't have a lot to

say about it in lieu of what she determines as the "real"

determinants of riots.

Knopf sees race riots in the first

place as endable only through real, material, structural

changes in society (e.g. a more egalitarian distribution of
wealth,

housing, educational opportunities); barring that,

her self -described provisional solutions all have to do with

broadening accountability of public offices to the
community, and increasing communication between officials

and the public on a day-to-day, non-crisis basis.

While her recommendations in general seem responsible
and reasonable, one irony presents itself.

Knopf concludes

her book by addressing the brief phenomenon of "Centers for

Rumor Control"

(CRCs,

public crisis hotlines for people to

report in rumors and check on their verification/

disconf irmation)

.

While CRCs enjoyed a brief vogue after

World War II and longlasting good press (307-308), Knopf
subjects them to some strong criticism, arguing that the

problems rumor signify are too big for CRCs to be
solution (311-312)

30
.

"They [CRCs]

30

a real

not only treat rumors

It's worth noting here that CRCs, when used by smaller
groups for their members only (for example, the Crips and the
My
Bloods gangs in Los Angeles), have met with success.
thanks to Bob Ackermann for pointing this out.
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as an isolated,

problem,

they treat it as the problem, with

rumor control as the solution," Knopf claims
course,

(308)

.

Of

in her rush to prove that rumors are not only
not

the problem but play only the smallest of roles
in the

problem, Knopf amply demonstrates that rumors really
aren't

her topic at all.

In other words,

exactly why she makes fun

of CRCs is because of the accompanying naive empiricism
with

which they began.

Just get the right facts out to folks, so

the thinking proceeds,

Truth,

and cease and desist any and all unlawful behavior.

But of course,
that,

and they can't help but recognize The

Knopf responds, rumors just don't work like

and more broadly, people don't work like that.

If you

don't trust the police

(or management,

head,

or your friends) to begin with, why

or your parents,

or your department

will you suddenly believe them when they tell you some one
fact contrary to what you've been believing for a while?

You won't, and so of course the disorder won't stop, she
says.

But most of Knopf's policy recommendations are simply

more sophisticated versions of exactly the same kind of

empiricist naivete
services

[300-303]

(newspapers should rely less on wire
;

police should be trained to become more

rumor-conscious, and screen police applicants for "emotional
fitness"

[259-262]; public officials should more actively

verify and communicate with the public about rumors they
hear [276-278]

)

.

63

To be sure,

Knopf herself is aware of this point,
hence

the band-aid remark.

But it seems to me that part of the

reason Knopf is able at the end of her extensive
study to
offer only (albeit bigger) band-aids to the gaping
wound of
race relations in this country is exactly because
she has

failed to grasp the complexity of the concept of rumor.
Riots and rumors can in some sense be seen as similar
concepts.

Both are genuinely ambiguous, unpredictable

social constructs.

The very ambiguity of Knopf's model of

riot aetiology (the vast number of "possible" structural

forces she names, the ambiguity of "situational"

circumstances) attests to this, as does her difficulty with

explaining the variance to rumor.

Knopf claims, quite

correctly, that rumors have failed to be controlled by such

inherently rational and predictable means as CRCs

--

new

rumors constantly crop up that are "untrackable " by the CRC

radar (e.g. in the '60s Communist conspiracy rumors died
down,

to be replaced by race rumors)

.

Riots are

(by

definition) a similarly unpredictable social phenomenon, so
it is hard to see how recommendations that require game-

theoretic rationality on the part of their participants

would succeed (well, the police have this great new public
relations program where they attend town meetings once
month,

so they can't also be brutal)

.

At best,

a

it seems

that riots would simply morph into differently manifested

phenomena

--

as the literature on the LA riots of 1992
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suggests.

Reducing social concepts to the sum of their

rational, precipitating factors
+

inadequate information, riots

local incidents)

(rumors
=

=

ambiguity of news

structural inequities

+

denies the inherent contrariness of social

life;

similarly, eliminating rumors from an analysis of

riots

(save for as a passive,

but negative, marker)

so as to

ensure a rational, predictable answer ensures that the

answer such analysis provides will not succeed.
Unfortunately, contemporary events underline this point.
Even where the topic is not nearly as grim as riots,
yet still not stereotypically gossipy

(a

view of gossip that

does not revolve around individual actions)

,

the tack of

dismissing the accuracy of rumor so as to enhance the

potency of centralized policy solutions remains attractive
to far too many academics.

Marie Zaner,

in her 1991

dissertation, sets herself the pragmatic task of designing

a

model for communicative strategy to help companies implement

organization-wide changes (layoffs, reorganizations, name
changes,

etc.)

without drastic negative side benefits (which

she sees as,

among other things, unionization of the

employees)

While she begins the dissertation with one

.

assumption of how communication strategies have to change
(on a

broad-based level, changing how the message is

initially presented, to whom, and its content)

,

her

secondary research early on demonstrates that rumors are

a

key reason administrative changes often go over poorly (5265

;

!

She positions herself as a supporter of informal

53).

channels

--

companies need to make use of the grapevine to

communicate their information with less risk and greater
speed,

ability for evaluation on both sides (72-73, 75-76)

But enthusiasm aside,

Zaner still has a fundamental

mistrust of the effect of rumors on stable businesses, a

mistrust her research suggests is misplaced.

First,

she

cites several studies that demonstrate that rumor accuracy
is much higher than we might otherwise think

50-90% accuracy!

[75]

)

(ranging from

this fact becomes particularly

revealing when we examine her 15 case studies of companies
instituting organization-wide change carefully.
the 15 cases,

a

In seven of

major problem for the companies was that

they released inconsistent information to their employees

regarding the change, so the employees would lose trust in
the company,

become more hostile, etc.

(In four of the

other case studies, the company simply released very little
information,

resulting in similar situations.)

Anyway,

what's thrilling about this is that the "authoritative"

information is only about as accurate as the lower end of
the rumor accuracy level
(Or certainly,

.

Rumors are almost always right

no less wrong than the "right stuff.")

This becomes ironic to me when Zaner endorses another

writer's advice that "once rumors have begun, the best
advice is to provide facts to those most affected by its
spread.

By doing this management has removed the ambiguity
66

"
,

.

because the facts are transmitted via
source"

(133-134).

But of course,

a

reliable original

there's not much of a

solid ground in this study for believing that management

information is necessarily going to be all that much more
reliable than rumor information.
(four),

In several of the cases

accurate rumors about the proposed changes provoked

management into announcing the change sooner than they'd
intended to, oftentimes months before the change was

scheduled to go into effect

--

in company chaos so many times

this is partly what resulted
(and while the rumors

occasionally may have been exaggerated in those cases, the
essential character of them wasn't far off the mark)
example,

.

For

when the news was finally announced,

in one case,

"the general feeling among the employees was 'It's about
time'

(211)

.

Only in one case study does Zaner actually

mention than some of the rumors circulating were bizarre
(219)

but at the same time, this case was yet another case

study where management had provided inconsistent information
("No layoffs!"
-

-

layoffs

"No more layoffs!"

-

-

"No more layoffs!"

still more

[200]),

where information was desperately needed

-

more layoffs

in a situation
(a

total of more

than one-quarter of company employees were laid off over two
years)

Zaner is assuming the sustained reliability of

authoritative information, a reliability belied by the
evidence at hand.
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;

By the conclusion,

Zaner apparently recognizes at least

some validity to rumor.

Her model changes drastically from

the beginning of the research to its conclusion

--

and the

one major change in the model is the new emphasis given

rumors.

Zaner

'

s

proposed model depends on Grice's (1975)

maxim of four parts to communication strategy:
source,

channel,

timing.

message,

In the original model,

is the most central part of the model

the source

(she most closely

links it to the nature of the change and the organizational

dynamics,

255); but in the revised model,

most central part of the model

(282)

timing becomes the

and timing is

important because rapid transmission of management

information defuses the power of rumor.
in the original model,

More particularly,

"rumors" are the second and third

sub-categories to the (lower prioritized) timing category;
in the revised model,

rumors are the first subcategory of

the first-prioritized timing category.

Zaner is explicit

that rumor pervasiveness is the reason behind her changes to
the model

(273

)

.

Yet even in such a straightforward analysis of the

importance of rumors in official change, Zaner must still

present criticisms of the existence of them at all.

Even

after Zaner has argued for the efficacy of rumors for

administrators (the grapevine is there to be used, employees
can be manipulated successfully through rumors)

,

still remind us of the moral taint rumors carry.
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she must

Often the grapevine made the changes worse than
they ultimately became.
Employees seemed to feel
that any information was better than no
information.
The more interest employees had in
the change and the less information they received
from management, the more rumors developed.
(235)

Any

information, of course,

(probably)

implies information of

dubious accuracy and reliability.

Remember,

we're operating from within a framework that still takes
source of information and credibility very seriously (and

means both terms in the most straightforward, typical ways)
This casual slam ignores the fact that information from
hiGfhly credible sources

(management)

was often,

in these

very case studies, of no value at all, and only served to

mislead employees even more (in fact, contradicting many of
the accurate rumors employees were trading)

31
.

In short,

despite her moments of appreciation of the power of

then,

rumor,

Zaner clearly thinks that rumors are an inevitable

31

Zaner is by no means the first scholar to make this
point explicitly; Tamotsu Shibutani s well -regarded Improvised
News:
A Sociological Study of Rumor (1966), begins by
pointing out that "false intelligence is sometimes worse than
ignorance" (2) While Shibutani s manifest purpose is to bring
rumors up for examination, to show where they are empirically
right as well as wrong, and while he refers to incorrect
information being disseminated from various authorities as
fact (and as inciting rumor)
it is interesting to note that
the language of violence he invokes to criticize inaccuracy in
information (see part 2 of this chapter) applies only to the
the
not
to
rumor- information,
and
inaccuracy
of
"authoritative" data.
'

.

'

,
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commodity inherently dangerous to business;
smart managers
should strive to quarantine them successfully 32
.

What we have seen up until now is a series
of more

applied analyses of gossip and rumor, each assuming
the

inevitability and the undesirability of gossip and
rumor.
The more general rumor authority most rumor authors
cite,

Gordon Allport and Leo Postman's The Psychology of Rumor
(1947)

,

while not having such an activist agenda as to

propose models or recommendations to control the spread of
rumor, presents the same old argument that there is a dire

need to control rumors and gossip, to preserve community
sanity.

Even though Allport and Postman initially define

rumor pretty innocuously:

"A large part of ordinary social

conversation consists of rumor-mongering

.

In our daily

chitchat with friends we both take in and give out whole
lungfuls of gossip
(

vii

33
)

,

--

sometimes idle, sometimes not"

their real opinions soon become clear.

alternately "sap morale
needless alarm... rais

...

[e]

Rumors

menace national safety ... spread

[]

extravagant hopes," and "sprea[d]

the virus of hostility and hate"

(vii-viii)

.

Indeed, when

Allport and Postman define rumor in more exact terms, they
32

For a comically excessive demonstration of this line of
thought, see Philadelphia Institute for Social Relations
This study of the effect of a false rumor on a
(1958)
disaster- stricken community actually purports to trace out the
play-by-play path of the rumor (13), so as to instruct readers
to control more effectively similar "outbreaks."
.

33

Notice that this is another
intermixing of gossip and rumor.
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example

of

the

casual

.

are only able to do so in terms of a lack:

"specific

(or topical)

a rumor is a

proposition for belief, passed along

from person to person, usually by word of mouth,
without

secure standards of evidence being present"

(ix)

In other

words, we recognize a rumor chiefly by what it's not,

justified true belief.

More precisely, their analysis of

the path of rumor transmission is an analysis of how the

requisite distortion occurs (they trace a path through
recall,

forgetting,

participants, viii)

imagination, and rationalization of
,

clearly not even considering the

possibility that rumors could be accurate, or have validity.

Of course,

part of the reason Allport and Postman

conceive of rumors as necessarily false and necessarily

present is because of their highly psychologized account of
how and why we spread rumors.

We spread and believe rumors

because they relieve, justify or explain emotional urges, as
well as providing closure and meaning in an inherently

chaotic environment

(37)

.

Because of this complicated web

of individual emotions dictating our rumor transmission,

Allport and Postman regretfully conclude that even when
there is a "kernel" of truth to

a

particular rumor, it is

probably inextricably embedded within the detail and
distortion that are added to satisfy the particular
individual's psychic interests (147-149, 43).

At the end,

Allport and Postman come clean and admit that rumor isn't
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.

really about designating or presenting new information,
but
"evaluating" or "appreciating" old information.
Indeed,
they continue,
[ijnsofar as rumors pretend to be informativedesignative, they are always, in part at least,
erroneous.
Since this pretense is always present,
they are invariably a deceptive mode of discourse
[167]

Such false and manipulative information can be controlled to
some extent, Allport and Postman admit

—

when people are

more educated to the real nature of rumors, they are less

likely to be susceptible to them

(36)

But the fact remains

for Allport and Postman that no matter what our activist

intentions,

the specter of rumor remains to haunt us --

ultimately,

it makes public both private,

and desires and larger,

individual wants

collective fears and dreams.

Ultimately, what Allport and Postman make explicit

--

encouraging us to study rumors in their "appraising,
legendary, mythic, poetic" capacities

what their followers
done.

(Bergmann,

(169)

--

Knopf, Tannen,

is exactly

Zaner)

have

These students of rumor and gossip are ultimately

interested only in the legendary and mythic aspects of
conversational formations.

Gossip and rumor are interesting

more for the cachet with which they are held than for the

divergent forms they take, and the myriad effects they bring
about.

No matter what the ostensive content or circle of

gossip and rumor

--

intimate friends, neighbors, corporate

employees, nervous citizens

--
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gossip and rumor can function

.

only to highlight inevitable flaws we have

(we speak

separate languages, we are not serious enough,
we ignore
reality, we are unselective in our information
collection)
Such are the elements of social meteorology.
For this group
of barometricians,

the populace,

1

.

2

rumors and gossip are

(ig)

noble lies for

nothing less, and certainly nothing more.

Spin Doctors

Unlike the social meteorologists, who only see gossip
and rumor as always already present, those academics

I

think

of as gossip and rumor "spin doctors" share some commitment

to social constructivism;

to varying degrees,

each attests

to the fact that our words can construct real truths for us,

that even "less" empirically reliable words like those of

gossip and rumor can be part of that truth-making, and that
hence gossip and rumor are more complicated features of the
social scene than we might have previously thought.
course, while this sounds initially appealing,

Of

the

depressing reality is that spin doctors really do still have
sacred cows, just more covertly.

The members of this group

clearly write with two truths in mind

--

Truth, which is

actually empirically correct, and the truth of gossip and
rumor, which may sometimes coincidentally turn out to be

Truth,

but in general is simply an interpretation of,

exaggeration of, projection of, or otherwise distortion of
The Real Thing.

Social constructivism turns out to be
73

a

.

,

convenient peg on which spin doctors can hang

notion of truth

--

stuff in between.

truth,

triadic

a

outright falsehood, and the messy

But unfortunately,

the two initial

concepts remain purified; the in between messiness of
gossip
has no meaningful status or content for these

constructivists.

Untidy gossip and rumor are simply empty

space
John Beard Haviland, in his Gossip, Reputation, and

Knowledge—in—Zinac antan (1977), anchors this discussion; his
arguments about gossip titrating already-existent social
rules paradigmat ically demonstrate the spin doctor's

competing allegiances to social constructivism and an
absolute notion of truth.

Haviland apparently seeks

Of course,
a far less

at first glance

value-dependent social

function than the other social scientists we have examined.

When he blandly repeats the standard dictionary definition
(personal talk about an absent third party

[28]

)

it is not

to set himself up for a Bergmannesque lecture on its evils

but so as to appreciate its varied uses.

Haviland explores

his assumption that gossip is a venue for apprehending and

appreciating (and occasionally critiquing) social rules.
Haviland'

s

view,

there are different homogeneous groups

applying standards to personal behavior and habits; gossip
is simply an interpretive trope

reflection)

individuals.

(a

passive vehicle of

for individuals to use to consider other

While this allows for some social
74

By

,

.

constructivist power for gossip, Haviland's
individualist
bias towards gossip diminishes his ability
to read the
gossip moments he collects, to consider and
analyze the

background and intents of his various informants,
and
probably, to hear certain kinds of conversation
as

gossip.

Hence Haviland is only able to see gossip as a
factor in

information manipulation, not creation.

And initially,

Haviland's individualist bias explains why his attitudes
towards gossip (what it is and why people do it)

attenuated

Bergmann

'

--

while

strike a moralistic tone similar to

s

This failing begins to appear when Haviland repeats
that definitional saw about gossip as sordid personal

chitchat.

While Haviland doesn't explicitly say what kinds

of actions aren't worthy of gossip

(he

only loosely

categorizes gossip as "news, report, slander, libel,
ridicule,

gossip"

insult,

[28]

)

defamation, and malicious and innocent

it is clear that the one thing that gossip

never addresses is political decisions, community issues.
The instances

(gossip-moments) Haviland cites

all about issues like excessive drinking,

marriage, divorce, etc.

notion that

a

(23,

9)

are

adultery,

Leaving aside for one moment the

conversation can have many layers of

interpretation and content, Haviland early on states baldly
that instead of gossip exposing issues that affect the

Zinacanteco communities (like new taxes, harvesting or
75

s

voting issues)
conflicts:

,

he observes gossip as "masking" the

"the gossip,

that is, has less to do with power

and political ends than with the personalities
and

propensities of the disputants"

(9)

.

In short,

even when

gossip may occur in a civic or political setting (here

Haviland is referring explicitly to gossip-conversations
that happen in court cases,
on^ly

about personality.

gossip is personal

(i.e.,

in town halls)

,

it is really

So when the ostensive content of

Haviland observes

a

conversation

about someone's drinking too much, say), there is no latent
gossip; but if the gossip potentially concerns political
issues,

there must be a latent personal content so that the

gossip (and the implications of gossip) can be kept safely
on the trivial plane of interpersonal relations 34

.

It

is

difficult to reconcile the one-sidedness of Haviland'

willingness or disinterest in seeing multiple narratives,

34

In case readers are beginning to think that I as a
gossipist am obsessed only with politics, and in fact
bifurcate my gossip to the reverse of Bergmann, Haviland et
al
wit,
(to
that only political gossip is important/
interesting and that personal gossip is dull)
let me make it
quite clear that I follow no such dichotomy in my own
characterization of gossip. To be sure, I do not believe that
gossip can be divided (often) as strictly personal or
political,
rather that gossip conversations
(like most
conversations) are clearly about many subjects at once.
The
only reason I am writing so heavily on political gossip in
this chapter is to correct what I see as the mistakes earlier
gossipists make in abundance. When I use words like "sordid"
in this chapter with apparently judgmental tone, hopefully the
reader will understand that the tone is an attempt to indicate
how I read these social scientists' tone when they write about
gossip, rather than as a reflection of my personal opinions
about personal gossip.
.

,
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.

.

.

with his initially proclaimed interest
in the power of
gossip
At one point,

concluding a chapter, Haviland mentions

gossip that concerns town issues (65); but
this is a quick
mention, with no quotations from transcripts
or lengthy
analysis.
Rather, Haviland 's point in mentioning
that

gossip around town issues occurs is to shore up
his notion
that gossip reinforces factions in towns.

When this

assertion is considered in light of his earlier argument
about political gossip being transparently about
personal

issues

(and indeed,

in light of the rest of the book and its

overwhelming supply of sordid anecdotes about Zinacantecos

)

,

his meek acknowledgement of civic gossip carries little

weight.

For Haviland only a very few conversations merit

hearing, and only according to a very limited stock of

interpretations
Now,

the careful reader could dispute this as a

reductive reading.

After all, Gluckman's claim in the

original 1963 article is simply that the boundaries between

gossip and non-gossip are hard to draw, and that there are

many kinds of subjects to gossip (sometimes all at once)
Couldn't
him)

,

I,

in my reading of Haviland

(and Bergmann before

be unjust in inferring simply from the ostensive

content of the cited gossip-conversations a univocal

approach to gossip

--

in other words,

isn't it possible that

Haviland and Bergmann are both hip enough to recognize that
77

when we gossip about someone getting drunk
and being silly
we may also be gossiping about who should
be chair of city
council or how much property tax should increase,
etc.?

Couldn't they be that sophisticated?
In a word,

no.

is not simply the fact that they

It

both only listen to, record, and remark upon
gossip-

conversations about ostensively personal behavior; both
also
very have static notions of what gossip is about, and
are

unwilling to grant freedom to gossip to move beyond content
restrictions.

When Haviland lists the topics of gossip

(74),

they are all

jail)

about explicitly personal aspects of life, and the

topics

(with the possible exception of one,

(listed by frequency of appearance in gossip)

also clearly static

--

are

there is one topic per gossip-moment.

Haviland can justify this assumption because part of his
notion of gossip is evaluative storytelling
51,

53)

--

(cf.

10,

48-49,

gossip is telling a story, only with more group

participation and group ranking and rating at the end.
Incidentally, Haviland'

communities"

(8),

s

gossip groups are "moral

locution which suggests stasis in not only

the content of the story of gossip but the interpretation

and evaluation that follows.
Like Bergmann before him, Haviland seems to take his
role as a social scientist very seriously -- his analysis of

gossip reflects his training on many levels.
his close adherence to the

'

commonsense
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'

In addition to

gossip definition,

Haviland also argues that we can only consider as
gossip
what Zinacantecos would consider gossip; and that
that

set

of conversations must also fit what we would think
of as

gossip, and to which we would react as we do to gossip

(

28

)

While at first this sounds impressively thick-descriptive
(Geertz

s

term for social science that thoroughly reflects

the social and epistemic norms of the society it purports to

depict)

,

Haviland

claim reflects how deeply, and how

's

limitingly, his social science instincts run.

According to

this notion of what we can call gossip, gossip has to be

translatable and transparent; in short, everyone and anyone
must be able to recognize a conversation as gossip.

transparency may be

a

This

necessity for success in some social

science world, but it is a path to failure for gossip (and
ultimately,

I

would argue

[as

I

think would Geertz]

,

for

social science that aspires to greater completeness and

complexity).

Haviland'

s

apparent objectivity here is an

attempt to please everyone, and has the result the cliche
predicts.

Universality in gossip --an abstract notion of

what gossip is and what it does

--

simply cannot make sense

(gossips wouldn't accept it); this is Gluckman's exact

point 35

Gossip is fluid, has fluid functions, has fluid

.

effects.
count,

Coming up with a category of gossip (this can

this can't count, gossip must do this and can't do

35

My cynical first reaction to Haviland' s remark (who are
Do 'we' have a univocal opinion about gossip? Do the
Zinacantecos?) is a short version of this criticism.
'we'?
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this)
in a

beforehand means that you approach your
conversations
predetermined way -- that you can only hear certain

things,

nuances,

that you will miss certain conversations,
certain

certain asides.

Those "certain" conversations that

Haviland thinks "we" will regard as gossip are clearly
only
the most idle, the most trivial, the most stereotypically
gossipy; e.g., those conversations that most narrowly
cleave
to that chestnut of a dictionary definition of gossip.
At one point,

Haviland observes (following Gluckman)

that he simply cannot understand much of the conversations
he hears because he isn't aware of the local gossip.

what Haviland misses,

But

in his attempts to be locally

acceptable about gossip, is exactly this notion that you
restrict your field of what you can hear and the connections
you can draw dramatically.

How better to explain the fact

that the only conversations Haviland (and Bergmann)

think

worthy of transcription and repetition are those involving
the transgressions of the seven-deadly- sin variety?

Haviland isolates the stereotypical gossip-moments only to
quarantine them, so that gossip can have reference and
resonance in reflexive ways only.

But as

I

demonstrated

before with the analysis of Bergmann, just because there is
an everyday conception or has been one,

doesn't mean we must

maintain it uncritically and in perpetuity.
When Haviland moves beyond the dictionary definition of
gossip,

and attempts to draw conclusions based on his
80

:

.

research,

the result is a rather meager extension
of the
most modest of Gluckman s theses.
Haviland uses the cargo
'

system in Zinacanteco culture as evidence
for how gossip
expresses tacit, consensually held community
standards of
morality.
The cargo system is simply the structure
of

community religious ceremonies to celebrate the
corn
harvest, which is the basis for the Zinacanteco
economy.

There is an elaborate hierarchy of roles one can
assume
one is a man)

in the cargo ritual,

up through the cargo ladder.

and one

'works'

(if

one's way

Cargo participation is

restricted (there are only about 30 roles to play)

,

and

relative position is supposed to reflect, according to
Haviland, not merely one's social status, but one's moral

purity
system,

--

how hard one works, how pious one is.

in short,

transparently indicates Zinacanteco

beliefs, values and practices.

success is,

The cargo

"

in most conversation,

[T]

he idiom of cargo

synonymous with virtue,

diligence, and worthiness," Haviland writes

(104).

He

continues
Gossip about cargoholders fortunate and
unfortunate, leads directly to the interrelated
notions of wealth, prestige, luck, seniority, and
success.
[ibid]
,

For Haviland, when Zinacantecos gossip about their primary

social link,

it is only to use it as a yardstick for

virtues
This conviction about the transparency of the cargo

system and its gossip gets interestingly complicated when
81

Haviland explains its warps and woofs; when
Haviland
accounts for cargoers who don't fit into
the Horatio Alger
picture, and the gossip around them.
Haviland

is aware that

lots of Zmacanteco gossip centers around
cargo decisions,
and that much of that gossip in turn centers
on decisions
that many Zinacantecos don't accept.

But Haviland

characterizes that gossip as exceptional.
When gossips encounter a cargo career structured
in an unusual way they try to reconcile the
facts
with the peculiarities, disabilities, or bad luck
of the individual.
They explain, that is, why
what happened was not exceptional, not surprisina
[

100

]

In other words,

code,

fill

gossipers only enforce

be it explicit or implicit,
in

a

preexisting social

and their gossip serves to

gaps so as to endorse the legitimacy of status quo

decision-making (or the existence of the social code, and
the appropriateness of the rules that are perhaps sometimes

less than rigidly enforced)

.

This analysis ignores the fact

that gossip is often what determines status quo decision-

making,

and that fact that gossip also (and contradictorily

to each of these earlier social functions)

acts as criticism

of status quo decisions; gossip highlights bureaucratic or

personal incompetence as often as it complicatedly

legitimates it 36

.

The competing and irreconcilable nature

of these social functions of gossip suggests that function
in gossip may operate on a deeper level -- that the reason
36

Zaner's evidence of gossip efficacy bolsters this point.
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why we can do so many different social
things with gossip is
because it's not transparently an
endorsement
of social

order

.

Haviland ignores these less- than-Pollyanna
implications
of gossip as critical of the social
order 37
,

and he does so

because he grounds his concept of gossip in
too strictured
an understanding of social rules and how
they
operate.

individualism is
notion of truth

a
--

His

result of his maintaining a categorical

gossip can't have

a

broad impact.

Haviland 's analysis of the failure of the cargo
system is
peculiar:
"gossip reminds us that people fail, that

careers

go wrong,

that following the rules is not the rule"

His locution is suggestive

--

that are wrong or don't work,

(

108

)

it is not the rules themselves
it is the individual.

Following" the rules is the erratic occurrence; the rules

themselves are no cause for gossip or concern.

Gossip

tracks and evaluates the individual, on an idiosyncratic

basis

it stays away from the touchier,

stuff like what rules we

more dangerous

(apparently or actually)

37

live by

And importantly, he ignores conversations themselves
that are less than Pollyanna about the social order.
He
quotes transcriptions (102, 103) of conversations about cargo
where the conversations suggest an ironic attitude towards the
cargo system -- a shared belief that while supposedly the
cargo system may represent virtue, diligence, etc., in reality
it is (like other political systems) also an opportunity for
the purchase of power and influence, with cynicism and
selfishness being the operating factors. While Haviland heeds
the words of the conversations he transcribes, he misses the
laughter
83

.

and if they make sense.

.

Gossip cannot be

a

means for

evaluating the big stuff, only the small stuff.
For Haviland,

social rules are not completely fixed or

rigid; he thinks there are many different
kinds of rules,

and that the point of defining rules is to
understand and

recognize their violation (158)

.

Ultimately, Haviland

thinks there needs to be a flexibility to rules and
our

interpretive guides of rules
such

a

primary guide

[167-68]

(of

which gossip functions as
To demonstrate this,

)

Haviland describes how impossible it would be for
scientist

(or anyone)

social

to explain what rules are in effect,

when and why for a situation as simple as
a

a

busy traffic intersection (178-80)

a

But,

yellow light at
as he makes

absolutely clear in his chapter on the cargo system, it is
an individualist,

Haviland seeks.

crudely relativist flexibility that
Ultimately, the looseness he wishes the

social sciences would adopt is this narrative looseness with

which he characterizes gossip

--

the freedom to constantly

make particular, on an individual level, why someone does

something and how (or how not) actions reflect their

supposedly determining social rules.

Haviland

'

s

conclusion

is that our social grammar needs more complexity -- and

while the completion of such a complicated descriptions

would be impossible (imagine

a

complete description of why

eight cars and three pedestrians did whatever they did at
some traffic light), gossip nonetheless stands as a marker
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.

of the kind of complexity we should
be seeking in our social

explanations of human behavior (180)

.

The difficulty here

is that Haviland's conclusion about
social rules and

gossip's role is implicit from his beginning
assumptions.
Of course gossip's productive domain can
only extend so far
as to explain individual moves and individuals'

stories

(and

their lives are for Haviland always stories, and
stories
only)

,

never contributing to any kind of broader critique
or

understanding of who people are and why they do what they
do

This starting and closing assumption of the

restrictiveness and triviality of gossip is most patently
clear when Haviland finally refers to Gluckman explicitly.
As he closes his book, Haviland sharply observes that

Gluckman

'

s

position that you don't know

a

society until you

know its gossip is a "fatuous and self-congratulatory

position that would deny most social science"

(171-172).

This harsh critique of course ignores his own self-

consciousness at finally learning Zinacanteco gossip; and
how his status in Zinacanteco society changed dramatically

after he learned it

(12-14)

.

Haviland is desperate to

justify social science that doesn't include gossip, so
desperate that he ignores his own experiences, and indeed,
the import of his own conclusions about gossip.

He later

notes that "the naive ethnographer, unlike the old-hand
gossip, has trouble distinguishing the exceptional from the
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,

ordinary"

(175).

By this reading,

instead of the gossipy

social scientist being fatuous and arrogant

(and hence

overemphasizing her own work), wouldn't the
non-gossipy
ethnographer be practicing the bad social science?

This

juxtaposition of remarks recalls Bergmann
trouble with definitions

--

1

s

fundamental

since Haviland as well fails to

make clear what his opening assumptions and biases
about

gossip are, he avoids the tricky issue of clarifying why
it
is he approaches gossip the way he does.

Basically,

Haviland attacks Gluckman for lending credence and
significance to gossip, the subject Haviland apparently
thinks interesting enough to merit an entire book.

Haviland 's dismissive attitude towards gossip is
surprising, given his interest in being seen as

knowledgeable gossip.

a

He quite painstakingly lays out his

means of capturing and analyzing gossip.

Haviland collects

various knowledgeable people from the different hamlets and
tapes lengthy collective interviews he calls "Who's Who"
sessions; in these he asks about various people or
incidents, and his informants spell out histories 38

technique itself
Haviland'

s

I

.

The

have no serious quarrel with (because, as

transcriptions make clear, once stories start

38

Bergmann, amusingly, is appalled by this technique (he
finds it artificial -- thinks that clearly, what Haviland is
collecting isn't really gossip because it's too content-driven
and ignores the interactive nature of gossip [37]
and of
course replaces it with his own much more exacting technique
that produces exactly the same result.
)
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they are interactively told), and because
it's clear that
Haviland simply acted (albeit more formally) as
many of us
do when we lead our lives -- he asked for gossip.

where

do quarrel with Haviland

I

's

However,

Who's Who methodology is

the representativeness of his informants.

Haviland, without

elaboration, makes a quick claim that his Who's Who

participants are

a

'representative'

sample

(13).

several reasons to be suspicious of this claim.

There are
First,

it

is not clear that Haviland' s informants are other than
all

male.

Haviland 's understanding of Zinacanteco gossip is

that it occurs primarily through the men; and that the women
act as "vehicles" only of gossip -- they transport it,

don't create it 39

(

26

)

.

While Haviland acknowledges that

children too can be carriers of gossip
in this passive,

they

(40)

,

it

is similarly

vehicular notion of gossip that children

are characterized as gossips

--

and there is certainly no

suggestion from reading the transcripts that children are
included in the Who's Who groupings.

majority of Haviland'

s

The overwhelming

transcripts of gossip-conversations

seem to be between men; he frequently refers to circles of

men engaged in gossip (1,8-9,21,27,31,35,43-44), and at one
point he refers to the panels as being composed only of men

talking (primarily) about men in the village.

(13-14),
39

In other words, women can't do the heavy thinking
necessary to interpret social rules, but they can usefully
Notice that this is the location where
spread men's wisdom.
precisely
constructivism
most
Haviland s
social
gets
compromised
'
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Now,

feminist

before
(I

I

appear to be

a

cranky Pagliaesque

complain when women are castigated as gossips,

complain when women are excluded from gossip)
myself absolutely clear.

I

,

I

let me make

don't think only men or only

women gossip, or only rich people or poor people,
or only

Zinacantecos or Anglos or Latinos or Asians, or only
existential philosophers or ethicists, or only any one or
other particular group.
be,
it

.

My point (obvious though it should

and clearly following Gluckman)

is that everyone does

Any attempt to constrict and restrict gossip to or from

particular social sub-groups must be wrong.

While in

a

sense Haviland's restriction is modestly less irritating

than Bergmann

'

s

or Tannen

clear that men do gossip

'

s

—

(Haviland at least makes it
a lot

--

and often about sordid

personal topics, analysis that somehow must have escaped

Bergmann

1

s

and Tannen

obvious cliche,

'

s

notice) because it is less of an

it nonetheless distorts the domain of

gossip
This is not the only distorting methodology

Haviland's book.

I

find in

Presumably, his notion of representation

should contain some class representation

--

he should have

talked to Zinacantecos from all economic levels.

Particularly when cargo gossip is considered, given the

inaccessibility of cargo positions, it would be important to
have richer and poorer Zinacantecos

(identified as such),

particularly given the amount of cargo gossip that occurs in
88

this book.

But here again, Haviland is silent on the

background of his informants.
aren't helpful either.

The individual transcriptions

There are only two mentions of cargo

participation from informants
participant and one

a

--

one an elementary

higher-up participant.

conversations, this doesn't tell us much.

From over 50

It is important

to know whether or not those Haviland quotes as being

pleased or annoyed with the cargo system are those who have
succeeded at cargo, or tried and failed, or simply been
excluded.

In fact,

it is impossible to get a very

complicated analysis from Haviland 's conversations without
getting

sense of who's doing the talking; as Haviland

a

himself earlier says,

intent, motive and agenda are

important parts of gossip.

So why then does he leave

intent, motive and agenda out of his Who's Who

transcriptions

--

does he assume

(ludicrously)

that when his

informants enter the room they automatically adopt neutral
roles?

Given the looseness of his methodology here, his

analysis

--

choosing to use his transcriptions as

a basis

for making cultural generalizations about the values that
are important to all Zinacantecos

insincere.
(76,

77,

--

rings particularly

He makes this agenda clear at various points

86-87);

primitivist bias.

it is an agenda that smacks of a

Haviland rather sniff ily refers to

"American student gossip" as "highly psychologized"
89

(58),

as

gossip focusing solely on determining motives
for behavior
on an individual level.
be

f rust rat

But while individualist biases may

ingly relativist

Haviland should know)

(as

it

,

is

equally frustrating to have gossip act as a great
leveller,
simply transmitting cultural codes and beliefs through
human
mouths.

This primitivist bias becomes clear when Haviland

very cautiously acknowledges that

"

[he]

cannot avoid the

feeling that some Zinacantecos take cargos or involve

themselves with ritual simply because they enjoy it"

(

119

)

This conclusion is one that easily applies to other
cultures'
a

social,

religious or political systems

--

imagine

resident of this country having difficulty with the notion

that some Americans involve themselves with holiday rituals
(Christmas, Hanukkah,

special feasts,

songs,

Kwaanzaa)

gifts

--

,

with their accompanying
for pleasure,

not simply for

the religious and cultural reasons ostensibly behind the

rituals.

The cargo ritual is similarly marked by feasting,

playacting, parades, and tokens, yet Haviland seems

unwilling to consider seriously less-than-pure motives for

partaking in a system that
artifacts,

is,

like so many cultural

complicatedly effective and ineffective,

functional and superfluous.

I

suspect that this bias

towards overgeneralizing the motives and actions of the

Zinacantecos partly determines why Haviland'

s

analysis of

gossip is so constraining of the effect of gossip.

Haviland

the spin doctor can only see gossip as an individual,

90

.

,

.

interpretive device to apply and analyze particular
social
rules,

because his view of Zinacanteco society is itself

ultimately too simple.
Ultimately, then, gossip for the spin doctor is at best
a tool

for opinion, not fact.

This assumption is central in

Karen Jane Brison's work, Gossip,

Village Polit ics Among the Kwanaa

Innuendo,
.

.

and Sorcery:
as well.

(1988),

Brison's dissertation (since published as

a

book [1992])

confronts the "problem" that the Kwanga have many long

public meetings, typically devoted mainly to addressing
(unsuccessfully)
(16)

.

issues that originate in village gossip

The Kwanga hold two kinds of meetings:

regular

village meetings each Monday to distribute community labor
(only one half-hour is spent on the division of tasks,

several hours spent on gossip issues [2-3]

discussions, held after

determine the cause

a

(12)

.

)

and funeral

death in the community, to
The preconceptions clearly

guiding Brison's study are that since these meetings don't
result in overt change of villager behaviors, laws,
reputations, and that since the issues at the meetings are

often trivial

(11-12),

there must be

a

significant social

explanation for their occurrence.
The theory she proposes, after eighteen months of

observation of and interaction with the Kwanga, is that the

particularly egalitarian form of Kwanga society necessitates
ineffectual meetings

In a society without a

(42-43)

91

)

,

.

particular hierarchy, Brison contends, the meetings
are
necessary to establish both social norms, and
social

rankings

40

(37)

.

More to the point, egalitarian societies

contain within them the seeds for more

f act

ionalizing

,

while

simultaneously being more dependent upon consensus (since
there aren't recognized leaders or parties [42-43]).
Seemingly ineffectual talk can actually be critical social
maintenance work, resolving or helping to resolve problems
(41)

.

Finally, being a good talker (being able to talk

frequently, and eloquently)

status for these villagers
in the Kwanga,

,

is the highest mark of social

(of the

three kinds of 'big men

orators are the most respected

[46]

1

)

While all of these comments delineate a society

strikingly supportive of gossip as

a

constructive rather

than destructive social force, Brison nonetheless observes

Kwanga holding the same old myths about gossip as

necessarily distorted and counterproductive.
in several of these meetings

She observes

(the purpose of which seems to

be only to make public and evaluate accusations circulated

through private gossip

that people seem to distrust

[65]

others' public statements

(66);

and indeed, that they regard

gossip as disuniting of the community (ibid)
the Kwanga,

in their village court system

.

In addition,

(Papua New Guinea

has been independent from the rule of Australia since 1975)

hold rumor and gossip spreading to be
40

a crime for

which one

Which, of course, would hardly seem "ineffectual".
92
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can be charged,

tried and punished (88, 158, 276).

Finally,

Prison notes that at several of these meetings
participants
discuss not only rumors but rumor -- complaining
about
the

veiled way in which accusations of culpability
in
are made,

for example

a

death

(140)

The problem with all this conceptualizing is
that the

end result is a kind of levelling and simplifying
of the

Kwanga perspective.

In other words,

the conclusion

I

see

Brison making over and over again is that the Kwanga
are

only straightforwardly afraid and mistrustful of gossip

--

that they see gossip and rumor as disruptive of what is

otherwise a peaceful community order.

But what emerges from

the anecdotes Brison herself presents is a more complicated

reading of the Kwanga.
To elaborate:
wild,
(151)

Brison describes community rumors as

and potentially leading to disastrous consequences
.

Focusing just on rumors of how someone in the

community dies, Brison describes variant, elaborate rumors
leading to "retaliation through sorcery, court, or

embroilment in long, expensive competitive exchanges"

(the

Kwanga participate in a competitive harvest system around
their yam, called the tamburan cult

[133]

)

But this

reading can't be accurate; for in the several case studies

Brison herself presents throughout this study, formal and
informal penalties threatened or levied (e.g. fines through
court,

threats of retaliatory violence, rejoinder
93

,

accusations of malfeasance) are never actually
carried out
(73,

89,

120)

It seems

.

implausible that

a

community would

be imprisoned by a fear that never makes
itself manifest.

More particularly, Brison only speaks well of
the

public system of courts, laws and assessed fines,
even when
it is clear that the Kwanga themselves have
reservations
about those institutions.
the "new law"

(157,

158)

She praises the development of

where gossip and rumor are

indictable offenses, and where personal slights are

adjudicated in court.

More to the point, she draws an

implicit contrast between the indirect speech of rumor and

gossip and the direct speech of the courtroom; remarking
that direct, public speech results in (apparently) much less

conflict

(161-163)

.

Again, Brison acknowledges that the

Kwanga seem to have little faith in the efficacy of the

public meetings (64-65)

and that the court system itself

has a reputation for distorting facts and preserving

ambiguity (275)

.

In this praise of institutional political structure,

Brison perpetuates a neat disjunction between informal

information and adjudication sources
and their more formal brethren

--

--

gossip and rumor,

public meetings, courts

and the laws and penalties they impose.

Brison clearly

accepts the fact that both exist simultaneously (and with
some tension)

in contemporary Kwanga society,

but repeatedly

portrays the latter, overt, formal judicial system as
94

.

necessary because it balances out the
inequities of the
former.
Witness Brison's theory (borrowed from
Donald
Brenneis

[1984]

)

as to why people are afraid of the
negative

power of gossip:
...as long as a dispute is confined to the
realms
of partisan gossip, there is the danger
that it
W1
spread to include other members of the
community.
An official public version restoring
the good reputations of both parties removes
this
danger.
[148]

H

"Official public version

[s]

"

or explanations come about only

through the lengthy meetings, or the court system.
The basic tension throughout this argument is as

follows.

Brison grants gossip the power to construct

reality

gossip and rumor are the chief means by which

explanation and reputations are spread, gain communal force
(113)

.

Indeed,

she even allows for a genealogical character

to gossip -- she admits that the public meetings,

court

systems rarely if ever seem to get at the root of problems

within the community, or adjudicate satisfactory
explanations of deaths
"it
a

[is]

(73,

4-9,

52-53)

.

impossible to know the true cause

couple of years later.

.

Indeed,

she avers,

[of death]

until

.It is only after a couple of years

when tempers have cooled that people will drop hints when

gossiping with friends and relatives and the truth will

eventually emerge"
both ways

--

(13)

However, Brison wants to have it

gossip is a powerful force within the

community, acts as a force towards eventually resolving

disputes and constructing truth explanations, but only
95
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.

because of its necessarily distorting character.

Gossip

constructs truth by manipulating it, impurifying
it.

As

gossip must necessarily cohabitate along with
multiple

such,

public channels for its evaluation and confirmation,
even if
those channels are necessarily ineffective.
Both of these
claims simply cannot be true 41

.

In other words,

Brison is

implicitly maintaining an absolutist conception of truth
(the only way a social constructivist account of truth with

gossip is palatable to her is if the "truth" that gossip

constructs is always already distorted)

.

Papua New Guinea is changing rapidly, Brison observes.
The harvest cult system (with its complicated system of

inter-village communications, partnerships, and
competitions,

fading out

in no small part based in gossip

--no new members

harvest cult since 1978
men

1

[258])

is

have been initiated into the

(initiated cult members are the 'big

of Kwanga society)

The Kwanga response to this change

(which in turn has spawned other changes -- less bartering,

more cash cropping, more hierarchy because of fewer Totem
[harvest]

groups

[ibid]

)

has been to hold more public

meetings; conflicts which used to be resolved mainly through
cargo competition and cargo meetings

--

through gossip, in

short -- are now supposed to be resolved through public

meetings, and the court system (260).

41

Brison contends that

Indeed, one reviewer of Brison 's completed book noted
the same exact difficulty in her analysis: see Oceania (1994)
96

.

this change happens because "people attempted
to stop

tradition by stopping the system of gossip which
supported
it"

(ibid).

But again,

this contention suggests a belief

that gossip is predominantly destructive, or distorting,
that the facts in Brison's dissertation simply don't
support.

And so while Brison is certainly to be admired for

acknowledging the influential status of gossip in Kwanga

—

she does not shy away from declaring its social power or its
at least occasional ability to uncover facts

—

by

conceiving of gossip as the necessarily weak end of the
dialectic of truth and punishment in Kwanga Papua New Guinea
she ultimately perpetuates a stale notion of gossip as

priori distorting or malicious 42

Brison

a

classic spin doctor

--

.

a

This is what renders
her interest in (active)

constructivism forces her to downplay her bif urcat ional

42

I think it's also relevant to draw attention here to the
primitivist stain of this kind of analysis:
in short, that
gossip uniquely has a kind of distorting, malicious, and
warping capacity that "open" or "public" speech in courts does
not
(which Brison herself acknowledges fails to reveal
accurate reconstruction of events)
Indeed, Brison is not
alone in making these kinds of dangerous assumptions about
gossip.
Witness Robert and Ruth Munroe s response to Donald
Campbell in the pages of Zygon (1976), where they casually
observe that in more sophisticated societies, "an ethical code
is a more indirect form of social control than the face-toface methods such as gossip,
scolding,
and witchcraft
accusations often employed in simpler societies" (3).
In
short, one mark of "simpler" societies is their social control
only through face-to-face, non-abstract or universalizable
(and obviously, not as good) moral codes -- it is only the
sophisticated societies that can operate according to
"indirect" "abstract" rule systems (and hence have less
reliance on imprecise methods such as gossip)
.

1
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noton of truth; however, gossip always ultimately
maintains
the inferior half of that division.
Ori Bet Or

(1989),

in his dissertation examining the

status and function of gossip in an Israel kibbutz,
takes

a

tack similar to Haviland's, using painstaking methodology
to

justify unsurprising, formulaic results.

Bet Or,

in trying

to move the epistemological question to a different
kind of

realm than "straightforward" truth or falsehood,

unfortunately simply displaces to
ultimate status as falsehood.

a

secondary level gossip's

One quote in particular

demonstrates this attitude:
...gossip is more Impression Management than
Information Management.
The gossipers are making
use of information, in order to influence and
change.
Selection of the information and relating
it to certain interpretations rather than
straightforward presentation, is typical of
gossip.
By being more a matter of evaluation,
criticism, judgement and impression, than of
actual information or rational analysis, gossip
cannot be related to in terms of truth or
falsehood, reasonable or unreasonable.
[424]
To put it simply,

Bet Or tries to have it both ways.

He's

appealing to the defenders of gossip, by saying that it's
not so much that gossip is either true or false

(because we

know where gossip would fall if that were the criterion)

,

but that it's beyond those simple categories -- it's off in
the murk of judgement.

But his language betrays him

--

gossip is not "straightforward" information transmission,
it's not "actual" information, and of course,

"rational."

I

it's not

find myself strangely uncomforted by the
98
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)

notion that gossip is simply too ethereal to
belong to dull,
earthbound realms of reason and unreason, truth
and
falsehood; because it's clear that gossip is simply

shadow- irrationality

,

a

phantasmic falsehood.

a

Because

gossip lurks around corners, never presenting itself
directly, never confronting confirmation or disconf irmat
ion

square in the face,

it's in a non-realm, where it has no

actual connection with truth or falsehood, only manipulation
and "management."
too clear

But the implication there

I

think is only

managed information is adulterated information,

gossip can't be straightforward because presumably some
other kind of information is.

Bet Or

'

still clearly

holding to that dichotomy that truth and falsehood exist,
and gossip is simply even further from one category than the
other,

rather than in its own realm.

Like Haviland, Bet Or thinks that gossip (as the

conclusion makes clear [239]

functions to make particular,

evaluable, and malleable rules, norms, proceedings,
statuses, constitutions that we already operate by.

He

thinks that we already modulate the norms and categories to
suit our own personal experiences, and that gossip is simply
the means by which we check our evaluations with others,

and

confirm that our own interpretations aren't too far off the
mark.

And again, like Haviland, it's also clear that Bet Or

suffers from the same fundamentally dismissive attitude

towards gossip.

For example, he can't help from describing
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gossip as essentially negative

--a

way for someone to boost

his or her own self-image at the expense of
another -- even
as he acknowledges the contradictions rife within

assumptions of gossip's fundamental negativity or positivity
(423)

.

It's also clear that Bet Or is well aware of

gossip's supplemental power in truth-making; he describes
the

common knowledge" that no one in his particular kibbutz

actually follows the dictates in

a

pamphlet describing rules

and proceedings; a new kibbutz member is ridiculed for

citing the booklet

in general,

(7)

Bet Or on several

occasions recognizes both the positive capacities of gossip
(107-108,

163)

9,

and the simultaneous reliance of the

community on gossip along with their fear, suspicion and
negative attitudes towards it

(9).

Therefore, Bet Or

'

inflexible interpretation is at odds with the complicated
data he has collected.
of kibbutz members 43

gossiped about
about

(N=29)

,

For example, his numbers show that

(N=157),

(N=117)

,

74.5% both gossip and are

18.5% gossip but are not gossiped

and that only 7%

gossiped about.

(N=ll)

In other words,

neither gossip nor are

gossip is a regularized

activity that most members of the group partake

in,

in

various locations and at different times, with all sorts of
topics and interpretations.

43

Here he means actual members; there are other residents
of the kibbutz who aren't members of the kibbutz community -salaried residents, temporary residents, etc.
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;

It's bizarre,

then,

,

that with the breadth of his

conclusions, and with the progressive nature of much of
his

methodology (essentially, as he makes clear, he gathers his
ormat ion by eavesdropping and initiating gossip [349352]

at one point he avers that you "can't study gossip

;

without participating"

[299]

Bet Or nonetheless retains

)

many of the most rigid and constraining aspects of gossip
study.

For example, after acknowledging that defining

gossip is hard not only because of the linguistic

constraints but because of the social science paradox that
you will only confirm what you set out to discover (342)
Bet Or returns to the tried-and- true definition of gossip as

evaluative, negative storytelling about the absent
347)

(305-306,

Bet Or also mysteriously describes gossip at one

.

point as "more structured, defined, delimited, amplified and

programmed [than conversation].

much less flexible.

It is

Rather than being open to change, it acts against them"
(309)

.

This analysis seems flatly contradictory to Bet Or

repeated remarks that gossip is hard to categorize and
define,

and that gossip-situations are quite fluid, their

contents,

intents and interpretations constantly shifting

(182-183,

385).

Fundamentally, Bet Or

'

theoretical

ambitions are held back by his methodological timidity.
Therefore, he ultimately reaches conclusions that only

reproduce Haviland's analysis of the decade before, albeit
with new data.
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The diminishing of the conception of gossip,
even with

elaborately particular methodology, is nothing new.
Those
anthropologists seeking to articulate theories about
gossip
early in its study (by responding to Gluckman
'

groundbreaking 1963 article) are themselves guilty of
skewing the concept of gossip too much one way or another,

levelling gossip into conceptual flatness.

theory

One competing

recognizes gossip entirely by virtue of very

individual, particularized, psychological roots
[1967]

)

(Paine

Another grounds gossip entirely within

.

a

crudely

political framework; gossip happens whenever someone has an
agenda to push of protecting their own good name or

attacking another's (Wilson [1974]).
[1970]
(291,

)

A third (Abrahams

reduces gossip to its status as nonsense performance

293-4)

.

These professionals all seek to consider

gossip as meaningful purely in terms of its status as

communicative tender.
(it

Reducing gossip to communication only

is a channel for individual twitches only,

advancing political aims, or simply to perform)
these writers,

purely for
,

for all of

is tantamount to reducing gossip's proximity

to truth.

Wilson is explicit about this fact

--

he argues that

the Makah Indians use gossip as a tactic to deceive a

visiting anthropologist

(by gossiping to her about

themselves and others, he suggests, they can mislead her
about the true nature of community ranking and self102

:

.

knowledge

[95-97]).

Abrahams contrasts the "nonsense"

activity of gossip with "sensible" conversation;
"sensible"
means "well-spoken" and "knowledgeable," "emphasizing]

the

order and decorum afforded by knowledge"
anthropologists,

it seems,

For these

(294)

gossip can only reveal its

various agendas (personal, political, performative) by

preserving

a

status as cunning fakery.

In other words,

all

the different anthropologists miss what's truly exciting

about Gluckman's work

--

the vital connectedness of gossip

to all of our conversation,

its indiscernability amongst

important talk.
The underlying problem

I

observe both in this section

and in the previous one is that social researchers on gossip

ultimately cannot resist the negative reputation of gossip,
no matter how hard they try and how much their theoretical

training prepares them (and

I

think it is fair to say that

the spin doctors are better prepared than the social

meteorologists)
of order here,

.

I

While it might be odd to present him out
think it is important to document how

someone who is so initially positive towards gossip can

himself fall under the spell of its reputation

--

Max

Gluckman, responding to his initial exciting article,
1968.

in

A passage from this response is worth quoting in

depth
...Doubtless there is gossip among financiers, and
they may in the course of it acquire information
of pecuniary value to them; and there definitely
is gossip among senior academics in the course of
103

which they acquire information which guides them
making appointments, or in awarding research
grants.
But this, I consider, is the passing of
confidential information for specific utilitarian
purposes.
It cannot be classed as gossip, if we
pay any regard to what the dictionary defines as
that [sic!] - idle chatter.
It might become
impossible, as a friend of mine told me, for a
^^itish colonial official to do his job under an
independent African Government when what he called
the gossip channels' were closed to him, so that
he did not know what were the relationships among
members of the Cabinet.
But the chat in which
such information is set can only be placed on the
margin between true gossip -- idle talk -- and
necessary information.
[33]

m

.

Of course

,

.

what Gluckman omits saying here is that the kind

of gossip he's now ruling out is precisely what he included

in his 1963 article; notice that when he talks about

professional gossip originally, he exemplifies it as "slight
personal knockdown --concealed in

a

technical recital, or

the technical sneer which is contained in a personal gibe"
(309)
a

.

More particularly, Gluckman explains his pedagogy as

teacher of young anthropologists, in part, as

about the scandals of the field:

"I

believe

I

teaching
am not alone

among senior anthropologists in finding it more interesting
to teach students about anthropologists than about

anthropology"

(314).

Anthropologists gossiping about each

other as part of their work is his very first example of

professional gossip.
puts us

(and Gluckman)

I

think this juxtaposition of passages
into an uncomfortable position

--

either he must hold strictly to the words of his later
article,

in which case there's a clear distinction between

gossip and non-gossip (and that distinction is essentially
104

between minutiae and what matters)

,

or he must side by his

earlier statement of inclusion, in which case
gossip again
can be necessary information, and in which the
lines between
gossip and non-gossip are all the harder to draw.
To explain:

in his later article Gluckman argues that

necessity and idleness are the defining (and oppositional)
criteria that separate directed talk from gossip
there

a

s

grey area (professional gossip)

,

--

while

such talk is so

directed (he says) that it can't really be idle, hence it's
not really gossip.

He's effectively writing away any

legitimacy for gossip other than his own, group-maintaining
and -defining anthropological purposes.

What's depressing

about this formulation is that with it, Gluckman lumps

himself in with all of the other professionals producing

work on gossip and rumor; each of them are guilty of
reducing gossip to one kind or another, accountable by one

monolithic theory or another.

Each of them must

wholeheartedly dismiss out of hand what all their
disagreeing counterparts has to say, because the theory of
gossip is a zero-sum game
collective.
agenda)

.

(if

it's personal,

If it's performative,

it can't be

then there's certainly no

What every member of this group misses is the

possibility that gossip and rumor are simply more
complicated, more convoluted than these dismissive theories
suggest.

The Max Gluckman of 1963 made fascinating strides

towards accounting for gossip in
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a

complicated way that took

.

into account all sorts of positive and negative
results,

intentions and agendas.

The Max Gluckman of 1968 is rushing

to appease his wounded colleagues, who are certainly
never

themselves guilty of idle chitchat, only "necessary
information"

(to

which Bergmann can enthusiastically attest,

no doubt)
Sadly,

rumor scientists fare no better in this arena

than the gossipists; Tamotsu Shibutani

Sociological Study of Rumor (1966)

,

'

Improvised News

s

suffers flaws of

:

A

a

trivializing attitude towards gossip, disingenuously tricked
up as a pluralistic attitude towards truth.

there is much to commend about Shibutani

1

s

the data for 60 different rumor-locations

On the surface,
work: he examines

(a

rumor location

being the ambiguous set of historical circumstances around
which numerous unverified or unverifiable oral reports were
generated; the actual number of rumors Shibutani studies is
471)

while the bulk of the rumors Shibutani is considering

;

are Western-hemisphere located and in the twentieth century,
the rumors occur in various countries,

and stretch in time

from the plague in Central Europe (14th century) to

President Kennedy's assassination in the United States
(1963)

.

Aside from the breadth of Shibutani

approach is also refreshingly realistic.

'

s

research, his
He points out that

while rumors may have something less than the preferred

absolute standards of verifiability and reliability, that
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they must be studied simply because people
adhere to them.
His outlook is sensibly pragmatic -- when we
evaluate
beliefs, we do so not by the strict constraints
given us by

contemporary epistemology

--

in his words,

"truth and

falsity are attributes of propositions; conviction and

skepticism are attributes of

a

man's judgement"

Shibutani advocates early on for
and rumor

a

(7)

"continuum" between truth

there are no clearcut boundaries, no crystal

moments in epistemic time when some propositions pass from
rumor to fact

Indeed,

(8)

Shibutani has sharp words of

criticism for his colleagues in social science who persist
in labelling rumor a pathological activity

(exceptional,

engaged in only by the psychologically damaged)
more widely practiced activity.

instead of a

Such distorting vision,

Shibutani argues, leads to an over-narrow and generalizing
account of what rumors are and how they occur

--

these

accounts look only at the content, the empirical facts and

distortions therein, and assume that rumors present an
'obstacle'

to normal,

accurate, reliable communication

(ibid)

Shibutani
rumors

'

s

counterattack relies on his conception of

(and indeed,

communication) as transactional

occurrences; that is, collective (not individual) processes

where a variety of roles

(narrator,

auditor,

interpreter,

messenger, antagonist, skeptic, agitator) may be assumed by
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the participants 44

The transactional analysis of

.

communication, informal communication in particular,
is
nothing new; what's unusual about Shibutani s argument
is
'

that he

(unlike even more recent critics such as Bergmann

and Haviland)
roles.

does not confine participants to particular

In one conversation a person can move from being
a

narrator to an interpreter, agitator, auditor, etc.
Shibutani

image of rumor-conversations is much more fluid,

s

much more malleable and developing, than those of his

colleagues

--

indeed,

it should be clear,

Shibutani

'

analysis seems (as yet in this chapter) to be the only one
that appropriately captures the "informal" nature of such

communication
Shibutani uses this transactional critique to undermine
the content-oriented rumor analysis that comes before him.

One reason earlier rumorists have no conception of rumor as

related to truth is that they can only appreciate rumor as
static stories

(a

rumor is created, spread [maliciously]

distorting reality)
to Shibutani

'

s

;

rather, what actually happens according

schematic

historical data)

,

(and amply documented by his

is that rumors develop as they are spread,

that the spreading process is actually a period of testing,

comparing,

selecting.

The end result is that even when a

44

Transact ional analysis of communication differs from its
predecessors in that the purpose, end result is not the
expression of ideas but the establishment and maintenance of
communicative relationships between individuals.
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plethora of seemingly wild and utterly incompatible,
farfetched rumors crop up in some ambiguous set of
circumstances, the inevitability of time, natural curiosity,
and a lack of convincing 'authoritative' information result
in rumors that grow more truthful as they circulate

(16-17)

Instead of rumors getting wilder (as conventional wisdom
tells us)

,

then,

they get more nuanced, more particular,

more credible -- more truthful.

In particular,

rumor

participants' capacity to assume different roles in the

consideration of rumors ensures that rumors are compared,
evaluated and rejected or accepted rigorously (contrary to
the assumption of carelessness that almost always

accompanies analysis of informal communication)

.

Shibutani

even explicitly links rumors to rational discussion at one
point

--

the rumor is actually the rational tool for moving

the dialectic of information-gathering forward (71)

.

So

there are some reasons to be enthusiastic about this book.

Shibutani also has a handful of casual historical notes
to point out the more mainstream ways in which rumor and

gossip have come to be relied upon
uprisings,

reports

--

revolutionary

the functioning of the stock market, press

(the ubiquitous "anonymous source"

"unnamed

Administration official", etc.), doctors testing and
experimenting with new drugs

(45,

58,

71-72)

Indeed,

at

one point Shibutani goes so far as to say that "most of the

decisions one makes in the course of each day are predicated
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.

upon unverified report s
'rumors,

1

...

such definitions are not called

the term being reserved for those accounts of

which one is suspicious; most of the information
upon which
men base their lives, however, cannot meet high
standards

of

verification"

We infrequently acknowledge but

(94)

invariably rely on rumors and gossip, doppelgangers of news
and truth.

While,

it is true,

several writers on rumor and

gossip refer to our day-to-day reliance on hearsay and rumor
for decision-making
Two]

(Knopf,

are obvious examples)

;

Haviland, Coady [see Chapter

Shibutani is the only writer who

pauses long enough to make this case convincing, providing

meaningful data of decisions that are made deliberately,
that are nonetheless determined by report rather than 'hard'
fact
So what,

after all, can be wrong with such an approach

to rumor and gossip?

Shibutani has acknowledged the

historical situatedness of rumors, their fluid, mobile,

developing nature, the collective, constructive roles

participants play, and most fundamentally, he alleges

a

significant relationship between rumor and truth.

would

It

seem that for an avowed defender of the integrity of rumor
and gossip, little else could be done to salvage the honor
of the two besmirched institutions.

However,

Shibutani

1

s

position as an adherent to empirical social science belies
his status as a full advocate for rumor and gossip.

Shibutani is a spin doctor because he's trying to subsume
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rumor under a category of rational, empirical
knowledge.
The category itself doesn't change,

includes more things.
it shouldn't.

it just gets bigger,

This tactic can't possibly work, and

From rumor and gossip we learn not only that

they can be truthful but that truth is constructed

differently than we might think it

--

in other words,

that

itself is not rational, empirical, clearly defendable.
So simply trying to push rumor (and gossip)

off into one

category, where frankly no one accepts them anyway, without

giving

a

solid account for why it is that that category must

change to accommodate them

notion of truth must be

a

--

in other words,

that our

different kind of truth, to allow

for disparate elements like rumor and gossip

--

is a futile

task
In other words,

spending such inordinate amounts of

time solely on proving that gossip and rumor "really" are

rational accomplishes nothing so much as to underscore the

justification for rational, orderly knowledge

--

to admit

that standard conceptions of knowledge and belief really are
for the most part accurate and well-grounded, they just need

tinkering with here and there.

Examining both sides of the

issue -- showing that not only are gossip and rumor more

rational than we're comfortable thinking, but that
"legitimate" knowledge is in fact far less rational and

orderly than we'd like to think

--

throws the whole

bifurcation of knowledge (certain fact/less certain opinion)
111
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into doubt.

In so doing,

space is created for a more

pluralistic conception of knowledge.
of this job,

Shibutani

'

s

By only doing one-half

Shibutani perpetuates that bifurcation.
well-meaning, but impossible pluralism is

mindful of nothing so much as the recent Republican
allusion
to their party as "one big tent," accommodating
all who are

interested.

Of course,

as their rhetoric makes clear, you

are only welcome to stand under the tent if you disavow

everything about you that labels you deviant in the first
place,

and even then official acknowledgement will be

reguent and artificial only.

Sadly,

this can only be the

status of rumor and gossip if we were to buy Shibutani

'

schema; we could happily nod along and endorse our

multiplicitous attitude towards information and knowledge,
while quietly continuing to dismiss or disregard lots of

information as just scuttlebutt.
The mechanism Shibutani chooses to analyze how the

truth of rumor develops demonstrates this rationalistic
bias.

After all is said and done, Shibutani argues, it is

by a process of "natural selection" that rumors are sifted,
compared, evaluated, and ultimately accepted as fact or

rejected as 'mere rumor’
Shibutani is advancing

a

(186).

In other words,

while

dialectical notion of truth

come to understand situations over time)

,

(we

his dialectic is

closed

--

(75)

The closing of this dialectic cannot help but to

.

final interpretations become selected and ossified
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maintain such an uneven weighting of rumor to truth.
Imagine a rumor that "becomes" true through Shibutani

natural selection.

1

s

Clearly, we stop thinking of such a

rumor as a rumor; it transmogrifies into fact.

So rumor

doesn't really have a truth content for Shibutani; it is

proposition that has yet to prove itself true.
t ru t h/ f a 1 sehood

Further,

ambiguous,

The

dichotomy still exists; it is only

of time before particular rumors pick sides

a

a

matter

(or are picked)

in the situations that remain open and

it is clear that Shibutani believes the correct

interpretation exists, only that it has yet to be put in
operation.

While Shibutani is sophisticated in that he

believes in incrementalism --we gradually come to know
things, our beliefs and methods change as we implement them
(169-70); he still operates with assumptions that there's an

order connecting our currently variant paths of knowledge.
More to the point, as the very language of transactionalism
suggests, this order is a marketplace order, where truth,

falsehood,

rumor,

and gossip are so many commodities to be

traded for (individual and social) profit.

Shibutani

'

language of natural selection suggests that there is an

overdetermined momentum to the entire process of chaoscrisis-resolution, where rumors compete on an intellectual
for the prizes of palatable,

marketplace,

action (177)

.

implemented social

Communication, then, is still task-oriented;

even though each unveiling is simultaneously a reveiling, we
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.

reconstruct them according to the theme of connected

enlightenment to which we all intuitively throng.
More to the point, the field of consideration

(of

possible rumor-scenarios) that Shibutani is willing to
grant
is initially constrained -- assumed public tenets
of

rationality and pragmatism mean that necessarily some
explanations will be instantly thrown out.
Shibutani

'

s

Witness

strong language in demonstrating this:

perplexed men are trying to develop

a

"When

realistic orientation

toward their environment, pragmatic considerations come
first.

Some individuals may become hysterical, but their

remarks are discounted by others"

(93,

emphasis mine)

Shibutani also gives himself away as fundamentally

suspicious of the irrational character of rumor-action.

When he describes the behavior of rumor-spreading, his
examples of the emotional contagion that precipitates rumor

formation are such lurid displays of mass mania as mobs,
stampedes, bank runs, even lynchings and collective

hallucinations

(95)

He describes crowd behavior as a

collective lack of self-consciousness, critical ability, and
self control

(96)

.

Further, Shibutani is suspicious of the

mechanism by which rumors can be evaluated:
logic change when we're talking rumor;

our ideas of

"images are

juxtaposed and associated rather than logically connected"
(113)

.

And while Shibutani offers up an excess of evidence

showing the rational and social nature of meaning
114

negotiation (in other words, if

a

group is considering

several explanations for a situation, held by
different
members,

the group will almost inevitably work to reconcile

extreme explanations into a moderate, uniformly acceptable

compromise explanation [143, 145]), this transactional
analysis seems to apply only to informal, less empirically

verifiable information

--

nowhere does Shibutani consider or

aver that rational knowledge-assessment may proceed in much
the same way that rumor and gossip-mongering do.

45

What this tap-dancing around the issue amounts to, in

my reading,

is an analysis of rumor that still leaves it

with the taint of distortion, inaccuracy, emotionalism,
irrationality, and ultimately falsehood.

This reading slips

out here and there in the text, most notably when Shibutani

discusses rumors as coincidentally true

--

not because they

convey accurate information but because they produce
information or behavior that confirms the initial (and

initially false) rumor (148)

.

In other words,

accuse

someone of cheating often enough, and eventually you'll

discover some suspicious crib notes under his chair.

False

rumors are uniquely important to Shibutani because they

convey an atmosphere (118, 120); they provide data for
sociological analysis of why a crowd believed the

45

0n this point, see Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar's
Laboratory Life (1986), for an exhaustive interpretation of
exactly how such 'rational negotiation’ takes place, in the
august milieu of contemporary science.
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necessarily absurd things they did (or behaved in
the
positively irrational ways they did)
For all his
.

transactional talk, then, Shibutani is still making
fundamental content - style distinction here
to empirically verify or refute rumors,

--

a

it's important

because only true

rumors show us how truth is produced, and false rumors
show
us only how controllable and directable social behavior
is.

What

'

s

important for us to understand here is that this

dichotomy must necessarily be false

.

Shibutani

1

saying

s

that when we call something a rumor (something that

eventually becomes true, say that Michael Hooker is looking
for a job as a president of any university other than
UMASS)

,

then clearly that thing was never really

a

the first place -- it was truth waiting to happen.

other rumor
~ _

--

rumor in
But this

this rumor about UFOs landing in Harvard Yard

this was clearly identifiable as a rumor (e.g. false)

from the beginning.

The two items are by nature different;

we can learn different things from them (one produces truth,

one produces falsehood)

.

Only rumors can be false, for

Shibutani; therefore whenever we call something a rumor that

becomes true we were misusing language at the time.
Shibutani

'

s

connecting up of truth and rumor comes at the

cost of creating an unbridgeable chasm between rumors with
the ring of empirical truth,

and false rumors that are
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merely sociological curiosities and not useful
for the
information they convey. 46
Shibutani's false dichotomy produces
artificial pacing for rumor.

a

similarly

He traces a crisis - stasis path

to explain how rumors occur and are resolved.

Because

Shibutani's bias is towards rational, complete, consistent

knowledge-gathering that fundamentally is at odds with rumor
formation,

Shibutani's explanation for how rumors occur is

essentially only that ambiguous historical situations
occur

(in other words,

situations that can't easily be

explained away by current beliefs and ideologies)

,

then the

vacuum of explanation generates excitement, and rumors just
start happening.

The major difficulty with this schematic

is that it simply fails to explain how the movement from

stasis to crisis and back again really would occur 47

.

In

other words, Shibutani has been arguing that rumors depend
on trusting networks reliably trading information to

supplement existing institutional channels.

So he's

acknowledging that rumors and rumor- traders are always
already present in normal social life.

But suddenly,

this

46

0ne has only to look at the noticeably condescending
language with which Shibutani describes belief in false
rumors, and the absurd character Shibutani ascribes to false
rumors, to justify this point (93, 96, 108, 113, 123).
47

This analysis is analogically drawn from the critical
analysis Henry Theriault provides, to explain why most
identity accounts of nationalism fail to explain both the
continuing existence of nations and why counternationalist
rebellions do and do not occur, in his paper " Ant inat ional - ism
and Armenia"
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mechanism of authority/ subterranean
communication becomes
incapacitated by historical coincidence, and
communication
breaks down

--

rumors become the predominant currency of

information, until peace is restored
is accepted)

.

(a

dominant explanation

But except for the cases in which information

is clearly simply not mechanically available

natural

(e.g.

disasters, after which presses are inoperable, phone
lines
are down, etc.),

there's no justification given for why

suddenly institutional channels are much less trustworthy
than previously, or suddenly rumor channels are much more

trustworthy 48

.

I

think it takes

a

different kind of

analysis of rumor and gossip to answer successfully these

questions of why and how gossip and rumor happen
to the point,

(or,

more

to demonstrate why and how they're omnipresent

and coextensive with our 'legitimated' knowledge)
So as we have seen,
a more

the spin doctors, while preserving

sophisticated notion of truth and falsehood than the

social meteorologists

(making much more of intermediating

categories such as judgment)

,

and while allowing gossip and

rumor the power at least partially to construct reality
(instead of acting as mere social indicators)

,

are

ultimately perpetuating the same stale old myths as their
more primitive counterparts.

For these theorists, gossip

and rumor are still negative, destructive forces.
48

While

Cf
the Harper
forum (1986), where gossipists argue,
with little justification, that suddenly we're gossiping more
because we've become more cynical.
.

'
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,

.

they may not carry the harsh taint of virus
or poison with
them,

it is only because their methods are
more devious.

Gossip and rumor construct false realities, these
word- and
idea-twisters and manipulators; their activity is never

wholly constructive, and usually reducible to one or
another
readable agenda (be it personal or political)
The
.

theoretical dance-steps are more fun to watch than

Bergmann

s

same tune

1

.

3

old one-two, but ultimately, we're dancing to the
(ouch)

Gossipy Voices

Happily enough, it is clear that the disciplines within
the social sciences are clearly not anathema to the

production of good work on gossip.

Three works in

anthropology, by Sarah Elizabeth Miller (1992)
(1963),

,

Max Gluckman

and Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar (1979), as well

as one writer in communications,

Peter DeBenedittis

(1993)

have managed to produce creative and productive analyses of

gossip and rumor that give some play to the complications
inherent within it.

Each are not like the meteorologists,

in that they are not reductive about their conceptions of

gossip; nor are they like the spin doctors, reading gossip

conversations as personal

(or political)

manipulations only,

with shadowy, ultimately false relations to truth.

Miller,

Gluckman, DeBenedittis, Latour and Woolgar are able to

appreciate gossip and rumor that is purposive without
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necessarily being malicious.
with Gluckman

,

It's appropriate to begin

first because his 1963 article is really the

important touchstone to this entire debate, and second,

because I've been dropping some rather gossipy hints
about
him for some time now.
From the opening of his article, Gluckman takes

a

strong stance with gossip, and challenges his readers, on
the basis of our own experience
us)

,

(as he

continually reminds

to reexamine our preconceptions of gossip and give it

the weight in our lives it deserves.

He writes:

I imagine that if we were to keep a record of how
we use our waking- time, gossiping would come only
after "work" -- for some of us -- in the score.
Nevertheless, popular comments about gossip tend
to treat it as something chance and haphazard and
often as something to be disapproved of

[308]

This is a provocative and accurate point

you think he intends "for some of us"?).
think,

(which way
It

do

[s]

is also,

I

one that could be applied to the professional

writings about gossip.

Part of the reason Gluckman takes

such a strong stance towards gossip is that his perspective
on what counts as gossip is much broader than previous and

contemporary accounts of gossip.

When reading Gluckman

'

article in the context of all the other works on gossip, one

difference immediately becomes striking:

Gluckman does not

rush to define gossip, and when he does make definitional

statements about gossip, none of them are in the dictionary

category of "personal talk or stories about an absent party"
120

used by almost every other writer on
gossip.

Gluckman never
forces himself to come right out and
clearly define gossip,
which might strike some as methodologically
shocking,

but in

this context is remarkably refreshing.

Gluckman from the

start incorporates his own intuitions
and experiences into
his analysis of prior anthropological
research, and the

result is a refreshingly expansive notion of
gossip.
The magnitude of Gluckman'

s

treatment becomes clear

when he begins to discuss in what contexts gossip
occurs.

Gluckman gives a quick account of professional gossip
(309)
that is both compellingly clear and indicative of
all the

fluidity and indeterminacy of gossip as it actually happens.
Professional gossip, notes Gluckman,

"is built into

technical discussion so tightly that the outsider cannot
always detect the slight personal knockdown which is

concealed in

a

technical recital, or the technical sneer

which is contained in

a

personal gibe"

(ibid)

.

This brief

statement is a dramatic recasting of gossip on several
levels.

First,

it acknowledges that gossip happens at work,

and second, that it happens in working situations

-

not

simply at the water cooler, in the cafeteria, while waiting
for the bus.

And third,

it acknowledges that the borders

between work comments and gossip comments are not easy to
draw

--

one of the reasons, Gluckman avers,

that it is so

difficult to be a social scientist (or any other kind of
outsider)

in this context is that it is so difficult to tell
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which comments are apropos and which are
not

--

which are

professional and which are gossip.
While Gluckman doesn’t address this point
further, this
analysis invites speculation --is this problem
merely
one

for outsiders,

problem
which

I

(if

or do the insiders themselves also have
this

indeed we were to think of it as a problem,

wouldn't)?

In other words,

could a participant in

a

professional conversation be able to differentiate clearly
in retrospect between the personal gibes and the
technical

evaluations?

Following Gluckman'

on my own personal experience,

I

s

dictate,

and reflecting

would have to say that some

distinctions are easy to draw, but that there are many
remarks which are both professional and gossipy.
importantly,

And more

it doesn't make sense simply to pull remarks

out of the conversational context and label them as one

thing or another, because regardless what we might call
them,

these remarks have effect as to the outcome and

decisions in conversations; therefore, Gluckman

1

s

quick

point suggests the importance of not rushing to draw

distinctions between gossip and non-gossip, because the two
are so interrelated in our lives.

interdependently

,

Both happen at once, and

to inform our decisions and beliefs --

therefore the only result of fixating on whether or not some
one remark is gossip or not can be that we look for excuses
to discount the merit of the remark.
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However,
of Gluckman s
'

this is far from the only creative
observation
.

As Gluckman's analysis of Elizabeth
Colson's

study of the Makah Indians demonstrates,
gossip is not a
phenomenon confined to one group or kind of
group (women,
the unemployed,
fact,

the poor, particular ethnic groups)

--

in

one of the effects of studying gossip is
the

recognition that social classings are hardly static,
and do
not necessarily determine how locals define
themselves.

Gluckman describes how the small community (400) of
Makah,
their lives having been redefined and reorganized on
every

possible scale for the past century by this country's
government, do not maintain community unity or possess

univocal beliefs.

Rather,

as their gossip shows,

there is

constant strife in the community, as members seek to define

themselves against each other in terms of class, social
position, religious capacities, and the practice of

witchcraft

(310).

In particular,

Gluckman's article

establishes how these categories by which the Makah are

constantly redefining themselves are not static
no set

(or even

--

there is

reasonably agreed-upon) community standard

for what it means to be higher or lower class.
are totally individualized

(essentially,

Standards

every Makah Colson

talks to describes herself /himself as high class and her/his

neighbors as lower class

[311]),

and totally chaotic.

this ultimately proves for Gluckman (and Colson)

What

is not that

the standards are useless or valueless, because clearly the
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.

notion of social standards carries
weight in Makah society
but that gossip is the meta-standard
by which
the social

standards are set
.. .Makah. values. and
traditions largely persist in
the gossip and in no other way.
To be a Makah
you must be able to join in the gossip,
and
fully a Makah you must be able to scandalize to be
skillfully.
[3n]

Since the categories by which Makah judge each
other (buying
rights to participate in religious or civil
ceremonies,

prosperity, practicing witchcraft) aren't discussed
in any
clearly public sphere but only through gossip, the
only

means by which Makah have access to their society and
their

standards is through gossip.
standards

(such as they are)

Gossip creates both the
and the channels by which

standards are known and debated.

Gossip is the only

standard that is fixed.
Since gossip is the only accessible channel for social

definition and redefinition, it is fortunate indeed that
Gluckman opens gossip up to the widest possible audience.
Unlike some of the social scientists we examined earlier in
this chapter, Gluckman doesn't attempt to confine or

restrict the practicing of gossip to certain social

groupings only.

In fact,

he makes it clear that the gossip

he is most interested in is the gossip that can't be so

stratified.

The gossip he focuses on is neighborly (i.e.

not confined to one gender or one social/economic class)

and he closes his article by specifically addressing gossip
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from one class about another -- gossip about
the distant
(media stars, royalty)
He notes that those kinds of gossip
are less interesting because there's less
invested
.

in the

gossip itself

--

it's more like a conversational nicety for

people who are only transitorily acquainted (i.e.,

a

slightly more interesting version of talking about the

weather [315]).

While

I

don't fully agree with his analysis

of the function of distant gossip, what's refreshing
about

his analysis of gossip is that it focuses on intimate gossip
as it occurs in all different kinds of situations,

sll different kinds of reasons.

and for

His account of gossip

focuses more on group competitiveness and power struggles
than it does on group bonding, but it's clear for Gluckman
that both work interdependently

,

and are blurred

--

in other

words, part of the ways in which groups bond is by gossiping

about other members of the group or measuring themselves

against perceived other groups.

Hence the playful conclusion of Gluckman
that we do indeed need "schools for scandal"

'

s

article,

(313)

Gossip

has an important enough function, helping us to learn about

our social selves and social surroundings,
that it

'

says Gluckman,

worth articulating the basic rules of gossip and

encouraging the practice of gossip (without guilt) even for
the very young.

works

--

The more we understand about the way gossip

about its multiplicity of functions and methods

the more we can recognize and be able to operate its many
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--

voices.

Gluckman is a perceptive reader of gossip.

points out that

a

single line of gossip can have many

meanings; that there can be both

manifest and latent

a

meaning in the gossip and that both can be
right
Again,
here,

He

(

314

).

he differs sharply from his professional
descendants
in that most contemporary gossipists only
recognize

the apparent meaning of gossip conversations.

As we have

seen when we examined Haviland and Bergmann in
particular,

inflection in gossip (body language, facial expression,
laughter or other non-verbal responses) either goes
unobserved, unrecorded, or unremarked.

This suggests that

the non-verbal components of gossip have no real place
or

relevance to its analysis

(except perhaps,

as part of the

amorphous setting of stage so that the reader can feel like
a

real insider)

.

But quite to the contrary,

several times,

when the non-verbal gossip is recorded but not analyzed
Haviland)

,

a

(cf.

reading of the gossip nearly opposite to the

one produced by the gossipist is easily apparent.
But Gluckman'

provocative,

s

call for schools of scandal, while

is also hypostatizing

.

Gluckman thinks that

gossip should be understood (and taught) as a means of

communication that already exists

--

that we should be able

to understand and appreciate the patterns it describes.

This is a dramatic move because it calls for a broad-based

legitimation of gossip, on the basis that we all already do
it and that it has good social effects
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(it

has many social

.

effects,

.

some of which are holding communities
together)

Gluckman simply wants his readers to acknowledge
what
already occurs around them -- while this is
a

simple task,

it is one many social scientists do
not face

(the post-

Gluckman gossipists never make such calls themselves)
Of course,

Gluckman
fact,

'

s

on the other hand,

there is an aspect of

charge that is not provocative at all

encourages control through gossip.

--

that in

Gluckman wants

gossip to be legitimate in part because he thinks it is
(or
should be)

a

defined and definable social phenomenon

--

because he thinks we should be able to learn all the rules
of gossip.

While this is an understandable move from within

the social sciences

(study a society and its patterns of

behavior so that you can explain them to outsiders,
translate them into other kinds of behavior)

,

the effect of

this kind of move is often to erase the very social aspect
of the patterns so described.

To steal E.B. White's famous

line about humor analysis, gossip analysis is like

dissecting

a

frog -- you can do it, but the frog tends to

die in the process.

There clearly are ways in which we can

talk and write about gossip

observed and discussed.

--

there are regularities to be

But when we attempt to isolate and

describe what really matters about gossip, what its real
function is, then we limit ourselves in our understanding of

gossip to our predesignated agenda.
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Gluckman lets his presuppositions about
gossip come
clean when towards the end of his article
he starts to offer
a few basic rules for gossiping
well 313 - 314
);

(

rules that

suggest that values of loyalty, of continuing
to get good
dirt and preserving group intimacy and
stasis are paramount.
While these rules and values are certainly
plausible
as

operators in gossip, they are hardly the categorical
imperatives Gluckman makes them out to be (suggesting
that
someone wouldn't really be a participant in society

if she

failed to observe these rules).
clear,

As Gluckman'

s

article makes

he is interested in gossip because it provides him

with an interesting index by which to determine group

memberships

--

who is in and out, and why

--

how one moves

from group to group, and how groups maintain cohesion or

disintegrate.
srid

But gossip's functions go far beyond that,

it is important in our various attempts to legitimate

gossip that we do not let our controlling agendas take over
the character of the phenomenon we are trying to describe.
So what are we to make of Gluckman

gossip's social disreputability

;

is it

'

s

refusal to explain

merely

(as

Bergmann

suggests) methodological or definitional irresponsibility on
his part?

Gluckman himself suggests some of the answer to

this question.

Contrary to Bergmann

'

s

insinuation, Gluckman

does address the fact of gossip's social disreputability as
a given -- he

merely does so obliquely.

When Gluckman

closes the article, he remarks that while gossip he engages
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.

in is interesting to him and full
of possibility and

enjoyment, gossip others engage in about
him fills him
"rightfully ...with righteous indignation"
315 ).
Ignoring
his repetitive locution, what’s striking
about this
(

statement is that Gluckman does not at all
deny the
association of social and moral disreputability
with gossip
(nor does he question its appropriateness;
note

that he says

he is "rightfully"

indignant)

.

Rather,

Gluckman is simply

locating moral and social disreputability within

a

particular sphere, and hence explaining it (exactly as
Bergmann thinks ought to be done, only the explanation's
not
one Bergmann can appreciate
Since,

[or

perhaps understand]

as Gluckman acknowledges in the opening of the

article, we all engage in gossip, and all engage in it

frequently and with enthusiasm, it would be rather
simplistic and disingenuous
to disapprove of gossip

Instead,

(we can conclude)

(socially or morally)

for any of us

carte blanche.

Gluckman simply acknowledges what seems more

appropriately to be the empirical fact about gossip
only gossip we denounce

a

--

the

priori is that about us, that

gossip over which we have little control, that gossip that
can in fact hold the most power over us
The entire measure of Gluckman

'

s

article is that gossip

holds power because it determines group membership and

position

--

it only follows that hearing gossip about

ourselves would sting (and seem inappropriate and wrong)
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because that gossip would determine whether or not we were

included or excluded, whether or not we measured up to the

currently applicable group standards.

This does not mean

that gossip has a necessary moral or social value.

Bergmann's assumption of such

categorical moral and social

a

value to gossip colors his account just as much as
alleges)

Gluckman

Indeed,

(he

Gluckman's lack of consideration of value colors
'

s

account.

But that is hardly the most salient

point about Gluckman to remember; the critical points for us
here are Gluckman's carefree style, his inclusive

consideration of gossip, along with his attention to
analytic detail, and his ear for gossip.

described status as

a

Gluckman's self-

player in the gossip game, even with

his overgeneralizing weaknesses

more than simply group ranking)

(for surely gossip is about
,

is the virtue that

ultimately makes his article stand out from the crowd, even
after over 30 years.
Where the exciting multiplicity in Gluckman is to be
found mainly in his awareness of myriad forms of gossip
(e.g.,

that men and women gossip, that people from all sorts

of class and employment backgrounds gossip,

sort of topics),

and about all

Sarah E. Miller (1992), makes a convincing

demonstration of the multiplicity of gossip- threads and
interpretations.

Like Gluckman, she begins her work

determined to look for varied but related stories; indeed,
she considers making sense

(not logical)
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of the variations

-

'

why all variations are told, not an
account of which one
is "right" -- one of her main projects
(xxix)
At one

.

point, when describing the difficulty she
had getting

relative strangers to gossip with her in some
intimacy, she
says
:

Unless the person knew me well, turning the
interview into an informal chat the stories I
gleaned by asking are all stiff and empty,
catalogues of the motifs that come alive in other,
appropriate recitations. .1 hesitate to commit the
same violence that the interviews did, labeling a
story and then reciting the motifs common to it.
This tedious process that categorizes each story
neatly, the runaway, the illegitimate pregnancy,
the cross-caste elopement suffers from the same
ills that delivering an
ethnography in a series of categories does -'kinship
'religion,
'marriage customs,
etc.
,

.

1

,

1

233 234
-

[

]

This is a lesson Haviland and Bergmann would do well to
learn; reducing stories to their ostensive content amounts
to stripping the stories

(and their subsequent

interpretations) of all complexity, all resemblance to the

human lives they supposedly articulate.
Miller acknowledges that gossip is very serious
business in Kathmandu (it is the negotiation in the wedding

negotiations that are the background for her study

--

the

formal negotiations that follow the gossip are often merely

windowdressing).

Miller is doing
gossip:

Compared to our other social scientists,
a lot of

things right in her analysis of

she's admitting first off that the "going native"

aspect of anthropology is primarily important as a

credentialling exercise ("only

I
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know where 'there' is", she

;

points out

[xxii]

)

;

she acknowledges several times the

limits of what she can hear and understand, given
her finite

contacts within the Nepali community (xiv, xxix)

indeed,

a

significant strength of her study is that she acknowledges
that her informants might not have been giving her exactly
the story she wanted to hear,
(2-5)

.

or the story they gave others

The point in all of this,

the explicit point Miller

acknowledges that sets her apart from the other social
scientists,

is that gossip is not the constrained passing on

of an objective,

neutral story that then becomes connected

to its auditors without ever changing its fundamental shape,

content or meaning.

Miller's goal with her dissertation is to show how
words make reality

--

not simply in the naively linguistic

sense of words shaping the reality we can understand, but in
the deeper sense of words themselves actually being actions,
of speaking and conceptualizing something actually amounting

to changing prior perceptions,

indeed prior situations.

I

see three unique conclusions in Miller's dissertation that

are nowhere else in the social science literature covered in

this chapter:

gossip forecasts reality, gossip reconstructs

new narratives to explain old, inexplicable events, and

gossip acts as a connector between communities that wouldn't

otherwise be connecting (contra nearly every other social
scientist here, who make it explicit that they think gossip
happens only within small, morally or ethnographically
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.

homogeneous communities)

.

The notion that links these three

conclusions is that gossip, by its very triviality
and
informality, provides a kind of epistemic and
conversational
safe space to make remarks and construct theories
that

simply couldn't be uttered in other kinds of
conversations.
Before

explore my criticisms of that notion, let me

I

explain how

Miller

1

I

see those three claims substantiated in

work

s

Gossip forecasts reality for the Nepali,

conversation has

a

does,

for example,

"word,

"

"

kuraa

,

"

matter, affair"

first because

much more exalted status there than it
in this country.

The Nepali word for

means not only word but "thing, talk,
(166).

Further connotations of "kuraa" all

revolve around movement, change and transfer (231)

kuraa is often used with the word "laagchha"
reality"

(ibid).

--

;

indeed,

"to effect

It’s not simply the language itself that

sets a greater epistemic store by conversation; as Miller

demonstrates, the path the negotiations take often is

determined not by the formal negotiations themselves but by
the informal visits wives

(yes)

pay to each other (364)

Through the course of teasing each other, telling each other
jokes, making delicate inquiries into others'

lives,

and

repeating stories about others' negotiations and weddings,
Nepali women are often able to sound out potential grooms or
brides, persuade the less enthusiastic or calm down the

over- interested,

and even attend to the more practical sides
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of negotiations

wedding gifts

(getting a sense of appropriate dowries,

[8-12]).

Sometimes simply the repetition of

a

particular story or joke can do the work of
narrowing future
possibilities; the speculative talk creates the
reality from
the plurality (178-184).
Stories are purposively
told:

histories are brought in as if to describe a
situation
already established, in the hopes of persuading
and

effecting
past.

a

beneficial future situation to fit with the

Thus the relation to the temporal movement of a

discursive identity is different"

(158)

As this quote so abundantly demonstrates, not only
can

storytelling gossip work ahead in this fashion, so can it

similarly work to reconstruct previous, unsatisfactory
events into a plausible narrative.

The stories are told to

make the future "fit with the past," Miller says.

Gossip

can be forecasting and reconstructive at the same time

--

a

multilayered functionality that is definitely new to this
field.

More particularly, Miller tells the story of a

ritual amongst the Nepali,

"eating one's rice."

The Nepali

believe that some marriages are predetermined; that one
spouse ate the rice of the other in

a

previous lifetime;

that they were bound to end up together (219)

makes clear, this belief fulfills

a

.

As Miller

very practical demand

for the Nepali; it gives them a way by which to explain

otherwise inexplicable pairings.

"There is actually

something minutely illicit about this movement of fate,
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.

:

Miller writes;

"in overriding all other considerations,

it

seems to be most appropriate in scenes
where other factors
are not quite right" (ibid).
Even very particular rituals,
and the gossip surrounding them, can have
a reconstructive
purpose.

event

Indeed,

as Miller points out,

("bhaisaky"/ already done)

that are long past

(224)

is applied only to events

.

Finally, gossip can be connecting,

heterogeneous communities.
[wedding negotiations]

the Nepali word for

can work amongst

Miller phrases it simply:

represent a kind of switchpoint

between cultures, a liaison between disparate discourses"
(422-423)

surrounds

Wedding negotiations, and the gossip that
(creates)

them,

simply are the links between

otherwise disconnected people.
strength; even Miller herself,

social milieu,

These links quickly gain
a

relative stranger in this

soon found herself relating differently to

the gossip because of her particular connection to one

household:

"the very kin relation that allowed people to

include me in a story also prevented me from hearing

elaborate versions from others"

(xxix)

Exactly those

relations also helped her to have more complicated, nuanced
readings of the gossip she was hearing.

Miller makes this

clear as well
It makes no sense to pass a story on to you if you
are not already interconnected by a network of
places and relationships:
to whom would you
circulate it in your turn? How can you relate a
story that is not related to you?

[xiv]
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While those relations, those connections are
sometimes hard
to document (Miller finds that occasionally
she doesn't
fully understand a story she is rereading from her
notes,

because so much of what she heard at the time of telling
was
context or significance that she didn't think crucial
and

didn't record), their technical absence in the dissertation
is far from a dismissal of their relevance.

Rather,

they

demonstrate all the more clearly how deeply nuanced in its
inception gossip is, and how it simply can't be reduced to

members of one tight community trading and re-trading the
same tired old sawhorses of scandal.

Gossip doesn't function this way in Nepali society in
part because of its status as a counterauthoritative

conversational tack.

To explain:

conversation has

a

higher, metaphysically substantial status in Nepali

language, but in part this is so because gossip-conversation
is seen as making reality from a pre-existing plurality.

Gossip conversation, and not authoritative conversation
(e.g.

men's talk, the wedding negotiations per se)

accomplishes these tasks alone.
gossip "suspend
meaning...

[s]

Miller points out that

the authoritative production of

[to glory]

in possibilities,

hard and fast, all mingled up together"

spitting them out
(178-179)

.

So the

methodology that Shibutani exactly criticizes (associating
and combining rather than coldly evaluating) not only takes

place here, but effectively so;
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"spitting out possibilities"

.

for Nepali women as often as not means
having one of those

possibilities actually occur.
More pointedly, gossip creates

a

safe space for the

undermining of authority, not simply by gossip happening,
but by the things the freedom of gossip allows
you to say.

notes that informal conversation "allows important

statements about hierarchy and subordination to be made
unscathed"

(186)

.

Chatter allows people not only to assert

their own social position, but to challenge others'
These kind of methodological and ideological challenges
can occur, Miller attests, because of gossip's position as

trivial and idle.

Miller draws a clear distinction between

"just" gossip, which is idle

(19),

and "real" talk, which is

the purposive pre-negotiation Nepali women carry out
the guise of just gossip, we must assume)

.

(under

She has the

caveat that the truly trivial is necessary, for without it
the real talk could not happen (21-22)

her dissertation,

;

indeed,

she closes

"the innocence and triviality of talk may

constitute its power"

(409)

This,

to me,

where Miller's dissertation falls short.

is the point

Other than this,

she has fully accepted the notion that there can be many

layers to gossip, many meanings, many intentions, many
nuances.

She has enthusiastically argued that gossip can

both foretell and retell stories; that it can create strong

relations while also undermining them.

So why then,

is she

still clinging to the unnecessary final belief that if
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something isn't transparently purposive, then
it's just
gossip; that when all is said and done, gossip
really is
just idle talk?

spin doctors,

This one last move is reminiscent of the

just as Gluckman's final reductiveness of the

origins of gossip amounts to social meteorology.
This thinking (that gossip can be purposive through its

very idleness)

is supported for gossip's corollary of rumor

in Peter DeBeneditt is
C entury

(1993)

Bordallo

generally fine Guam's Trial of

’

the.

tale of a former governor of Guam, Ricky

a

who while running for re-election in 1987 was

,

indicted with corruption of office (hence losing the
election)

.

(Bordallo was eventually acquitted of more than

half of the charges, but sentenced to jury time for the

remaining charges; in

a

protest of his sentencing, Bordallo

fled police custody and shot himself in the head while

chained to a statue in Guam's capital.)
DeBeneditt is

,

who served as the press secretary to

Bordallo 's primary opponent, begins his study with
impressive clarity of purpose --he admits that he thinks
rumors were used unfairly against his candidate, but

acknowledges his own use of rumor, and their power to convey
or undermine misleading official information

(21-22)

Further, he notes the accuracy and immediacy of rumors;

"the

rumor mill was about six months ahead of the papers for

information concerning FBI and local investigations"
Indeed,

(19)

he argues that rumors should be treated as media
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artifacts, advocating for a kind of pluralism
to truth in
history:
"the rumors recounted [here] are intended
to fill

m

the gaps between what was reported by the
press,

by officials, and believed by the community"

claimed

(22-23)

Sifting through the amassed print and television
news
accounts and editorials on the case, as well as
interviewing
the local and international officials involved,
DeBenedittis

draws many conclusions.

Primary among them, though, is his

theory that rumors are a necessary challenge to hegemony,
and even that in some sense hegemony creates challenges to
itself such as rumor.

DeBenedittis argues that for

bloc to form and survive

(and admittedly,

a

power

he argues,

hegemonic blocs are far from static, univocal or nonevolving)

,

an internalized ideology is necessary for its

participants and perpetuators

.

DeBenedittis traces the

effect of this ideology in the news accounts and interviews
about the case; to wit,

that journalists, while strongly

emotional about the case and its effects upon Guam's

political reputation, regarded themselves as reporting "just
the facts" while clearly sifting through and ignoring facts
(165-166),

and that several of the principals involved (most

self-evidently the the prosecuting attorney in the case
against Bordallo) similarly considered themselves to be
"just doing their jobs" while they took an unusually rapid,

emphatic course of action in Bordallo's case (e.g., it is
not unheard-of in Guam to delay preparing indictments for
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women about to give birth, people near
death)

The

prosecuting attorney repeatedly dismisses rumors
associated
with the Bordallo case as "silly" or "laughable"
(97-109)

DeBenedittis' response to these self-images is that
the

participants can only see themselves as neutral,
effective
public servants, whereas their actions betray a (n
inevitable) perspective to perpetuate a structure of
power
that benefits them.

In this setting,

where those in power

give away so little information (107-109)
natural, DeBenedittis argues,
spread,

,

it is only

that rumors will occur and

acting both as a counterpart to "official" theories

and justifying a cynicism in the naive faith in the purity
of the legal system that its proponents hold.

weakness is DeBenedittis

1

The only

analysis occurs in his refusal to

trace out effects of rumors; DeBenedittis does not explain

exactly how the spreading of rumors undermines structures of
power, other than by their simple existence.

Those familiar with the work may be surprised at my

inclusion of Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar's Laboratory
Life:

The Construction of Scientific Facts

section,

(1979)

in this

as nowhere in the book do Latour and Woolgar ever

explicitly reference gossip or rumor as influence or
evidence in their social constructive theory of science

production 49

.

However, a closer examination of the facts

49

The main exception, of course, comes not from the
authors
but
from
who
their
introducer,
Jonas
Salk,
disconcertingly regards as high praise of the book that " [it]
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that Latour and Woolgar consider
when evaluating what

constructs scientific facts reveals some
extraordinarily
gossipy tactics going on in science.
An important caveat is necessary here.

Latour and

Woolgar explicitly condemn gossipy sociology
of science
(sociology of science that has more to do with
the sociology
of scientists than of science itself
[24]), that is often
little more than "scholarly muckraking" (21) 50
They
.

profess themselves disinterested in breathless tales
of
scandal or of the everydayness of scientific invention
they phrase it,
[19]).

(as

"the exchange of great ideas over coffee"

These remarks of theirs might seem explicitly to

disallow any interjection of gossip into scientific analysis
as an inappropriately strong reading of the text.

response,

I

In

would first remind readers of my attempts to

discount stereotypical definitions of gossip as useless for
our purposes here, and suggest that Latour and Woolgar

's

invocations of gossip and scandal here represent only such

stereotypical usage of the words, and not

interesting consideration of gossip.

a

a

philosophically

Further,

as the detail

of Latour and Woolgar s ethnographic research manifestly
1

demonstrates, casual conversation has a significant role to

play in the construction of scientific fact.

In that sense,

is free of the kind of gossip, innuendo, and embarrassing
stories, and of the psychologizing often seen in other studies
or commentaries" (12)
.

50

See also page 32 for further irritated commentary.
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then, we might fairly consider Latour and
Woolgar important,

though perhaps unconscious, advocates of the use
and

significance of gossip in scientific construction.
Consider first how Latour and Woolgar define their own
project:

their "anthropological" account considers how

"many aspects of science described by sociologists depend
on
the routinely occurring minutiae of scientific activity,
the work done by a scientist located firmly at his

laboratory bench"

(27)

Latour and Woolgar wish their

project to be in some sense classical social science

—

adopting an outsider perspective so that all actions are

equally worthy of observation and recording.

(I

say "in

some sense" because Latour and Woolgar also write with great

emphasis about the dangers of pretending objectivity, and

ultimately describe themselves as trying both to respect the
culture of science

[its internal demands,

language] while

writing from the outsider's perspective [39].)

Only then,

they argue, can a genuinely thick-descriptive account of how
science works proceed.

Indeed, exactly their criticism of

much of social studies of science lies in the very

extraordinariness with which social factors are regarded;
for example,

the ways in which social factors are taken into

account only in unusual, controversial, or suspect cases of
science.

By choosing to examine a very well regarded

laboratory, and looking at a team working on

a

scientific

problem that is not under significant public scrutiny,
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Latour and Woolgar wish to be able to describe how
everyday" sociality contributes to the production of

science (31-32

,

37)

And describe they do.

After giving an exhaustive

depiction of the layout of the laboratory (including more

unexpectedly descriptions of individual desks, the
refrigerator, and the roof) and the culture of research

production, Latour and Woolgar assert a 5-type system for
the adoption of scientific fact,
(type

1)

from speculative assertions

to taken- for-granted fact

(type

5)

then monitor one particular scientific fact
and makeup of hormone TRF

[H]

(76-79)

They

(the existence

as it travels the five steps,

both within articles and in the more informal laboratory
culture,

and demonstrate the ways in which micro- and macro-

social forces contribute and shape the reception of this
fact.

In the course of examining the research trail,

Latour

and Woolgar discover that several research teams attempted
to isolate TRF(H), using different strategies

(114-120).

The scientist who ultimately gets the bulk of the credit for

isolating the existence and structure of TRF(H),

R.

Guillemin, pursues a research strategy and arrives at

conclusions substantially similar to several other
researchers and virtually identical to one other researcher
(who is popularly discredited as a researcher early on in

the seven-year process)

(119-122).
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The existence of TRF(H)

(its movement from speculative

hypothesis to contested scientific fact) gets jump-started
when Guillemin proposed new research and methodology

constraints for the TRF(H) project (in lay terms, the goal
was now to seek an integrated proof of the existence and

structure of TRF(H) through teams from a variety of

professional trainings and testings [endocrinological,
physiological, chemical], rather than the previous

hypotheses produced by partial testing)

,

which when acceded

to by the professional community served to eliminate

alternative strategies and researchers 120-12 3
(

51
)

.

Because

Guillemin proposed new, "rigorous" constraints to TRF(H)
research, he was simultaneously able to dismiss previous

research and theories as to the existence and structure of
TRF(H)

as "hasty"

(and correlatively

,

of course, establish

himself and his laboratory as the leader in the subfield)
(121).

Among those publications Guillemin dismisses are

both of the alternative theories referred to above, that

substantially or virtually adumbrate Guillemin' s eventual,

celebrated theory of the structure of TRF(H)

.

Latour and

Woolgar do not conclude from this saga that TRF(H) is not

a

scientific fact, nor that Guillemin is incorrectly or
^Individual researchers were eliminated because of the cost of the
equipment or chemicals necessary to run the great variety of tests, and
or
the necessity of researchers gaining additional research experience
available
hiring additional researchers, a time and money investment not
the
abandoned
v\ho
researcher
One
environment.
in a pressured research
pretty
TRF(H) project noted that the new constraints limited research
labs.
strictly to the Uhited States
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unethically attributed with credit for working on the
structure of TRF(H).

Rather, their tracing out of this

metamorphosis of reputation and fact serves both to
undermine our notion of

a

preexisting natural, categorized

"reality" that is somehow newly seen by scientists (129),
and correlatively to disconnect ourselves from the

conclusion that scientific chases are somehow inevitably
end-directed.

Several other researchers articulated the

structure of TRF(H); but only one researcher, due in part to
his reputation as the definer of the field, holds the

credit
More strikingly, Latour and Woolgar identify the

hundreds of informal conversational negotiations of
expertise, evaluation, reputation, and alliance that take

place in laboratories

—

consultations about whether or not

to read an article (is the author reputable?

how do field

experts regard the conclusions?), an evaluation of

potential professional threat (how good

a

a

reputation does a

competing research team have?), where a drafted article
should be sent for publication, ranging to more mundane
enquiries, such as where an item of scientific apparatus has

been placed (or misplaced) in the lab (157-160).

What is

critical for our purposes about Latour and Woolgar 's
to isolate
analysis here is the way in which they choose not
of
or overemphasize the uniqueness or extraordinariness
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these conversations,

conversations'

and their emphasis of these

intrinsic diversity.

Witness these remarks:

.there is no indication that such exchanges
comprise a kind of reasoning process which is
markedly different from those characteristics of
exchanges in nonscient if ic settings.
Indeed, for
an observer, any presupposed difference between
the quality of 'scientific' and commonsense
exchanges soon disappears.
[158, emphasis mine]
.

.

'

In short,

"scientific" thinking is not some special, ultra-

rat ional occurrence;

mental
a

to put it analogically,

there is no

gear-shift" that takes place to magically transform

scientist from her "normal" thinking manner to her

"professional" one.

Scientific conversations as a matter of

course contain social negotiations; the important caveat

Latour and Woolgar have to offer here is that this in no way

undermines or devalues the scientific conclusions they draw
(it

simply socializes and localizes them)

.

And further on:

The wealth of evaluations makes it impossible to
conceive of thought processes or reasoning
procedures occurring in isolation from the actual
material setting where these conversations took
place.
[159]

This passage can be rather straightforwardly read as an

empirical demonstration of one of Gluckman's central points
in his 1963 article:

that technical gossip

(pointed

evaluation of a fellow) can occur invisibly within
professional conversation, can be undetectable to the
outsider.

That series of conversation topics

I

quickly

listed above surely offers the possibility for gossip
amongst it

--

we "check in" with colleagues about their off-
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the-cuff opinions about an article, a colleague,

a

competitor.

Latour and Woolgar offer up evidence of these
conversations' informality; remarks include frequent

jokes,

laughter,

and casually extreme comments that publication-

r^i^ded scientists would be unlikely to utilize in
more

formal settings,

such as commenting that one colleague had

made an ass of himself" at a recent conference

(
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)

While the topics and information may be serious, the

conveying of the information is ironic, humorous, casual,
intimate

all hallmarks of the kind of gossipy

conversation Miller and Gluckman observe.
Further, Latour and Woolgar note that occasionally

scientific statement evaluation will be explicitly personal:
...Instead of assessing a statement itself,
participants [occasionally] tended to talk about
its author and to account for the statement either
in terms of authors
social strategy or their
psychological make-up.
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[

]

Technical gossip, then, can be more and less explicit in the

scientific laboratory; Latour and Woolgar give us examples
along a range.

The sort demonstrated in the TRF(H)

(Guillemin with one stroke establishing

a

saga

reputation for

himself by disreputing others) is more formal; these casual

conversations Latour and Woolgar document far less so.

All

sorts accomplish similar goals, just more and less

documentably

.

Of course,

I

would argue that these latter

sorts of technical evaluations are so invisible to Latour
and Woolgar that they are incapable of labelling them gossip
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(the sole failing

I

find with this book), but they are

gossip nonetheless.
is of course irritating that
even those authors most

sympathetic to the variety in aim and function
in gossip
still hold reservations, seemingly about
the word itself and
its accompanying reputation.
But other than that,
all the

writers

m

this section allow for an impressive, and
useful,

amount of critical analysis of gossip and rumor
that permit
them variety and interest, pleasure and purpose.
In other
words, as Gluckman, Miller, and DeBenedittis
attest (unlike

every other writer in this chapter) they write like
real

gossips

--

high praise,

indeed.
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Conclusion
The social accounts of gossip and
rumor that form the
backbone of this chapter (Bergmann,
Haviland, Shibutani
Tannen, Bet Or, Allport and Postman,
Knopf) are importantly

flawed

--

they either ignore or distort many of
the

important observations in Gluckman's article.
of gossip

trivialize the topic

--

Some analyses

while they recognize that

gossip and rumor are interesting and worthy of
study, they
take their value to lie primarily in the
fact that they

give

us a view of how people behave in their "off"
time.

This

"off" time,

so it seems from my reading of these social

scientists,

is demonstrably less important than "on"

time

.

Social scientists like to see how people behave

when they're really being themselves (i.e., they're
relaxing,

they're chatting), but only because it's important

to know the whole community, not because there's any

relation to or intermingling of on time and off time.
short,

In

it's important for contemporary social scientists to

have an account and explanation of gossip in society because
it's a credentialling exercise

they know the "real" community.

52

--

it's a demonstration that

However,

the gossipy

Any. skeptics need only read Haviland 's preface (ix)
for
direct inscription of exactly this assumption as a "worry"
about the efficacy of gossip-centric anthropology; a worry
that "stems not from a dissatisfaction over what I have
learned about how Zinacantecos think and talk - I am glad to
have gotten as far as I have - but from the fear that much of
this book is irrelevant to the lives of Zinacantecos and the
conditions that underlie those lives."
a
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,

knowledge they have of a community
doesn't get related back
to the knowledge that really matters
of a community (which
still lies along traditional ethnographic
lines:
religious
beliefs and practices, work behavior,
family constitution,
class structure, kinship, civil government,
sexual
practices, dietary practices, etc.); gossip
is still an

outsider

m

weighty)

factor in understanding

words,
a

social science, and still a trivial
a

society 53

.

(but now

in other

for Gluckman gossip is important to
understanding how

society works because of what gossip does, and
what

happens during gossip; but for these other
gossipists,

gossip is important for formal reasons only.

Why is it important to read (or care about) what
these

professionals have to say about gossip in society
it a relevant move

(other than self -credent ialling)

this long criticism of these folks?
this question that

--

I

think

I

I

why was
to do

have two answers to

pertinent right now.

The first pertains to this work.

If

had to, after

I

reading the social scientists, restrict myself to one

criticism of all of them (difficult task)

5

I

would have to

~Jorg
Bergmann,
himself
one
of
the
preeminent
trivializers of gossip while singing its praises, makes
precisely this point when he considers his gossip-friendly
social scientist colleagues.
As he puts it, conversation
enters the domain of scientific research "only to be captured
there like an illegal border jumper and either put into
quarantine or 'sent back' again" (24).
Gossip, and more
generally conversation, gets oversimplified and hence frozen
as a topic of scientific research, or researched so that its
inadequacy as a topic of fruitful research can be revealed.
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say that all authors have
written tautologous books here,
What I consider to be tautology
he re is the omnipotence of
all authors' assumptions about
who gossips, what gossip is
about, and what power gossip can
(or cannot) have.
Their
assumptions very clearly determine the
methods they choose,
the definitions they use, and
ultimately the conclusions
they draw.
Their assumptions are in general
tacit, and have
to be teased from the works by
what I hope was my close
analysis of their various inclusions and
exclusions from the
text
Now,

that

I

before

I

sound too arrogant, let me assure you

think most books are pretty tautologous.

The reason

someone chooses to write at length about a
topic is because
s/he has something to say to motivate the
writing
(the

'

50 s

science-nerd fantasy that we write simply to explore

neutrally a topic is exactly and only
some initial ideas,

essence

I

a fantasy)

--

intuitions that spur the work.

s/he has
So in

think there are more and less interesting

tautologies

-

there are assumptions people have

(and

analyses people carry out and conclusions people draw) that
are productive to read because they go against the

tautologies that are conventional wisdom (assuming there

really is conventional wisdom)

.

I

find the social science

analyses of gossip that are the subject of this chapter

uninteresting ultimately because they seek only to reproduce
conventional wisdom

--

to explain why we should go on
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believing that gossip is trivial,
often wrong, often nasty,
often morally dubious if not outright
evil, and never
powerful.
It is too easy to hold those
beliefs about
gossip, and it is too uninstruct ive
as it is)

I

think my work (such

on gossip is a more interesting
tautology because

my initial intuitions about gossip
important,

.

--

that it can be

right, positive, morally powerful and
strictly

powerful, and epistemologically relevant

--

have the

capability to be instructive, because they
challenge

overwhelming conventional wisdom and 'everyday
conceptions'.
Less centrally,

I

think it is important to take

seriously how the social scientists consider gossip
because
it is a microcosm of how the social scientists
work,

and

hence how it is we arrive at our social beliefs (or
whether
or not we maintain them)

.

What

I

have tried to suggest

throughout this chapter (hopefully not too hamhandedly)

is

my general reaction to the social scientists' treatment of

gossip

--

as awkward,

method is not

a

ill-fitting,

clumsy.

The scientific

pristine Platonic ideal to be clumsily

attempted to apply to the clay of humanity, it is simply one
construct of a technique of arriving at human understanding.
There are many others

.

Much has been written about the

impossibility of assuming rationality to be the only means
of analysis and understanding;

when taking on

a

I

think it is curious that

topic as unwieldy, as difficult to analyze,

and as fluid and uncategorized as gossip (other than by that
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darn conventional wisdom)

,

that the social scientists we

examine here choose to apply the truth
of their training in
the most elementary, compulsively
rational, compulsively
over-categorizing and subsumptive way possible 54
I think
it is similarly curious that the
authors think that they
have learned real, rational truths from
such divisive and
dichotomizing approaches to gossip. Max Gluckman
concisely
opened some possibilities for a productive,
creative
.

analysis of gossip.
(save Sarah Miller)

I

think his professional descendants

have failed to do either,

and in doing

so demonstrate some of the outdated character
of social

science in applying to truly social, and hence very
truly
human, phenomena.

54

I particularly savor the irony of the post-1963 gossip
writing (again, including Gluckman' s own) being so especially
ungainly in its analysis. Before Gluckman "outed" gossip, and
made it a
"legitimate"
topic for scientific analysis,
gossipwork could be more carefree, perhaps. Only after gossip
became a "real" issue did social scientists have to work more
carefully; that is, with much less creativity, and a method
much less applicable to the confusion and clamor of social
_

lif e

.
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CHAPTER

2

METHODOLOGY LITE; WHY GOSSIP IS ALMOST
ALWAYS TRIVIAL
IN THE HUMANITIES

The previous chapter reveals nothing
so much as the

wide-reaching homogeneity in social science.

Gossip and

rumor's impressively long-lived, broadly
studied pedigree in
the social sciences is essentially a mirage -social

scientist upon social scientist takes it upon
him or herself
to establish what gossip and rumor really are,
and again and
again these well -credent ialed professionals come up
with
the

unsurprising fact that gossip and rumor are nothing so
much
as what common wisdom says they are.-- malicious,
communitydestroying distortions (if not outright lies)

,

whose only

virtue can claim to be in revealing exactly the petty ground
upon which social ranking and ordering happens (my former
friend broke this or that social taboo, and so in gossip

I

will reveal this fact and denigrate him socially)
The review of the social science literature reveals
that not only do most of the scientists seem never

themselves actually to gossip (hence the moralizing tones
their analyses often take)
surprisingly)

,

but that

(even more

their work is riddled with condescension

towards those unwitting people who do indulge in gossip.
best,

At

gossipers are shallow (enjoying trivial conversation

for its unself -conscious pleasures); at worst, gossipers are
J.

Edgar Hoovers in miniature, conducting localized witch154

hunts appropriately to root out and
punish community
deviants, for social stakes far more
insignificant than
those of seventeenth-century Salem.
Indeed, Henry

Kissinger's remark when he left the tempest in- teapot

Harvard for the headier political climate of
Washington
recalls this attitude of the social scientists:
"the

battles are so fierce,
so small"

(Isaacson).

"

he sneered,

"because the stakes are

Social scientists'

flattening out of

the meaning of gossip and rumor is interesting not
only for

what it does to those two concepts
indexes)

,

(reduce them to social

but because for what it correlat ively does to the

social agents in question.

Gossipers become laughable

either in their triviality, or in their malevolence.

neither case does gossip or rumor seem

a

In

worthwhile topic

for study; for what meaningful lessons are we learning from

such people, whatever could they teach us?
To use these points as springboards into the discussion
of humanists,

the first obvious comparison between the

fields is their respective methodologies.
the philosophers,

the theologians,

The lit critters,

the folklorists and the

historians don't seem to have nearly the obsession with
rigorous accounts of how they proceeded (no graphs so far)
-

but this isn't to say that they're sloppy.

-

To illustrate,

it's clear from the bibliographies and source discussions in
the book-length works discussed here that authors

painstakingly reviewed and evaluated the respective
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literatures on gossip and rumor; writers
analyzing rumor
often supply exhaustive primary source
reference to document
rumor transmission and evolution.

Lack of precision in

terminology and method does not equal carelessness.

As we

saw in the first chapter, overwhelming expanse
of method

does not guarantee originality of insight

--

in fact,

it can

be a clear stultifier of insight.
To reformulate this,

the striking thing about the

social scientists is their compulsive need to control
gossip
to use their methodology so absolutely that gossip,

the

ultimate in uncontrollable phenomena, appears restrained and
transparent.

scientists

Of course,

the transparency of social

gossip is essentially an emptiness

—

they can

learn nothing about gossip, they can understand nothing
about the way it occurs or why, because they commit

themselves to understanding only its orderliness, of which
there is none.

So their insights are not simply surface,

they're illusory.

The fun thing about the lit critters

(and

other "lite" methodologists, like philosophers [!]), is that
they're not so compulsive about controlling gossip through

their methodology, so some problematic insights and fissures
in the smooth surface of textual analysis can appear.

These

more problemat izing analyses of gossip and rumor are

discussed in the latter sections of this chapter;
specifically, 2.3,

"Doppelganger Gossips," and 2.4,

"Archaeologists of Gossip" present analyses of gossip and
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rumor that grant epistemic legitimacy to
the contents of
idle chat.
This granting is permissible in large
part
because the varying humanists consider a
multiplicity of

perspective
Still,

non- controversial component to social
reality.

a

humanists are no less capable of constricting

gossip and rumor into socially restricted categories
(to use
Bergmann's phrase, quarantining it from everyday, kosher
discourse).

Historians,

for example,

in utilizing gossip

and rumor as analytical tools, resist the obvious

application

--

suggesting its persistence and importance in

modern-day ethical and social issues.

Literary theorists,

in analyzing gossip as a trope in texts,

overwhelmingly

restrict gossip from having particular, determinate effects
on life

and in so doing observe a kind of unspoken

distinction between gossip-time and real-time, fictional
life and real life

(these humanists are discussed in the

first section of the chapter,
Rumor")

.

Philosophers,

of conversation,

"The Trope of Gossip and

in analyzing gossip as a subcategory

cannot resist the temptation to lay down

strict rules of when it is and is not appropriate to chat
about one's fellows

(see 2.2,

"Referees of Chatter").

me map out the categories of analysis,
of the preceding chapter 1

Let

following the bounds

:

1

As in the first chapter, there are apparently no
humanists who can conceive of gossip or rumor being both
passive
(simply
a
social
index,
uncontrollable
and
unpredictable) and truthful; again the category remains empty.
I divide those humanists who regard gossip and rumor as an
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Truth

Falsity

Passive
Gossip

see footnote

Active

2.4 Archaeologists of

1

2

.

1

Trope

of

and Rumor

Gossip
1P

2.2 Referees of

Chatter
2.3 Doppelganger

Gossips

In sum,

then,

there is substantially more to celebrate,

for the catty of mind,

about the humanists than there is

about the social scientists.

The social scientists are more

overt and hamhanded in their distinctions between gossiptime and real-time, with concomitant values of idleness
and

waste versus purpose and seriousness; whereas the lite

methodologists almost always acknowledge the possibility of
competing interpretations of the purpose and value of gossip
as compared to "serious" conversation.

We can see this

reflected in the structure of this chapter; ultimately,
humanists can conceive of more theoretical possibilities for

gossip and rumor.

In the final analysis,

however, most

humanists tend to observe the same lines in the sand, and
dismiss or trivialize gossip and rumor.
so more directly

(as do this

If they do not do

chapter's opening theorists),

active social construct and largely false into two sections
because I think it is important to distinguish between those
humanists feigning no judgmental tone, and those who write
largely to adjudicate disputes of gossip.

,

they do so indirectly
too- scarce

-

by heightening the value of all-

rational, purposive discourse.
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2.1

The Trope of Gossip and Rumor

Despite the creativity of their approaches,
many
humanists fall into the same trap of their social
science
colleagues:
reducing gossip and rumor to entirely passive
literary devices.
For these academics, studying gossip and
rumor is relevant only insofar as they demonstrate
other

fundamental human truths

(how intimate are humans; do humans

mean what they say; what are communal norms)
for what they actually do.

In other words,

,

rather than

gossip and rumor

possess status only for what they represent, not for what
they depict, change, challenge, or construct.
Foremost within this category stands Patricia Meyer

Spacks

now-authoritative Gossip (1985).

'

the book's virtues,

seriously,
story,

Principal among

if we are to take its dust jacket blurbs

is its successful commingling of gossip with

showing the ways in which our conversational and

literary stories similarly tell tales of human foibles and
intimacy.
Bok)

Indeed,

two commentators

(one of them Sissela

commend Spacks for her (apparently surprising) ability

to show some kind of substance to the "triviality" of

While this praise at first might sound important

gossip.

(a

theorist of gossip who does not hold gossip to stern

standards of validity/invalidity

,

a

scholar interested in

how gossip functions both in literature and life,

a

scholar

who challenges widely held cultural norms of the serious and
trivial)

,

the content of Spacks' work actually leaves much
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1

.

to be desired.

In particular,

Spacks

'

emphasis on gossip as

storytelling ultimately not only restricts its
import in
non- 1 terary spheres, but presents gossip
for us as nothing
more than a trope, a literary version of
the social

barometer the social scientists presented last
chapter.
short,

Spacks

1

In

gossip is an entirely passive literary

phenomenon, revealing (not creating, challenging, or
interpreting) eternal and immutable human truths.

Spacks herself would not agree with this

interpretation.

She begins her book by announcing her

project as "a rescue operation:

to restore positive meaning

to a word that had once held it"

(x)

"Rescuing" gossip,

it

soon becomes clear, means reasserting the complicatedness of

gossip that lies behind the narrow public condemnation of
it.

Indeed,

she closes the book by reminding us that gossip

isn't an easy topic

--

we can't trivialize it,

easily judgeable (morally or intellectually)
is often impossible to assess or predict.

"essential ambiguity," she writes,

unconscious motives.

,

it's not

and its impact

Gossip has

"mixed and often

Reassuring and connecting, troubling

and divisive, relentlessly ambiguous, gossip evades easy

ethical distinctions"

(258-259)

.

Gossip is interesting,

Spacks ultimately observes, because it manifests itself in
such divergent fashions,

effects

--

to such wide effects.

Its positive

its constructions of personal intimacy,

interpretations of community norms or mores
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--

erupt exactly

through gossip's small-mindedness, its
pettiness, its
triviality.
Indeed, the function of literature

in some

sense is nothing more than gossip writ large

,

"reveal [ing]

the complexity of a self in its own consciousness
and in the

consciousness of others, uncover [ing] discrepancies
between
the two vies,
(261)

.

dramatiz [ing] the tension of self and society"

We would do best,

Spacks concludes by suggesting,

not by denouncing the moral danger inherent within gossip,
but rather by marking gossip's path and impacts through
our

titclss and communities.

For it is only through inevitable

gossip that we gain any possibility of a new perspective on

ourselves and each other.
While such strong statements in defense of gossip 2 may

spark exhiliration, they contrast sharply with the rest of
Spacks' work.

Indeed,

as Spacks makes clear as she analyzes

manifestations of gossip in (primarily English and American)
literature, not only does gossip not ultimately resist easy
forms of categorization, but in fact her book is nothing

quite so much as a series of discrete analytical

categorizations that don't seem to leave us much further

incidentally Spacks also remarks in this concluding
chapter
that
such
a
popular
defense
of
gossip
was
"inconceivable" twenty years ago (259)
While it is certainly
clear that the bulk of mainstream "defenses" of gossip (if
indeed they are that) as well as academic treatments appeared
after Max Gluckman's 1963 article, it is still important to
note (as I did in Chapter 1) that defenses of gossip were not
unheard of, even before the sixties.
Gluckman's article
simply brought gossip to the academic mainstream, a far
different kind of advance.
,

.
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)

along

m

understanding

a

.

conception of gossip.

Gossip here

is not so much uncategorizable as
categorized right out of

existence.

As a first example,

let us look to the issue so

important to the theorists of the last chapter
is defined.

makes clear,

Indeed,

as the langage in Spacks

'

--

how gossip

final chapter

she has difficulty coming up with one sense
of

how gossip appears or makes its effect known;
it can have
highly divergent motivations, intentions, impacts,
communities.

Given that, the reasonable reader might

wonder, what then connects the different literary

conversations Spacks is grouping together under the rubric
of

gossip"?

Is it gossip simply when an epistolary

novelist proclaims it so?
Perhaps unsurprisingly, what makes

conversation

a

gossip for Spacks is the now-standard dictionary definition:
"idle talk about persons not present"

(26)

Of course,

the predeterminations such a definition presents

discussed in Chapter
driven,

1)

occur here

all

(as

(gossip is content-

can only be about people, comes with a necessary air

of secretiveness or the clandestine

[58]

.

In addition,

Spacks immediately refines her definition by clarifying
"idle"

--

"lack of announced purpose:

committee about the behavior of

a

(ibid)

.

a

personnel

candidate for promotion

presumably does not qualify as gossip
mighty close"

talk in

--

although it can get

While in her applications of this

definition to analysis of literary texts, Spacks ascribes
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.

.

various effects from gossip, what is clear from
the outset
is that these consequences are only accidentally
connected

to or resulting from the gossip itself;
is purposeless

.

inherently, gossip

So purposeless is gossip,

Spacks makes a particular point

indeed,

(pace Gluckman

that

[1968]

)

of

distinguishing between what are merely gossipy (but still
purposive)

discussions in meetings, and real gossip, which

has no motivating purpose.

purposiveness,

in part,

Spacks grounds this lack of

in gossip's uncontrollability;

at

one point she likens gossip to rumor, dinner-table chat,

aphorism, news, and story

--

all in their varying degrees of

individual intellectual control

(52)

Gossip,

like these

other conversational formations, is interesting in part
because its effects and paths are so hard to trace or
direct 4

.

This initial awareness of complexity is

The
example
of
the
personnel
committee
meeting
recollects Max Gluckman' s eager backpedaling in 1968
professionals don't really gossip (or there is no such thing
as "professional gossip", to wit, gossip that is part of doing
a professional's job) because they are too purposive, any talk
that has a point can't be gossip.
Only the truly fruitless
talk can be gossip, which happily lets chatty academics
inclined to trade naughty rumors about their colleagues under
the guise of "serious" evaluation off the hook.
Spacks,
apparently, suffers the same prejudice.
3

4

0f course, Spacks later on seems to contradict this very
point, suggesting that "gossipers generate meanings, which
While it
they may choose to keep within their group" (103)
is certainly not implausible to consider gossip-generated
readings of events or persons that are strictly confidential,
the mildness of "may" suggests that this occurrence is far
more individually controllable, as well as far more common,
Indeed, the reason why
than simple observation indicates.
news, conversation
with
rumor,
along
Spacks admires gossip
constructions
of events --as
their
social
etc. is because of
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.)

.

,

,

.

promising; my contention is simply that Spacks
fails to
follow through with the implications of this
line of

thinking
It

is important to note at this point that
Spacks'

definition of gossip crops up in the midst of

a

blistering

attack on the unfair connotations attributed to the
word
over the centuries.

Spacks lays out a tidy etymology of the

word "gossip" from its origins in ancient English as
relative or friend of the family

(25)

a

close

to its contemporary

definition, dating from the 18th century, of gossip as

a

necessarily morally scurrilous activity (and ultimately, in
the 19th century, gossip takes on the status of a noun as

well as a verb

[26]

.

Such moral advocacy disguised as

lexicography, argues Spacks, misses the positive values to
gossip,

and hence fails at capturing the concept

(ibid)

Later in the book, Spacks offers an additional definition of

gossip as

a

"mode of relatedness"

(204)

and chastises other

writers for considering gossip to be "human dirt" or the
"ballast" which connects us to the earth.

This muck, Spacks

energetically responds, is exactly the stuff great novels
are made of; gossip is about the topics most interesting to

people.
in novels

The topics and voices of gossip reassert themselves
(204-205)

even the most rudimentary understanding of social science
informs us, the social world is hardly characterized by its
submission to individual intentions.
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;

.

However,
herself,

.

for all this vitality in argument, Spacks

in her own attempts to gain control over
what

gossip means, similarly fails to grasp the variety
implicit

m

gossip.

She begins by noting that gossip "spill

sometimes dangerously,

into the real world"

[s]

over,

While the

(3)

meaning of "dangerously" here is not immediately clarified
(is

"dangerous" descriptive or prescriptive?)

meaning soon becomes clear enough.

Spacks'

,

the real

first

distinction in the book is between two modes of gossip (most
gossip,

she argues,

lies along a continuum with these two

modes at its antipodes)

.

The first is malicious gossip,

which "plays with reputations, circulating truths and halftruths and falsehoods about the activities, sometimes about
the motives and feelings, of others"

"serious" gossip,
int imacy

.

.

.

(4)

the second is

"which exists only as a function of

in a context of truth... its purposes bear little

on the world beyond the talkers except inasmuch as that

world impinges on them"
clear.

Two points are immediately

(5)

Gossip's modality is identifiable to Spacks

centrally as moral:

gossip is either good or bad

(adumbrations of Tannen here)

.

While of course the social

scientists of the previous chapter would refrain
overtly)

(at

least

from using this morally tinged language, the

important point for our purposes is not so much that Spacks

distinguishes between gossip as good or bad morally but how
that difference manifests itself.
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Bad gossip is active

gossip

it is the gossip that changes
reputations,

reports, perceptions about activities or
people.

gossip is the ineffective gossip

--

Good

we really only talk

about ourselves, take the external world into
our own

subjective perspective 5

.

This may provide comfort for us

(Spacks continues on to talk about intimate gossip
as being

particularly useful for those in
a

a

subordinated position, as

venting technique for their frustrating lives)

but it

,

certainly has no meaningful effect on anything other than
our personal perceptions and stories

.

We write our own

fictions of how we would like the world to be when we gossip
in the right way -- and the world continues on its own path,

indifferent to our chatter.
must also be useless.
real world,

then,

So for gossip to be useful,

it

Gossip intrudes "dangerously" on the

when it threatens to change it, to

challenge previously unargued norms or beliefs.

The

intrusion is dangerous not simply because it is false
(malicious,
-

overinterpreting, exaggerating, outright lying

-

all these connotations are contained within Spacks' brief

quote)

,

but because it works.

Presumably those in

subordinated positions can take no lasting pleasure or
relief from challenging overgenerous reputations or

5

Indeed,
when
Spacks
reviews
the
social
science
literature on gossip, while she admires the completeness with
which they trace out the causes and paths of gossip (how it
happens and over what, how it ranks), she calls them all to
task for "avoid[ing] moral judgment" (34).
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rankings; their real relief comes only
from complaining to
sympathetic, and equally disempowered, peers
(46)

Most interesting here is the kind of
gossip Spacks
places in the middle of this continuum of
good and evil,

inactive and active.

observes is

The most common kind of gossip Spacks

(of course)

not purposive, but idle in the most

straightforward sense of the word.

Citing Kierkegaard and

Heidegger, Spacks refers to this kind of

(literally)

talk" as originating from "lack of thought

...

"idle

unconsidered

desire to say something without having to ponder too
deeply"
(5)

.

But this kind of idle talk, apparently also itself

inactive,

ends up being much closer to the active end of the
*

spectrum than the other.

"Of course,

it too damages

reputations and hurts feelings, its consequences

uncontrollable and incalculable.

.

.blunted awareness marks

such gossip; involving little real consideration of the
issues its discourse touches, it constitutes moral

avoidance"

(ibid)

.

At least with the first version of

malicious gossip we are given the scant comfort of knowing
its directness; malicious participants know they are doing

damage, and do so with at least some intention.

Serious

idle talkers here resemble no one so much as hypocrites,

seeking out to do damage by their very thoughtlessness,

avoiding entirely the injurious implications of the issues
they raise.

Spacks criticizes Heidegger only for failing to

allow for the full range of possibilities within gossip, but
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,

.

not for the intrinsic limitations within his
concept of idle
chat.
"I would not wish to claim that Heidegger
is

necessarily wrong about the idleness of 'idle talk,
observes

(17)

;

indeed,

1

"

she

further on she adds an even more

ringing endorsement of gossip's irrelevence:

"Heidegger and

Kierkegaard accurately locate the moral insufficiency of
gossip in its frivolous modes"

(20)

While Spacks qualifies this restrictive analysis of

gossip by observing (rightly) than gossip can easily mutate
forms,

or that forms may overlap

talk provoking intimate alliance

insists on its own frivolity"

(her example is malicious
[6]),

(ibid)

.

ultimately,

"gossip

So while gossip may

go from honestly malicious to truly intimate, or vice versa,
it can only do so,

it seems,

through its own irrelevance.

Gossip's multitudinous forms are rest on the central tenet
of its own status as non sequitur,

as harmless play.

Spacks' most serious charge against Heidegger and

Kierkegaard is that they fail to appreciate the necessarily
dialogic character to gossip (21-22)

;

however, as is clear

from the preceding, the dialogues Spacks hears have very

restricted applications.

Indeed,

when Spacks at one point

iterates gossip's "usual purposes," they are sadly limited:
"mak [ing]

people feel important, declaring] moral and

social allegiances,

fill [ing]

time"

(189).

important only for the illusions it creates
the

(pre-existing)

lines it recognizes
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Dialogue is
(importance)

(alliances)

,

or

merely the fact of its existence (filling time),
apparently,
and not for what it accomplishes (creates or
constructs)

This dismissive attitude towards gossip reproduces

itself throughout the book; several times Spacks

distinguishes between good gossip, which promotes and
explores relationships and connections, and bad gossip,

which amounts to nothing more than straightforward

maneuverings for power

(43,

63).

The fact that human

relationships themselves form through dynamics of power
seems to escape Spacks; good gossip is devoid of power
relations, existing only on a Kantian in-itself plane of

human interaction

fantasy

.

good gossip, in short,

is a egalitarian

Even when Spacks seems to acknowledge the

centrality of power to any conception of gossip

--

"gossip,

however,

constitutes not only a discourse about power but in

itself

a

code of power"

within

a

negative context.

--

(68)

this observation is only

These observations appear while

Spacks is in the middle of excoriating People magazine,

tabloids in general and talk shows for their petty

trafficking in private lives.

Presumably,

then,

the kind of

power gossip deals with is only effective power when
destructive; good gossip is simply commentary about power,
not invocation of it.

As the rest of the book makes clear,

while gossip is grounded within discourses about power, this
is a fact we must be wary of,

sordid ends.

and not manipulate for our own

The best gossip is a genteel commentary on
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power relations that helps us illuminate ourselves
to
ourselves (60); precisely the worst gossip is that
which
seeks to publicize what really oughtn't be public,
debasing
the complexity of human relations.

This chiding tone runs throughout Spacks

'

considerable

discussion of People magazines and personality journalism
in
general.

Spacks'

decision to analyze gossip magazines in

juxtaposition to eighteenth-century gossip letters, while
initially intriguing, soon reveals itself as a tactic for

distinguishing and dignifying her analysis of gossip at the
expense of much of what many people might first think of as
gossip.

Spacks comments, with ill -disguised distaste,

"I

would find it in many ways more convenient for my argument
simply to ignore People and its shady relatives"

(68)

.

One

might wonder what a scholar of gossip is doing, to so

enthusiastically express at the outset a complete lack of
interest in what after all constitutes a rather large

portion of what we could reasonably consider to be part of
her field of information.

Mightn't an analysis produced

from such a reduced field of information be similarly

reductive in its conclusions, or applications?

Still,

bravely she presses on, only to reveal that tabloid
journalism isn't real gossip, given its hopeless lack of
sincerity, voice, complexity, depth, or directness
77,

85)

.

At her most outraged,

(66,

73,

she analogizes People versus

the series of letters to "a one-night stand rather than an
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extended relationship"

The aggressiveness of this

(78)

language aside, what is curious about this
entire analysis
is
how exactly it overturns and ignores much

m

of what,

as

she expresses clearly early on in the book,
makes gossip

gossip
In short,

we call something gossip quite often because

of its indirectness,

its subversiveness -- gossip says what

we can't quite print or say publicly,

or "seriously"; gossip

creates an oral space to do what are quite often very
serious investigations and explorations with lower stakes
than,

say,

op-ed pages of newspapers, seminar rooms, or

meetings with one's boss.

But when it comes to People

.

such

indirectness is apparently only something to be scorned:
the People style relies heavily on denial.

than it states.

.

.

.

[it]

.the unmentionable is mentioned,

hints more
the

unphot ographable photographed, by skillful deflect ion ... the

magazine thus avoids responsibility for its suggestions"
(67-68).

While the indirection may be "skillful", this is

damning with faint praise indeed

--

simply means for Spacks that People

skillful indirection
'

s

editors and writers

can make whatever (no doubt false or exaggerated)

allegations they care to, while protecting themselves from
litigation or public outcry.

But the real payoff to such

indirection is clear; People provides its readers with the
false illusion that they really know the celebrities in
question,

that their lives really are open books.
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The sad

fact,

for Spacks,

is that not only are human lives not

comprehensible, but that People provides dubious
information
in fact,
It

and appropriateness, and accountability

(

67

)

both imitates and debases social functions of oral

gossip," she concludes

(ibid).

exists along a moral cliff,

For Spacks, gossip only

constantly wavering between

productive and destructive; celebrity gossip outright
hurtles over the edge.
In particular,

this spurning of celebrity gossip

sharply contrasts with the quite extensive treatment Spacks
gives to literary gossip in eighteenth- and nineteenth-

century novels, spinning out the manifest functions and

presentations of gossip within their frames.

As her chapter

titles make clear, Spacks has some productive

interpretations to offer about the function of gossip:

she

thinks it works as a voice for otherwise voiceless

communities; it acts to produce knowledge or interpretations
that otherwise cannot be said; it serves to reproduce or

enforce community standards, albeit with individualistic
interpretations; and finally,
close to home,

it serves to bring the remote

to make seemingly hard- to- fathom characters

or events familiar, human.

The other main agenda item of

the book is a debunking of the Englightenment mythos of the

autonomous,

self-sufficient, rationally guided self; indeed,

part of what makes gossip such an effective trope for Spacks
in this book is due in part to its running at such cross-
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.

.

purposes to the themes of the novels analyzed
within its
pages.
Indeed, Spacks makes clear at several points
in the
book that there exists a rather peculiar paradox
of gossip:
overtly, many of the authors treating gossip have
their

characters using in in quite lamentable fashions ("it
emenates from this kind of idleness: from understocked minds
of limited energy"

and moral vice

[176]

(161,

)

162,

,

where gossip is clearly a social
164,

169)

This overt repudiation of gossip, of course, arrives in
the fact of gossip being quite obviously a necessary

literary technique for these very same authors (ibid)
indeed,

as Spacks makes explicit,

'

and

the one available tool for

agency for disempowered wives and spinsters (170)
Spacks

,

6
.

willingness to construct extended analyses of

gossip's paradoxical uses and statuses in fiction is damning

testimony to her rigid inability to observe similar
complexities or paradoxes within celebrity gossip.

Now,

it

is certainly true that simply because gossip in one

manifestation is so complicated and paradoxical, that the
same is not necessarily true in every manifestation of

gossip.

However,

for a literary theorist as interested in

how literature reflects

(and constructs)

social reality,

Spacks apparently has a difficult time conceiving of the

Indeed, novelists' apparent discomfort with appearing to
openly praise or rely upon gossip as a trope is reflected by
Spacks' singular praise of William Faulkner as one of the few
novelists who can write through gossip naturalistically (240)
6
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s

'

fact that literary gossip in "classic” novels
isn't simply

reflecting the paradoxical and contradictory status
gossip
has in our own lives.
This brings me to one final point about Spacks

analysis of the People

.

It's clear,

from the tone of

Spacks' prose in those pages, that she thinks that
celebrity

magazines simply pander to our most base tastes, and do so
disingenuously.

However, what is less clear (indeed, what

goes unaddressed in Spacks' analysis)
take in celebrity gossip magazines.

,

is how we as readers

One is tempted to ask,

after finishing Spacks' outraged diatribe against the
amoral ity of tabloid journalism:

does she think everyone

who reads them is really stupid?

Spacks suggests that we

read celebrity magazines so that we can really get to know
celebrities; to bring them to our human level

(from their

presumably extraterrestrial planes of spectacularity)
course,
al

.
'

she is hardly alone in this analysis:

.

Of

Jack Levin et

analysis of tabloid gossip columns announces one of

the main themes of celebrity columns to be that "everyday

life is worthwhile and exciting, even for the 'little'

people of the world.
great after all"

And the world of celebrities is not so

(Levin

[1985]

517)

.

Of course,

the flaw in

this analysis is that it presumes that the millions of

readers of celebrity gossip are simply taking in the gossip
uncritically, enthusiastically endorsing it in exactly the
same tone in which it is presented.
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Simply analyzing the

,

themes by which tabloid journalism appears doesn't
guarantee
a univocal,

unthinking reader response.

More to the point, Spacks is clearly willing to spend

lengthy amounts of time discussing the "text" of classic
novels

(critical of gossip as a moral vice,

focusing on

locating gossips as immoral, manipulative people) versus
their

subtexts"

(vitally relying upon gossip to create the

complexity of their storylines and characters, empowering
women characters through their ability to freely evaluate
other people and behaviors without being constrained by
rigid social mores

reading (which
thorough)

I

[228]

)

.

However, this complexity of

find often very acute and impressively

somehow stops at the borders of the canon:

apparently,

some texts are subtext - free

;

and correlat ively

some readers have apparently no ability to distinguish or

decide between multiple lines of analysis.

I

think what's

important to note here is not that Spacks, or Levin et al

consider this point and then reject

it,

.

,

or study reader

response or critical literature about popular magazines (in
part,

no doubt, because it doesn't exist when they write);

in short,

it's not the fact of their disagreement with my

perspective that

I

challenge.

The central point

I

would

make here is that it apparently never crosses anyone's mind
that readers of celebrity journalism could have brainpower

or analytic skills comparable to those holding Ph.D.s in
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.

communication, or English literature; complexity,
apparently,

is field-

No doubt
here:

I

(and person-)

specific

7
.

leave myself open for a reasonable response

isn't it feasible to imagine some readers

(in fact,

don't we all know at least one or two people,
people who

might include ourselves depending upon the topic?) who
do

uncritically lap up celebrity gossip, gorging their brains
on random facts about Time Warner deals or Julia Roberts'

and Lyle Lovett's marital troubles, believing exactly what's

printed and thrilling to the "just folks" tones of the
articles?

I

certainly have no problem allowing for that

possibility:

the whole purpose of granting reader agency is

to acknowledge its spectrum, which certainly must include

enthusiastic true believers of every gossip item.
correlat ively

,

But

it is certainly the case that there are

plenty of scholars of communication and English literature
7

And of course, sometimes even Ph D s fail to detect
complexity within texts.
Witness Spacks
reading of Henry
James' What Maisie Knew
where she suggests that there is
really one one kind of voice, or subject, to gossip: "Gossip,
always personal, never dispassionate, full of emotion and
judgment,
bears
little
resemblance
to
such controlled
narrative as this. Although divorce, allegations of moral and
financial turpitude, and matters of child custody comprise
conventional material for speculation, this story-teller goes
out of his way to avoid gossip's atmosphere.
Yet the
insistent rejection of gossip's voice and feeling only
underlines the book's preoccupation with gossip's substance -not just its subject matter, but the issues of knowledge,
interpretation, and morality that focus gossip as a discourse"
While Spacks is talking about a whole range of gossip(216)
hermeneutics, it is impossible here to miss the suggestion
that there is one typology of how gossip sounds, and what
sorts of topics it discusses. Not much in the way of subtext
here
.

.

'

,

.
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(to say nothing of philosophy)

who are equally uncritical

within their fields, who simply restrict their reading
to
the narrow field of their specialty, and hence have
pretty
pre-programmed, unthinking responses to every article and
book they come across.

If it agrees with their agenda,

like it; if the perspective is different,

why they don't like it

8
.

they

they know exactly

But the point is that we do not

deny the possibility of thought, creativity, or genuine

disagreement within academic fields simply because some

practitioners are less thoughtful than others; conversely,
it makes us look all the more closely at dissenting

perspectives

9
.

Given that, we should be willing to grant

the same possibility to tabloids and their readers 10

.

8

To get catty for a minute, a recent talk by Michael
Klare at Smith College (September 21, 1995) illustrates this
point rather tidily:
in discussing the evolution of U.S.
foreign
policy
over
the
last
several
Presidential
administrations and Congresses, Klare [an ardent progressive]
made the novel argument that the 104th Congress' foreign
policy doyens were distinct from those of previous Congresses,
because this latest group was patently insane, whereas others
were simply conservative.
Klare s presumably non-clinical
judgment of insanity seemed to rest entirely on an estimation
of Jesse Helms' emphatic disagreement with principles which
Klare holds dear.
'

Denis Donoghue s review of Leo Bersani s Homos and
Marjorie Garber's Vice Versa in the New York Times Book Review
is just one recent example of exactly that kind of hypercritical treatment.
9

'

'

10

In particular, it seems to me that this is an argument
with at least minimal merit, given that the novels Spacks is
so fond of analyzing are themelves recent entries into the
literary canon; and more pointedly, that novels themselves
were in the not-too-distant past decried as foolish, "womanly"
wastes of time that conveyed no information worth unearthing.
If we have been flexible enough to learn to appreciate
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I

have one possible, and rather gossipy,

explanation for why it is Spacks is so uncomfortable with
the notion of complexity within more "downmarket"
gossip.
To put it bluntly,

Spacks

there is a variety of evidence within

own text that suggests a continuing fascination,

tinged with discomfort, with much of what she regards as the
substance of gossip

--

sexuality.

Spacks begins her

explanation of gossip's power over us by referring, fairly,
to its status as power -- to trade gossip about someone or

something is to share knowledge that isn't publicly
available.

Such information, Spacks observes rightly, is

voyeuristic in nature; "gossip, even when it avoids the
sexual, bears about it a faint flavor of the erotic"

Spacks'

(11).

initial forthrightness about the voyeuristic

character of gossip, though, to me soon gives way to
overemphasis.

For indeed,

Spacks wishes to attack many of

gossip's decriers for exactly this kind of obsession with
the voyeurism of gossip; such obsession, presumably, reveals

more about those obsessed than the gossipers who may have

mildly voyeuristic practices.

Spacks presents and

criticizes the seventeenth-century literary tendency to

embody talkativeness in phallic metaphors (loose tongues,

whorishness

[123-125]).

These literary works, Spacks

greatness in Austen, the Brontes, and Eliot, and indeed novels
in general rather than simply philosophy and history, why is
it so implausible to imagine substance in our more modern
versions of lincrua franca ?
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argues,

reveal more about writerly anxiety (gossips
may

possess phallic power through the tongue, but
their gossip
is impotent; it has no effect
[124]), and fear of individual
expression against social mores ("the world functions
as

enemy of sex"
of gossip.

[125]

)

,

than they do about the actual function

That being said, of course,

the sexualized

stigma of gossip of course continues to this day.

But

analysis aside, Spacks uncritically reproduces the terms of

comparison so crudely displayed in the Restoration poem.
The passage is worth quoting at length:
The intimate involvement between gossip and
sexuality extends beyond metaphor.
To be sure,
gossip employs the tongue in both its phallic and
its whorish aspects.
Particularly as the dreaded,
fantasized voice of the world, it possesses the
dangerous generat ivity the uncontrollable power,
the unsettling authority of phallic force.
In the
trivialized form of sexual tattle, it reveals its
whorish side.
The degree to which all gossip,
both rendered and imagined, in Restoration comedy
obsessively concentrates on sex points to another,
more ambiguous, connection between gossip and sex:
the relation of gossip to fulfillment.
At once
agent and enemy of desire, gossip allows the
individual expression of hidden wishes.
People
talk about sex because they care about it; they
work out for themselves, or remind themselves of,
the limits of the permissible by discussing other
people's activities; they satisfy themselves
vicariously by dwelling on what others have done.
Such satisfaction makes room for the other side of
gossip:
its repressive force, its insistence on
social norms at the expense of individual
expressiveness.
[135-136]
,

The dualism that Spacks observes here

(we are

obsessed both

with the fact of sex and with the taboo of our obsession) is

certainly nothing controversial; what is curious is that she
chooses to reproduce the earlier terms in such an explicit
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:

fashion.
topics,

While we can gossip about many different kinds
of
the strong image in this paragraph is not
so much

the careful dissection of the dualism, but the
memory that

when we gossip we are both phallic and whorish.
Spacks

'

line quoted earlier,

(Recall

about celebrity magazines being

one-night stands," for additional resonance that that is
our role as gossips.)
Indeed,

should we have any doubt that by indulging in

gossip we are treading dangerously on sordid subjects,
Spacks hastens to reassure us that this is the case.

She

writes that
Literature, unlike gossip, has didactic
pretensions; the novelist may aspire (or claim to
aspire) to make mankind wiser and better by
exemplary f ictions ... Minimal introspection would
probably reveal to most readers their own
incompatible wishes for fictional satisfaction.
We yearn for fairy-tale fantasies (sufficiently
plausible to encourage suspension of disbelief)
about flawless beauties and dashing adventurers
whose lives work out precisely as we would wish;
and we respond to the opportunity for dwelling on
life's seamy side, imaginatively fulfilling
forbidden desires.
Gossip, of course, satisfies
the latter needs.
[191]

Despite the fact that Spacks has spent much of this book

documenting and arguing for the closeness

(if not

identity)

between literature and gossip (each serves to illuminate
each other and ourselves to ourselves, each serves to make
half - fictions and truths out of our lives)

,

there ultimately

are neat lines to be drawn between gossip and fiction --

fiction really can teach us something (even though they may

only be "pretensions," fiction still has the potential to
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.

.

claim overt usefulness), whereas gossip

is,

.

after all is

said and done, still in the muck of human relations.

when Spacks discusses Thackeray's Vanity Fair

Later,

she reminds

,

us that it succeeds as a novel in part because it

successfully displaces onto the fictional Becky Sharpe our
own inappropriate interests in our neighbors' bedroom
activities (205-206)
Spacks grounds this point by reminding us that the

higher truths are not in fact learned through gossip:
avers that in Middlemarch

,

she

Celia and Dorothea are both right

even in their staunch disagreement about the utility of

gossip (Celia sees it pragmatically, as

a

resource for

information; Dorothea sees it morally, as a vice)
"Dorothea," she writes,
level.

"is of course

'right'

at a higher

Dorothea's rejection of gossip stems from her

admirable determination to find her own way to the good"
(197-198).

While Spacks continues on to endorse Celia's

pragmatism, pragmatic interests in human relations are not

accorded status as "admirable"; this is reserved only for
individuals who rise above community mutterings
This brings me to the bulk of my criticism against this

book's argument.

Throughout the book, Spacks makes much of

her interest in constructing a social knowledge that stands
against, reinforces, challenges, or empowers individual

knowledge and development; she sees gossip as one of the
tools by which we can appreciate the individual and social
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.

worlds colliding and collaborating

.

Spacks concentrates

(8)

on this point because it holds importance for
the book

--

it

demonstrates some of the ways in which gossip confuses
the
naturalized boundaries between private and public.
Gossipers assume

(create,

invent)

both insider and outsider

positions simultaneously, she writes, they "encourage
certain confusion in [their] participants"

(212,

a

214)

While this reasoning is productive, in that it suggests some
of the chaos inherent within social production of meaning
(e.g.

that there is no one clear entity that is the

"social",

to say nothing of the "individual"); ultimately,

Spacks undermines this whole argument by suggesting that the

knowledge and role-playing created by gossip is meaningless.
Either gossip functions simply to corrode and delegitimize
notions of the social without offering new possibilities
(225,

226)

,

or it simply universalizes community rankings

and conceptions, erasing any possibility for a more chaotic

theory (179)

.

In part,

it seems to me that this tactic is doomed to

failure because the sides

(individual v.

social)

are

actually assumed to be more totalizing than they really are
in this work.

When Spacks analogizes gossip to Freud's

treatment of jokes, she accepts whole-hog his casting of
jokes as individual aggression against either other

individuals or social norms (50-51)

Of course, while

Spacks' own analysis allows room for gossip in which the
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roles are switched (gossip is the voice of the
community

attacking particular individuals)

,

the fact is that gossip

in this book is almost always of an adversarial
nature,

generally individual

(s)

and

pitted against social norms, with

the white and black hats alternating.

This stasis in

casting doesn't allow for a broad range of scenarios.
Because of this limitation in casting,
and flavor) of gossip,

(and purpose,

the ultimate theory of gossipy

epistemology that Spacks produces falls somewhat short
I

.

As

said earlier, Spacks sees gossip (like literature) as

producing stories of our lives, created knowledge that can
have a knowledge -like status.

But,

similar to the Spin

Doctors in the previous chapter, this theory amounts to
little more than quarantining off literary gossip as

a

quasi-knowledge that will still fail to be taken seriously,
because it has "different",

"special" standards of defense,

in contrast to "real"

scientific, objective, really

tested)

knowledge.

(i.e.

Spacks illustrates the dubious nature of

gossip-knowledge right from the start:

"all gossip also

circulates information (duly mixed, of course, with

misinformation)"

(8).

This lamentable beginning

("misinformation", after all, could hardly be

qualifier

--

a less

damning

there might be some truth to gossip, but it's

sure disguised by plenty of falsehood)

,

is modestly

compromised by an account of what "storied" gossip-knowledge
is;

in essence,

being able to construct broadly
184

:

interpretative accounts of events from scant evidence
181-182,

230)

Of course,

.

Gossip draws meaning from "surfaces"

(10,
(53)

when we are given no reason to doubt the veracity

of scientific evidence,

and rationally arrived-at

conclusions, these appeals to creating large stories from

big assumptions and thin evidence holds little sway; in
particular, Spacks reminds us that these are community

stories

(256)

.

After the corrosive, invasive,

transactional, exploitative, and manipulative powers of

gossip have been amply demonstrated for us, an appeal that
we should be willing to let go of the only tool almost

unceasingly admired for its accuracy in all circumstances
(the almighty logos),

in lieu of information that's not

really going to be very empirically true anyway, has only
the feeblest of persuasive power.

For lest we forget, gossip isn't very accurate.

Spacks

hastens to remind us through literary examples that gossip
is right in a broad,

apart on the details.

metaphorical sense, but tends to fall

Writing again on Middlemarch

she

,

observes that
The gossip about Ladislaw and Dorothea is always
'wrong'
the community cannot at all comprehend
either of these unusual beings.
But the moneyfocused gossip about Fred and Lydgate and Casaubon
and Farebrother and Brooke and Bulstrode often
touches oddly on truth.
I mean by that much the
same thing I meant when I pointed out that the
stories about Lily Barth, in The House of Mirth
although literally false, accurate chart her moral
Fred and Lydgate are in trouble
deterioration.
when the community thinks they are, though their
deepest trouble is not f inancial ... Money the
:

,

,
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communal object of desire, provides an appropriate
metaphor for other kinds of imaginative focus
[

200

]

Gossip can have accuracy only in the crudest sense;
"something's got to be wrong," we mutter to each other,

noticing unusual behavior.

But since our analytical skills

are so unsharpened by the titter of parlor-chat, we can only

jump to our typical,

lumpenproletariat conclusions

(presumably, only social standards of decorum prevent the

chatterers of Middlemarch from seizing upon that other great
obsession,

sex)

Spacks quickly follows this passage with

.

a

reminder of exactly how crude gossip's analytical tools are:
"Middlemarch gossips do not realize the questions implicit
in their judgments; once they decide,

for example,

that

Lydgate has sold himself, they do not inquire about motives
or about other possible interpretations for his actions"
(201)

.

Gossip is no more a tool for understanding here than

it is a tool for snap judgments,

quick conclusions; the

"stories" gossip tells have little in the way of depth or
meat.

It seems without accident that Spacks chooses the

metaphor of surface to express the character of gossip.
This is why

I

find Spacks' book to be far from

rescuing of the concept of gossip.

Rather,

a

it seems to me

that under the guise of recovering gossip for guilty-free

usage and analysis, what we have here is ultimately

a

gloomy

indictment of both the omnipresence and the negative,

distorting power of gossip.

When we gossip, we ultimately
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fail at understanding others or ourselves;
Spacks reminds us
of this fact at several points (90, 96, 206).
But sadly,

gossip is an inescapable fact; Spacks reminds us that
we
live in a world constructed by language more than by
action
(125)

.

Of course,

given the character and the power of the

language Spacks observes, it is no small wonder that she

uncritically quotes William De Britaine
that "if

...

1

s

1680 observation

we live upon the credit and reports of others,

we live always in danger"

(127-128)

.

While the social

unpredictability and uncontrollability of knowledge should
hardly be news, even in 1985, it is startling nonetheless
that lack of clarity amounts to "danger,

blandly if also more fairly)
world.

,

"

instead of (more

simply the way of the

More to the point, the real damage

I

see by

Spacks' book is a happy reduction of gossip's sphere to an

ever- tightening realm.

Gossip is overwhelmingly personal:

we gossip about other people,
for idiosyncratic reasons
get close,

in individualistic fashions

(to get power,

to manipulate,

to adapt /endorse/challenge social rules),

damningly individualistic effects.

to

and for

Nothing gossip does or

represents has effect beyond the klatsch

.

Gossip still

remains the bluntest of instruments, of interest clearly

only to those in such reduced circumstances that they don't
need more challenging (and reliable) techniques (logic, the
scientific method)

.

Ulitmately, gossip remains opposed and
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separate from domains of "rationality".

This kind of Gossip

nobody needs to read, or hear.
Spacks has a horde of companions in making this
claim;
indeed,

the vast majority of commentators on gossip and

rumor as tropes in English literature make much of an

emphasis on how gossip misses the real truth of the
situation,

in lieu of gross exaggeration of simplified

stories and invoking of tired stereotypes.
(1990)

Alexander's

analysis of Charles Dickens' use of then-hot gossip

to create some of the characters in his Bleak House bears

out this observation.

After briefly recounting the incident

that inspires Dickens

(a

failed romance between John Forster

and Letitia Elizabeth Landon, about whom many scandalous

stories were told; Landon ended the romance because Forster

believed the stories)

Alexander argues that it's up to

,

Dickens to ascertain the real truth in this situation:

that

Landon in question ended the romance not because of her
(stated)

rumors,

horror at her paramour's inconstancy in believing
but because she in fact had a "compulsion to punish

herself and others"
is the

(90-91)

"deeper truth"

fiction of Bleak House

This,

.

(ibid),
.

according to Alexander,

only accessible through the

What's curious about this

interpretation is not so much Alexander's interest in how
Dickens chooses to reinscribe the details of his
contemporaries'

lives

(for surely that is a rather mundane

feature of being a novelist)

,

but her emphasis on how much
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more accurate, more truthful, the fictional accounting

becomes than its gossipy counterpart.

All the gossip

produces is inaccuracy (for supposedly Landon in actuality
did not have the affairs implied in the rumors)

,

and a

trivializing of human psychological truths (Alexander refers
to the "strained sense of horror" Landon expresses
in a letter to a friend explaining her breaking off the

averring that Landon cannot possibly be sincere here

3-ffsir,

[ibid]

)

.

This asymmetry of interpretation (fiction produces

the meaningful truth; gossip produces only sordid

manipulation of event and self -aggrandizing) seems rather
more strained the the original horror Alexander observes.
It's as if truth is a zero-sum game; and that the truth

Dickens creates in his fiction can only come at the expense
of the truth Landon observes about herself and her friends
in letters and community conversation.

The terrain Spacks travels in Gossip

--

gossip as a

trope in the work of writers like Austen, Eliot, James, the
Brontes,

Chaucer

--

has since been covered and re-covered by

many commentators, most of whom admire, along with Spacks,
gossip's theatricality, and the freedom by which gossip can
reproduce previously unsayable community mores.

commentators argue, writing about Austen's Emma
"gossip travels fast because in
known;

a

Indeed,
,

that

sense it is always already

it is not news at all but part of a social agenda

already recognized by the community and already
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two

.

unconsciously internalized"

(Finch and Bowen

But the speed and omnipresence of gossip,

[1990]

,

l)

tacitly accepted

by so many writers, have little to do with its ability
to

interpret accurately events or persons.
(1984)

Indeed,

Jan Gordon

writes about gossip in Anne Bronte's The Tenant of

Wildfell Hall that "the first 10 chapters of the novel are

really nothing more than the attempt of gossip to come to
terms with meaning"

(722)

must necessarily fail,

This attempt, Gordon clarifies,

.

"not because of the inscrutability of

their object, but because of the nature of the discourse"
(ibid).

writes,

The nature of gossip is "speculative," Gordon

and its objects are necessarily impossible to

understand (e.g. gossip aims at people's private lives), and
so therefore gossip must always be tragic in nature --

engaged in futile tasks.
Given that dismal report on gossip's ability to ferret
out and interpret information,

it's only natural that we

might wonder why then people engage in gossip, to say

nothing of why it is such
so that characters'

revealed.

a

favored tactic among novelists,

innermost thoughts and beliefs may be

Gordon has a ready answer for this question; she

points out that gossip spreads compulsively (virally 11 ?)
11

My use of this metaphor is neither accidental nor the
result of compulsion on my part. Indeed, just as "poison" was
by far the favorite negative metaphor by which social
scientists characterized gossip, as shown in the last chapter,
its counterpart of "disease" seems equally popular with the
humanists. Gordon, for her part, uses the metaphor in a later
article (1988) on Jane Austen, writing that "gossip, like
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.

exactly because the power it holds over

a

person is that

s/he is becoming "a character, an 'other',

fiction"

(723)

lied about,

In short,

.

,

in someone else's

to be gossiped about is to be

to be created in a non-realistic fashion
at the

behest of someone else,

for omnipotent purposes

(for Gordon

clearly does not doubt the absolute control of the
author)
Gordon underscores this point by averring that "gossip
always attempts to be what it is not by incorporating
the

patterns of relatedness appropriate to the novel; i.e.
creates plots where none exist"

(724)

.

So,

,

it

contra Spacks

gossipers wish they could be as creative (and truthful) as
novelists)

,

but they fail at even that -- their only

specialty becomes outright lying, with the consolation that
their lies have absolute power in communities.
The lies of gossip are traced back to its roots in

collectivity.

Without individual sources, or individual

accountability, Gordon argues, gossip is "financially,
theologically, and narratively unredeemable"

(725)

This

outlaw status of gossip runs anathema to Gordon's literary
instincts

--

it means that gossip always works counter to

novelistic interests of closure, plot development, climax
and denouement

.

novel techniques

She contrasts gossip to other epistolary
(the diary,

the letter)

,

suggesting that if

only we could write completed diaries in the Bronte novel,
illness, is a system of informational storage which appears as
random and undirected -- a kind of oral plague without an
identifiable source" (20)
See footnote 8, chapter 1.
.
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)

.

the story could attain its previously-unachieved
closure
(and transparency

[728-729]).

This kind of transparency

by simple fact of its character, never be
accessible
through chattery, anonymous, false gossip. What
Gordon does
not do here is to pause to consider the priority
of
can,

transparency and closure on novels.

Indeed,

Gordon

pronounces Bronte's aim in Tenant finally to be aggressive;
an argument that writing must be spiritual, must rise
above

simple trafficking in human relations (i.e. gossip
[734]
Otherwise, Gordon closes, we will find ourselves

increasingly in

proliferates

a

Tower of Babel, where discourse

and truth disappears

,

(738-739)

Aside from

the stringently moralistic tenor of this conclusion, note

the over content of Gordon's assertion.
truth,

it seems,

conversation

--

We only access

through formal investigation and

informality and anonymity only bring out

transactional, mercurial, and exploitative impulses in us

which we can't help but spread to others.

The possibility

that gossip and rumor somehow help us to formulate and

consider possibilities that could be worthwhile, if

unpleasant to many ears, simply passes beneath Gordon's
radar
For some literary theorists, gossip is less a trope

about knowledge
lack)

.

(and its lack)

than about intimacy (and its

Parroting the language of the social scientists,

L.J. Morrissey

(1988)

presents an interpretation of Robert
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Frost

'

"Mending Wall" that straddles the by-now
predictable

paradox of gossip:
Despite the apparent message of 'brotherhood,'
the
poem's achievement is clear.
Frost has structured
a poem
which the message of brotherhood is
enacted from the rhetorical stance of gossip
which excludes, isolates, and distorts. He has
constructed a rheotircal 'wall under the cover of
pleading against walls.
[63]

m

1

Morrissey sees Frost's strategy as inviting the reader
to
gossip with him about a third person (the neighbor who
rebuilds a fence between properties with Frost, repeating

only that "good fences make good neighbors").

This gossip,

Morrissey argues, encourages us to exclude, isolate and
distort the character of the neighbor, so that we can feel
superior, and then uncomfortable, about our (similar)

disinclination towards the connection
represents.

a

removed fence

The poem, which is a meditation on the non-

necessity of fences, contains little analysis of the
neighbor's disinclination to let the fence fall, observing

only that the neighbor "will not go behind his father's
saying, /And he likes having thought of it so well"

[Ellmann

Because the neighbor is such a non-presence here,

396]

Morrissey argues, we are encouraged to see him through the
lens of gossip -- as a laughable caricature.
It

is not simply the fact that Morrissey is here

presenting
me,

a

very strong reading of the text that disturbs

but the nature of his strong reading.

Morrissey is uncritically reproducing
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Clearly,

judgmental

definition of gossip (it is distorting, it is
isolating
it is malicious)

12

--

and more to the point, this judgmental

;

definition to me seems to obscure the much more
obvious
symbolism of the poem.
To explain:

I

have no quarrel with the structural

observation that Frost is inviting us to reflect with
him
about his neighbor.
Of course, what's clear first is that
it's not the second-order commentary itself that marks
this

poem as gossipy, but the particular, moral overtones of that
commentary as distorting, excluding, and isolating

--

to

gossip is somehow to miss what could be for our own
preferable,
I

if ruder,

stories of what we think we see.

What

find curious in this reading is the supposition that Frost

is being narrowly dismissive and distortive,

and inviting us

to reflect upon our own readiness to join him in nasty

evaluation.

It strikes me as much more straightforward that

Frost is simply reflecting on the nature of division in
humans,

and that fences between properties are only a

pleasantly visual way to characterize the non-navigable
impasses that divide humans from another.
12

0n this point, note again the title of Morrissey's
article; Frost and the "Structure of Gossip." Like Bergmann
in the last chapter, Morrissey takes an apparently "mild,
objective" term to take on whatever stronger evaluative terms
he wishes it -- for where in the dictionary is gossip defined
as
"isolating,
excluding,
distorting"?
Instead
of
"structuring" gossip as its means of proceeding (e.g., those
selfsame dictionary definitions of "idle talk about those
absent" all our other theorists enjoy so much) Morrissey uses
the supposedly neutral language of structure to pack in
snobbish invective about the social unutility of gossip.
,
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.

Notice the way in which Frost is clear to articulate
the difference between his neighbor's properties and
his
own:

"He is all pine and

I

am apple orchard. /My apple trees

never get across/And eat the cones under his pines.
(Ellmann 395)

"
.

.

In this poem Frost is provoked by the

obscurity of his neighbor (who he only seems to see at
mending time, the poem insinuates)
doomed to failure:
(Ellmann 396)

;

this provocation is

"He moves in darkness as it seems to me"

It seems to me that rather in lieu of being

an invigorating poem about brotherhood

(or an ironic

commentary about how non-brotherly some people, i.e. all of
us,

are)

Frost is making a much more universal point here;

that not only are other people not knowable to us, but that
we even keep ourselves from making the attempts to

transgress self-imposed boundaries.

For in the poem,

despite Frost's evocation of wanting to ask why walls are
necessary, what we wall in or out by erecting them, at the
end Frost refrains from any of his "mischievous" impulses

towards his neighbor; presumably continuing quietly on to

reestablish the boundary, as his neighbor repeats "good
fences make good neighbors."

This is hardly the

incriminating, vindictive tongue-lashing Morrissey would
have us see it as.

Indeed,

it seems that if there is a

judgment to be had in the poem,

it would be Frost judging

himself for his New England reticence, and not his neighbor,
who after all,

is simply "dark",
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or unknown

(and presumable

.

unjudgable)

to us.

Given these observations,

I

find it

curious indeed that Morrissey insists on the particular

agency to gossip:

for by Morrissey's reading,

it

is the

structure of gossip that somehow compels us to contort
Frost's neighbor to fit our own (sordid, petty)

presuppost ions

Gossip is the real

.

(only malevolent)

agent

we simply move along, propelled by its destructive

here,

force

What we are left with, when we digest these literary
theorists,
-

is the overwhelming aftertaste of dour morality

to gossip is to engage in idle

judgment.

-

(if not vindictive)

While the judgments may in themselves reveal

truths about humanity (principally our venality, our need
for social reinforcement of moral codes, and our

distractability)

,

the content of the judgments do nothing to

dignify the human endeavor.

Referees of Chatter

2.2.

While many humanists simply see gossip and rumor as
passive, static literary entities,

to be observed and

remarked upon but little else, some of their cohorts take

a

more activist approach to tackling analyses of gossip and
rumor.

These referees see their projects as variously

amounting to writing rulebooks for gossip and rumor

--

understanding why we do and don't gossip and spread rumors,
and when (if ever) we should spread them or abide by them.
196

While the referees are primarily philosophers, working

within the domain of ethics, other humanists tackle these
"what-if" situational questions; additionally, the vast

literature on hearsay in jurisprudence pretty much amounts
to a consideration of when it is legally acceptable to

spread nasty chitchat about someone in a court of law as
evidence.

Unsurprisingly, the etiquette tenor that

permeates this body of literature suggests the strategic
flaw here -- that gossip and rumor are problems to be
solved.

I

think it's fair to say that there are two

assumptions grounding the various prescriptions authors in
this section produce.

First, gossip and rumor must be

controlled because they are inevitable human impulses;
second,

they should be contained because they are at

minimum dangerous (epistemically)

partially false.
the referees)

,

,

a

and probably at least

With the proper understanding (theorize

we will only gossip or spread rumors in

morally acceptable ways.
The philosophers provide the most fecund material for

analysis within this group.

Sissela Bok

'

s

Secrets (1983)

has stood as a popular standard of a rigorous philosophic

analysis of gossip.

Bok sees her book as an exploration of

the concrete issues in ethics -- in other words, a more

systematic guide for when and how to follow what kinds of
moral rules.

She's a Rossian in her approach to ethics

she thinks that we have basic moral imperatives that we
197

--

s

s

should and do follow, but that we should and do
adapt them
to certain kinds of situational restraints on
different
occasions.

Thus,

her book is less an exploration of why we

gossip and what gossip and rumor are, then under what

circumstances we gossip and when and why those circumstances
are appropriate or not

While there are some brief

.

definitional comments about what gossip is and the

motivations for it (91-93), the definitions don't deviate
enough from the standard analyses of gossip to deserve much
comment.

What is rather more interesting is her account of

how and when we should gossip, or more accurately, when we
shouldn't.

interesting,

While Bok

'

book at first glance appears to be

in that it proposes a situational approach to

moral conundra (i.e., that the moral rules we take to be

second-nature are not all that second-nature, nor should
they be all that ruling)

,

the actual playing out of her

Rossian theory is rather rigid

--

the brief chapter on

gossip is entirely focused on when we shouldn't gossip, and
the reasons why.

Therefore, the effect of her chapter

simply seems to be an endorsement of the existence and the

appropriateness of those second-nature rules, rather than an

exploration of the possibility that rules ought to be
applied to situations lightly, or not at all.
Bok

'

In short,

situational analysis is none too situational in

nature.

In this respect,

Bok is even less adventurous than

other rules-oriented theorists like Haviland.
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After explaining what gossip
into two sections,

Gossip",

s

,

is,

Bok divides her book

"Reprehensible Gossip" and "Trivializing

itself a revealing dichotomy (this after some

admiring early comments that gossip is unfairly treated as
always negative
of course,

[90])

.

Bok

justification for such

'

a move,

is that it is of particular moral import to

discern precisely when gossip should be avoided (since if
you're constructing a moral scale from most important to
least important,

it is by her

standards more

[and Ross']

important not to do the harmful thing than it is to do the

beneficial thing, or merely to do the benign thing)

;

but the

absence of any even modestly sustained discussion of when it
might be legitimate to gossip leaves the obvious taint that

gossip can never be beneficial enough to merit any real
discussion (especially by

a

credentialled philosopher!).

Bok puts significant effort into coming up with stern

reasons why gossip can be reprehensible
it is unduly invasive,

it is false,

(if

or if it breaches confidence).

if

Bok

'

implicit conviction that gossip is generally harmful is most

clear when she cites what would seem to be

a

pretty benign

case of gossip (making up salacious stories about other

people to entertain a dying relative

[96]

)

and admonishes

sharply against its practice, as debasing because it
involves lying and reflects a paucity of communication

between those supposedly close.
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These harsh words are simply startling in their

excessiveness, and Bok

values

(of

course it

'

'

reliance and assumptions of common

second nature never to want to say

something untrue) seems simplistic.
this passage, however,

is Bok

'

Most noticeable about

overdirect and reductive

conceptions of what human relations can be

.

It's clear from

this that Bok thinks that human intimacy is only reflected

through sincere, thoughtful, direct communication; that if
someone is telling deliberately untrue stories that of
course this behavior is necessarily deceptive, and malicious
the possibility that someone could be perfectly

aware that they are hearing fictional stories and enjoying
it all the same

[or rather,

while Bok raises that

possibility {96}, she dismisses it instantly as incapable of
holding anyone's sustained interest 13 ]). Essentially, Bok
is dictating only one course of human action and

motivation --we must try to be transparent at all times, we
must want to be transparent to others at all time, and any

evidence of opacity, intentional or not, must be personally

disturbing at the least, if not actually harmful.

This is a

psychologically simplistic approach.
13

Compare this to Spacks discussion of People magazine
and its sibling tabloids; both share the attitude that we only
read and hear gossip in the most direct, uninterpret ive
critical
Somehow,
it seems,
inactive fashion possible.
grant
people
in a
willing
to
theorists
are
faculties that
we
when
are
wayside
fall
by
the
simply
situations
variety of
that
amazing
short
of
nothing
gossip.
It
is
with
confronted
something decried as so clearly trivial and meanspirited is
somehow so all-powerful as simply to take minds hostage.
'
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Other than that, her section on reprehensible gossip is

unremarkable; however, the section on trivializing gossip is

illuminating indeed 14

.

After exploring carefully the

myriad of reasons and situations that discourage gossip, Bok
then continues on to argue against the very notion of

gossiping at all, swiftly characterizing gossip by its very
nature as shallow, demeaning to both its participants and
their subjects, distorting, misleading, stereotyping, and

levelling (as she revealingly phrases

it,

"even the

exceptionally gifted, the dissident, and the artist are
brought down to the lowest common denominator"
Bok

'

elitist bias is impossible to miss here

s

[100]
--

)

the

language of "lowest common denominator", when compared to

artists

(creators)

,

dissidents (individualists) and the

gifted (intelligentsia)

is striking in its snobbery --

gossip reduces us all to unthinking robots, united by base
urges.

More to the point, precisely what is demeaning,

14

And of course, we shouldn't ignore the fact that this
very pedestrian approach to gossip is in the midst of an often
enlightening book --a book that frequently seeks to discount
Bok mixes personal
our justifications for keeping secrets.
secrets with professional, governmental, and military secrets
in her analysis, and the general take on secrets that she
proposes is that at the very least, the reasons behind keeping
something secret need to be accessible. Given that a thinker
who seems on some levels to be very interested in discounted
commonly held perceptions about right and wrong and desert in
the case of gossip can only rigidly underscore commonly held
perception, I am depressed by the fact that Bok apparently has
no problems with moral rigidity, as long as it is confined to
Her subterranean message in
"trivial" topics like gossip.
perhaps moral rigidity is
that
be
this work seems to
in real life that
unpracticable
but
so
preferable,
ultimately
"easiest".
is
when
it
maintained
it is best
201

s

,

erasing, and levelling about gossip is the fact that
it

recognizes commonalities between humans, and links humans
we
would otherwise naturally think of as different (i.e.,
the

rich and the poor, the powerful and the disenfranchised,
the

intelligent and the unintelligent)
cannot be a good thing.

.

Clearly,

for Bok this

On a more basic level, Bok

noncritically quotes Heidegger's remark that gossip cannot
be positive because it is "something which anyone can rake
up"

(90)

.

The implication here

--

that true knowledge or

understanding by its nature can be accessible only to the
few elite -- is regrettably selective.
The section is brief but devastating

--

it suggests

that not only is gossip a poor ethical risk to begin with
(because it is a veritable minefield of moral errors)

but

that even if you can manage to gossip without doing actual

damage to the person about whom you gossip, you almost

certainly debase yourself and your cohorts.

While Bok

closes the chapter with a quick paragraph acknowledging the

elitism of such

a

view of gossip, and suggesting that this

view can't be right

(that it's just as stereotyping as the

kind of gossip it is condemning)

,

the paragraph is so brief

and non-specific that it carries no weight, and seems only
the most formal of a qualifier.

In sum,

then,

Bok

'

attitude towards gossip seems even stricter than simply
"when in doubt,

silence," her ultimate moral prescription

for gossip- situations

.

Her essential attitude seems to be
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that gossip is inherently a deleterious practice, and
an

unavoidable one.

Her task,

in this pragmatic book on how to

conduct yourself, seems to be to minimize the moral damage
that must take place in this less than absolute world.

The

take on Ross that seems to dictate this approach is simple:
it's too bad we can't live in a world dictated perfectly by

absolute rules, because then everything would be consistent
and good.

But,

given that we won't all always follow rules,

because situations and people are so messy as not to be able
to be completely circumscribable by rules,

the least we can

do is to come up with second-order rules that make the

first-order rules more followable, particularly when the
stakes are as low as they are in gossip.
Bok has a compatriot in the field of popular theology;

Joseph Telushkin's Words that Hurt, Words That Heal (1996)
contains arguments against gossip so strikingly similar to
Bok

'

that

I

will not detail them here; rather,

contain myself to

a

I

will

few observations about the significant

differences -between his book and Bok

'

chapter.

What is

most striking about this book is Telushkin's resistance to

argument and analysis about gossip as a social

manifestation; whereas most commentators on gossip seek to

provide at least some initial analysis of what gossip is and
how it functions, Telushkin apparently regards such work as

entirely beside the point, assuming that everyone regards
gossip similarly, as idle, sensational talk about others who
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.

are absent

Telushkin

'

(16)
s

.

.

This assumption is underscored by

.

apparent obsession with gossip as

—

destructive phenomenon of speech

a

negative and

fully three out of ten

of his chapters on hurtful language are focused on gossip

and rumor; no other form of hurtful speech gets more than
one
The one-sidedness of this approach makes clear the way
in which Telushkin simply makes more explicit what is

implicit about Bok

kind of

(normal,

'

theory:

civil,

that gossip is an exceptional

rational)

speech.

Telushkin'

for a return to "civil" language of the past 15

(5),

"malicious",

"sadistic"

(43),

as like

and

ultimately, words that "incite" rather than "inform"

Gossip's uniqueness, its identif iability
from regular,

rational,

,

call

(64)

contrasts sharply with his descriptions of gossip:
"a loaded gun"

s

(9).

its difference

civil speech is what renders it both

so powerful and so harmful

Telushkin is an ardent advocate of speech control; he
frames the book with an analogy of hurtful language to

alcohol addiction, and suggests that words can be as

damaging as murder (xxvii -xxviii
of words,

,

xx)

To minimize the harm

he advises unrepentant gossips to follow the

teachings of Alcholics Anonymous, and control our speech

A call which in itself should sound alarms in anyone
even casually acquainted with literary or world history; for
surely, documents of past civil interactions reveal nothing so
much as a constant liveliness of discourse, some of which is
exceedingly uncivil, as well as friendly.
15
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"one day at a time"

(169-170).

It's not simply the fact

that Telushkin draws much of his evidence and principles

from Talmudic writings that make his book sound like
little
else than a collection of sermons; it is also the
excessive,

dire tone he adopts throughout the book.

Telushkin

’

attitude that gossiping is a serious vice that it is

difficult to resist withdraws gossip from the plane of
rational,

civil discourse,

and renders any defense of gossip

nothing less than self-serving hypocrisy.
And indeed, Telushkin is explicit about his belief that

gossip can be nothing more than self-serving hypocrisy
(showing that while his arguments about gossip are similar
to Bok's,

the effect of his book is to carry her conclusions

to more extreme ends)
of innocuous gossip,

its practice,

.

While he acknowledges the existence

he still admonishes strictly against

noting that it cannot remain innocuous for

long with inevitably descending into malice

(18)

.

Further,

he thinks -that we gossip only to protect and enhance our

(clearly pathetic, or why else would we need to gossip)

social reputations; we gossip only about our social equals
or betters,

for it is only through bringing them down that

we elevate ourselves.

There is no prestige in discussing

the "cleaning woman's or gardener's life"

(36)

This

elitism, of course, echoes Bok's; it is inconceivable to

Telushking that we might see those in lower social stations
to us as interestingly human enough to merit gossip.
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sum,

then,

gossip

.

.

Telushkin has such a restricted notion of

--

what it is and what it does

--

that while his

sermons are clear and compelling, they are hardly
educational; they do nothing other than reinforce the most

shallow and stereotypical notions of gossip.
Even such sympathetic readers of chatter as John Sabini

and Maury Silver, working in their refreshingly concrete and

conversationally written Moralities of Everyday Life (1982)

,

can only come up with a defense of gossip as a useful moral
tool in the most secondary sense.

For Sabini and Silver,

gossip is "a training ground for both self -clarification and
public moral action"
ground" is clear

--

(106)
a

.

What they mean by "training

low-stakes setting where opinions can

be clarified and potentially dicey scenarios can be explored

without offending or upsetting anyone.

The reason gossip

can be free of emotional trauma is because it is clandestine
--

it involves trading secrets

(96)

More directly, Sabini

and Silver follow the standard definition of gossip; that it

evaluative talk about someone behind their back

is idle,
(98,

92

16
)

.

Sabini and Silver qualify their definition to allow that
"gossip, of course, can be
our gossip may be institutional:
about honorary people -- universities, corporations, or
governments -- as long as they are treated as animated by
motives and subject to moral constraint. Clearly these cases
In short, the
are parasitic to our talk about people" (90)
lies in the
definition
centrality of Sabini and Silver's
-gossip
so is its
what
makes
evaluativeness of gossip
than its
more
character,
(presumably uniquely) opinionated
16

subj ect
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,

Sabini and Silver's argument, however,
its sophistication:

;

.

.

is not without

they make much of the fact that

gossip's idleness is apparent only, disguising real

purposiveness
iritie

,

(92,

94).

Indeed,

far from being idle,

they

gossip in part is recognizable as such because of

its very relevance to issues and personalities of interest

to us.

Sabini and Silver add a corollary to this

observation:

even old news or non-relevant personalities

can become subjects of gossip if the facts traded about them
are appropriately (e.g.

interpreted anew
But again,

(91,

relevantly) emphasized or

92,

95,

97).

the impression that lasts long after the

prose of purposiveness has lost its novelty is one of gossip
as dealing only with the tiniest of life details:

gossip

deals with less important human behavior (4); gossip is

ethics applied practically to the "mundane"

(100)

an important outlet for "trivial irritations"
we gossip, we dramatize,

gossip is

(104)

When

evaluate, apply and adapt abstract

moral rules, Sabini and Silver write (102)

All of those

adjectives share among them a kind of passivity --we react
to preestablished moral rules when we illustrate or apply,

even when we evaluate or adapt.

Not only do Sabini and

Silver not write about us resisting moral rules (e.g.
criticizing, debunking, rejecting)

notions that carry with

them the sense of more activity and engagement; but more
directly, nowhere in this chapter is there a sense that with
207
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gossip we genuinely create knowledge

--

e.g.,

articulate new

moral rules, use our "outlets" to arrive at genuinely
novel

interpretations or explanations of what is before us
For Sabini and Silver, gossip is an important feature
of our psychological life,

but mainly because it helps us to

see our own complexity; how we can

tidy theory

1

t

be summed up by one

because we do too many things that can't be

(5)

reduced down to singular motives or reasons (98).

But our

complexity amounts to nothing more than very particular
intepretations and variations on that preestablished code of
social and moral rules,

for that indeed is presupposed

whenever gossip occurs (102)

.

This phrasing, which recalls

John Beard Haviland's Winchian theory of gossip as an

interpretation of abstract moral rules, set us up as
gossipers to take

a

purely theoretical interest in gossip

--

we can come up with particular explanations for why it is we

gossip at different times (and why it is we should and
shouldn't), and indeed, we can come up with feasible

justifications for gossiping at certain times (like when we
need to blow off steam at someone for some "trivial" reason,
when it

'

s

not worth a direct confrontation)

beginning of

a

.

But what this

rulebook for gossip doesn't provide us with

is a fuller analysis of why it's worth thinking of the rules

of gossip at all -- for indeed,

if gossip only traffics in

the most meaningless details of our life, why indeed should
we care about our behaviors in that fashion at all?
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Why

y

shouldn't we simply assume that their effects will
be pretty
negligible, and that hence we can feel free to act as
our

whims and interests guide us?

Moralities of Everyday Life

fails to address that question, ultimately because it
cannot

recognize gossip as an important topic.
Of course,

when the stakes are somewhat higher, as in

the gossip that foregrounds Chaucer's Manciple's Tale
C 5 n t e r bu r

—Tales

)

,

still,

(in

the solution for commentators

often is to try and decode how Chaucer would have us gossip:
what are the ethics of gossiping in delicate situations (for
this one, revealing a wife's infidelity to her previously

unaware husband)?

As Peter

Herman (1991) sees

C.

reveals an all - too-human temptation:

it,

gossip

to act maliciously

because possessors of gossip have corrupting knowledge that

both everyone and no one wants to hear
it is on taboo subjects

(like adultery)

gossiping reveals human pettiness.
message in the Manciple's Tale

--

,

everyone because
and no one because

Chaucer's ultimate

according to Herman, is

,

"illustrating the depravity of earthly politics"

The

(325).

loose-tongued creature who spreads the unhappy news to

Crow,

his master the Manciple,

illustration.

is both agent and victim of this

The Crow occupies both roles not simply

because he relays the news but because he "takes malevolent
glee in revealing
(323)

.

[the gossip]

to Phebus

[the Manciple]

"

By his malevolence, and the brutality of his speech,

the Crow loses his justification in passing along
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,

/

occasion"
Phebus

and according to Herman,

(324)

--

is

"a murderer by

for the consequence of this revelation is

deadly assault on his wife.

While Herman clearly

holds both Phebus and his wife in contempt
murder,

(the first for

and the second for "treasonous" adultery)

,

his

severest criticism by far goes to the Crow, who somehow
takes on guilt for both crimes.
of the murder,
"

re j oic [ing]

Not only is the Crow part

but also part of the adultery, by

in his lord's downfall"

(ibid).

The Manciple's

for Herman, becomes a morality play endorsing the

Ta_l_e,

virtue of silence, or pious disapproval of earthly vices.
To do otherwise is to assert complicity; and somehow, this

complicity ends up overshadowing the events themselves.
Gordon's fear in her Austen article (that shared by Spacks)
that interpretation somehow constitutes the world to truth's

detriment, gets fleshed out here in the most gruesome of
terms.

Somehow, gossiping becomes the most reprehensible of
that most responsible for other earthly vices 17

actions,

.

17

It s important to note here that not all commentators
on Chaucer share this gloomy view of the fate of gossip in a
Michaela Paasche Grudin (1991) explicitly writes
community.
against such a quietistic interpretation of the Crow's fate,
arguing that "the solutions posed in the fables do not exhaust
the possibilities for confronting the problem [of whether to
speak or to remain silent] ...Chaucer everywhere in the tale
In
evokes the idea of creative or mimetic expression" (333)
simply because the Manciple's Tale presents two
short,
unattractive options doesn't mean that this represents the
entire spectrum of possibilities for speaking-against norms.
Additionally, we might also observe that just because there
might be malice in the Crow's speech doesn't imply that to
gossip is necessarily to be malicious.
'

.
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To gossip is indulge in brutality (if its
substance is

accidentally true)

,

avoidable only through abstinence

(Spacksian overtones fully intended)
gossip,

then,

These rulebooks of

.

are less books than simple commandments:

thou

shalt not

2

.

3

Doppelganger Gossips
Unsurprisingly, there are many humanists who wish to

ascibe some kind of epistemic legitimacy to gossip and
rumor.

For many humanists, gossip is a vital construct for

assessing human and social knowledge; but its vitality is
suspect.

The theorists in this section overwhelmingly

accept postmodern dictates that "real",

"natural",

"objective" knowledge simply aren't accessible, because of

various reasons
facticity,

(subject positioning,

etc.)

.

dynamics of power,

However, as is clear from

close

a

examination of their approaches to gossip, they have yet to
let go of some abstract notion of Truth that simply hangs in

the air,

imperceptible but Still There.

That being so,

knowledge gossip and rumor provides us is always
second-best,

a

the

a sad

grudgingly admitted substitute which doesn't

really fill the bill.

These theorists improve upon Spacks

in the sense that they seem to allow a genuine epistemic

content to the truth of gossip (whereas for tropesters the

emphasis is always on the falsehood of gossip)

,

but this

content must always be presented as adulterated, critically
211
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altered or exaggerated away from the (still-held)
absolute
standard
Lorraine Code's Rhe torical Spaces:

Locations

(1995)

Essavs on CenrW^a

attempts the mightily impressive task of

debunking contemporary epistemology's fascination with,
as
she phrases it,

"single and presumably self-contained

philosophical utterances pronounced by no one in particular
and as though into a neutral space"

(x)

Code's exploration

of the spaces of talk and meaning is an attempt to explore

how nuance and texture in language and knowledge claims must

significantly alter how we think about language and
knowledge themselves (one of the results, to begin with,
being that the very idea of language and knowledge "claims"
or propositions becomes meaningless)

.

She uses the mapping

metaphor quite deliberately, in its most active sense:
do we map our knowledge claims?

territory?

For Code,

how

how do we claim epistemic

thinking in terms of a concrete

metaphor such as mapping territory (moreover,

a

metaphor

with rich resonances of power, struggle, and ambiguity

disguised as clarity

--

"lines in the sand")

is necessary,

if our discussions of knowledge are to have any relevance to

the ways in which we use knowledge in real life.

language of rhetorical spaces," she writes,

"The

"removes the

onus of establishing credibility and gaining acknowledgement

away from the abstract,

'generalized,' disengaged, moral-

epistemic individual of the Anglo-American tradition, and
212

into the lives,
'

concrete

1

social structures, and circumstances where

moral and epistemic agents are engaged in

deliberations that matter to them"

(xi)

in short,

.

Code's

work here is significantly in concordance with my
project,
and

will happily map out

I

(

!

)

the points at which we differ

our agreement now.

However,

(the territory over which we

would be fighting) to me indicates important gaps between
our perspectives.
Code positions herself,

this book,

in her chapter on gossip within

as a necessary mediation between two extremes in

analyses of gossip epistemology.

She contrasts the argument

that gossip is entirely instrumental, and useful for

epistemology (her principal source here is Maryann Ayim
[1994]

)

,

with the more typically feminist epistemological

analysis of gossip, that it is simply women's private
language,

or 'house' talk'

(her example is Deborah Jones;

our analogue might be Deborah Tannen)

.

The first approach,

Code argues, makes too much of gossip, rendering it so

instrumental that it becomes indistinguishable from
traditional, disinterested epistemology; the second simply

trivializes it

(152)

.

Code writes to uncover gossip as it

actually functions in our knowledge-gathering; not as we
might wish it to, nor as we assume it to.
Her analysis of gossip's "actual" function,

delightfully, rests on an examination of gossip in
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a film,

A

Jury of Her Ppprs 18

.

The injustice of an accusation
of

murder of her husband leveled at the
wife is only uncovered
by two women (who do not meet until
the murder investigation
begins) who are able to come up with a
correct

interpretation of the (on the surface damning)
facts through
gossip (145)
Code sees a tripartite analysis of
knowledge
emerge through the facts of the film:
first, that
.

an

interested, engaged knowledge process

(such as happens with

gossip)

yields more plausible knowledge than the work
of the
professional, rational investigators; second, that
knowledge
emerges through a community (the community, by its
own

connections, produces knowledge that is internally

consistent and sensible but will be incomprehensible to

outsiders

--

investigators have

a

hard time accepting the

women's interpretations of the facts) rather than through
objective, disinterested individuals; and finally, that

gossip functions as effective chaos (there are no rules by

which one goes about gossiping, but its effectiveness is
undeniable

[146,

152]).

“Indeed, it's worth noting that Ayim, cited in Code's
chapter, uses the Miss Marple character from Agatha Christie's
mystery novels to justify how gossip can be instrumental, and
knowledge - reveal ing
Fictional gossip seems to be a favorite
resource for those seeking to defend the epistemic worth of
gossip; perhaps because the only other documented sources of
gossip (those scintillating social science accounts appearing
in the first chapter here) have such a predisposition against
gossip's validity that the far less authoritative source of
art is a much more fecund ground for analysis.
.
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Code's arguments in favor of the effectiveness
of
gossip are sensible:
she points out that knowledge simply
can't be removed from its location in situations
infused by
power dynamics (149); and indeed, that exactly
that kind of
removal is what produces the curiously antiseptic,

unrealistic accounts of knowledge that pepper
Anglo-American
epistemology.

We must displace,

she argues,

"persistent

liberal assumptions that people are all, really, alike
and

interchangeable"

(148)

.

She quickly and capably dissects

the power dynamics operating in the film (the gender

connection and class dissonance between the two principal
female "investigators," the more marked contrast between the

women and the formal, officious, and suspicious male
investigators

[ibid.]).

But ultimately,

Code's analysis

fails to be convincing, because of her insistence upon

maintaining traditional conceptions of epistemology.
might sound curious

(for indeed,

Code couches the entire

book as an argument against those very conceptions)
Code's arguments for
it is necessary,

a

This

,

but

purposeless notion of gossip, and why

demonstrate why this is

a fair analysis.

Code dismisses more aggressively purposive accounts of

gossip such as Ayim's; it is foolishly overgeneralizing, she
suggests, to think of gossip as if it is always, only, and

exclusively purposive and instrumental

--

the necessarily chaotic nature of gossip.

to do so misses

Indeed,

suggests, to do so is to fall into the clutches of
215

she

traditional epistemology.
she acknowledges,

"

[but]

"

it

[G]

ossip has instrumental uses

is important to note that

characterizing it as inquiry, as instrinsically
instrumental, amounts to reclaiming it for respectable

epistemological discourse cast in

disinterested mold.
as a located,

activity"

traditionally

Such a reclamation obscures its power

idiosyncratic, and hence peculiarly perceptive

(151)

analyze here.

a

There are several points we must pause to

.

The first is the claim that gossip can't be

instrinsically purposive without also being intrinsically
disinterested; the second is that (correlatively) gossip
can't be intrinsically purposive and located,
or perceptive.

idiosyncratic,

The third is the unstated implication here

that we can't actually talk about inquiry without slipping

into the language of disinterest, objectivity, neutrality.
Indeed,

she suggests as much when she criticizes Ayim's

attempt to claim instrumentality for gossip:
not,

as

I

see it,

"the point is

to champion the worthiness of gossip by

showing that scientific communities do it too, in the
serious,

fact-finding aspects of their work.

to show that gossip,

Rather it is

for all its randomness, produces

knowledge so valuable that it can contest the paradigm
status of scientific method as the only reliable means of

establishing truth"

(150)

.

Notice the wording in that quote.

Code is not arguing

with the legitimacy of the argument that scientists work by
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gossip; she's contesting the relevance of talking
about that

very topic.

Code is arguing that we must simply defend the

fact that gossip produces knowledge,

idiosyncratic way

(if

I

in its own

might juxtapose quotations), so much

so that it challenges scientific truth as the only means

possible.

But what does this mean?

Quite simply, that the

paradigms of science versus gossip remain separate (but
equal!)

;

that scientific truth and method remain unassailed.

Certainly, we might from time to time step down from our

scientific pedestals to indulge in

a

spot of gossipy fact-

finding, but we keep our borders clearly drawn (the

epistemic map can be distinct and finalized

--

now we are

hypothesizing scientifically, and now we will gossip)

.

This

analysis brings forth resonances both of Bergmann's portrait
of gossip "quarantined" in much of social science analysis,

and Shibutani

'

attempt to legitimate rumor as useful, and

s

occasional rational
useless, way)

(in its own,

This analysis,

.

special,

in short,

i.e. ultimately

perpetuates

gossip's status as distinct from isolated, still rational,
scientific method.
Shibutani,

And,

as

I

said while discussing

if given the choice between suddenly-acceptable-

in-unique-ways gossip and still -rational -and-universallyacceptable science, it hardly boggles the mind to imagine

which choice people will make

(at

least overtly)

Code's conviction that gossip must necessarily be

unruly in part

I

think stems from her definition of gossip.
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In the first place,

it seems clear that she thinks of gossip

as only being about other people;

she describes gossip as "a

finely- tuned instrument for establishing truths -- albeit

often corrigible, renegotiable truths
(147)

15

In the second place,

.

--

about people"

Code characterizes gossip as

simply a mode of activity while doing other things:
[gossipers]

are otherwise engaged; the gossip accompanies,

grows out of, and embellishes (cognitively) their practical

preoccupations"

(146)

.

Indeed,

she attacks Ayim

'

s

Miss

Marple-generated gossip as an inappropriate simulation of
gossip; the inappropriateness, Code argues, comes from its

overarching intentional and deliberate character

(151)

.

I

think there is some legitimacy to her statement about
gossip;

I

do think we tend not to think about gossip when we

19

Incidentally
her description of gossip- truths as
corrigible and renegotiable for me represents more evidence
that she ascribes significantly less legitimacy to the truth
of gossip than to that of science.
It is hard to imagine Code
defining scientific truths as corrigible and renegotiable (or
having to graft on the apologetic qualifier of "albeit
often"); although of course, as anyone who's studied even
elementary school science knows, exactly those adjectives
(Even our stillquite appropriately characterize science.
cherished mythology of science being one long linear process
into final cohesion and a revelation of all knowledge is
itself based on a belief that we are in fact always
scientific truth is always
that
progressing -e.g.,
in a unidirectional fashion].)
[if
renegotiating itself
Indeed, those adjectives are in a limited sense especially
appropriate in these days of speedily outdated, to say nothing
of simultaneously contradictory but appealing scientific
But no one would think it a worthwhile point of
theories.
analysis; Code's failure to hit upon exactly these sorts of
comparisons shores up her ultimate inability to see gossip as
more
way
as
same
the
in
worthwhile
epistemically
knowledge.
of
forms
"conventional"
,
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do it,

or after the fact

(e.g.,

if someone asked you what

you did today, you might rattle off

a

laundry list of

activities like working, eating, cleaning, exercising,
laundry!]

,

[even

while neglecting to mention that you spent 45

minutes gossiping about whether or not your division would
get more budget or labor cuts, or if the new neighbors

across the street would ever stop arguing loudly with their

windows open, or why it was that they were arguing so much)
But it seems to me that analyzing gossip as a mode of

behavior, or a necessarily parenthetical behavior,

for Code

necessitates its status as purposeless, or only accidentally
purposive.

I

do not mean to overemphasize the importance of

admittedly rationalistic concepts like intentionality or
consciousness (for surely it is consciousness that

differentiates the parenthetical behaviors from the
deliberate)

,

not least because

I

think that we can do many

things with purposes that are in fact quite unbeknownst to
us,

and therefore unconscious behaviors can often be quite

purposive (the Freudian slip is only the most obvious
example)

.

However,

I

still hold that is important not to

cordon off gossip and rumor into one mode of occurrence
only.

Gossip can not only or always be accidental or less

conscious than other epistemic behaviors; to hold this is to

perpetuate Enlightenment distinctions between intention and
accident, with the inevitable result that gossip holds
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.

lesser epistemic status than the "rationally-acquired"
knowledge.

I

do not think this is the case.

But let me return to the fallout of this modal

analysis,

those first two claims Code makes about gossip

(that it can't be intrinsically purposive without also being

disinterested; that if it is intrinsically purposive it
cannot be located and idiosyncratic)
that

I

.

My first reaction is

think Code must see this dilemma as emerging because

she is maintaining this covert distinction between the

paradigms of science and gossip, knowledge and chatter.
short,

I

In

think that we shatter the notion of a disinterested

epistemology exactly by demonstrating that epistemology is
often and by construction interested.
It also seems to me that the assumption that intrinsic

purpose and the disinterested scientific observer posture
are automatic companions is based upon a naive and outmoded

conception of how science operates.
(1986)

demonstrates,

As Laboratory Life

scientists do not proceed along

a

neutral quest for the Truth; their motivations for increased
income,

notoriety, a longer and more noteworthy resume,

besting the other research groups, and indeed hard to
categorize or rationalize motivations all factor in along

with traditional interests in finding solutions and
completing problems.

This does not delegitimize the

conclusions scientists arrive at; it situates and humanizes
them
220
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Code

'

s

modal analysis also seems to contribute to her

conviction that gossip must be pretty purposeless, or rather
only accidentally purposive.

Perhaps it is difficult to

reconcile the notion of an activity that is not deliberative
and orderly also being purposive.

Because gossip is not

fully intentional, Code seems to be arguing,

such

intent ionality as it possesses can't really be relevant or

essential.

However,

I

think there are many such analogues

(admittedly less glamorous) to be drawn from our everyday
life of behavior that are clearly not deliberative or

orderly, but also purposive.

The most appropriate example

is that so poorly used by Bergmann -- dancing.

certainly,

Now

there can be a basic purposiveness to dancing.

Quite often, people get up to dance from a sitting position,
or move away from a bar or the wall, or even another room,
so as to dance.

This is clearly done with the kind of full,

transparent intent ionality Code wants to ascribe to non-

gossipy knowledge 20
are on the floor;
a club,

.

But imagine yourself dancing once you

in particular,

imagine yourself dancing in

where there are no prescribed (Bergmannian

!

)

dances

Of course, we can easily imagine a situation where even
beginning to dance would not be done with the kind of full
In a crowded dance club, the
intentionality Code seeks.
area
and the standing-and-chatt ingdance
the
between
"border"
inscribed; and it's not
clearly
not
area
is
and-drinking
what
was once "the edge" and
at
standing
imagine
difficult to
deciding to do it
entirely
not
there,
dance
to
starting
simply
bob one knee to
or
arm
one
move
to
mildly
starting
(perhaps
then joining
energetically,
more
then
music,
the
of
the beat
in fully)
20
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to be danced according to rigid musical norms

waltz,

(now we must

now we twist, now we tango, now we mosh, and now

Virginia reel)

a

Once you are dancing, the movements you

.

undertake are not clearly thought out
move from side to side for

8

beats,

(why now,

I'm going

and then I'll start

swinging my arms back and forth; and you know, right now

I

think I'll make like John Travolta in Saturday Night Fever
and do a one-girl line dance)
(unless,

of course,

,

and certainly not orderly

you're a rehearsing chorine, John

Travolta on film, or simply reenacting the routine from an
aerobics class)

.

This is even more true when two (or more)

people dance together in

Each partner might start

a club.

following each other's moves, but in partial, tentative ways
(or aggressive,

elaborative ways)

clear nor prescribed.

,

and the order is neither

More to the point, no one person has

control of the dance; each partner often does entirely their
own movements

(my partner might be spinning around at a

nausea- inducing rate while
vortex)
other,

.

I

erratically circumnavigate her

The movements will simply resonate with each

following the same beat

(if

sometimes only roughly)

Yet no one would say that the chaos of one person or two

people or a group of people dancing in

a club has no

purpose; indeed, it's not hard to deduce multiple purposes
or intentions

(often simultaneously in action)

from dancing

(getting exercise, cheering up after a depressing day,

celebrating

a triumph,

getting to know someone, trying to
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lose an annoying person,

bonding with

a

testing someone's compatibility,

group of friends, simply forgetting about

external reality, etc)

More particularly, we can also

construct multiple purposes and intentions for particular

moves of the dance (all those listed above, and more direct
ones -- chasing out

a

kink in a joint, moving particularly

underused muscles, just moving differently than one is

conventionally allowed to do on the street, in
or workplace, while eating)

.

a

classroom

Purposive behavior doesn't

have to be transparently deliberative, with monolithic

reasons graf table isomorphically onto behavior-moments.
In sum,

then,

the main difficulty

analysis of gossip is her reliance on
epistemology.

I

a

have with Code's

zero-sum model of

To name gossip as instrumental, purposive, or

investigative is to renounce its merit or existence as
chaotic or accidental, or anti-rational,
perspective.

in Code's

And it is clear that for Code, while there

might be some plurality and play to her notion of gossip,
ultimately, gossip's chaos and unruliness stand as its

essential characteristics; any purpose we might ascribe to

particular gossip-conversations is in fact only situational,
not essential.

This kind of zero-sum modeling (your

conversations can be one or another, your truth can be
either/or)

seems far more pervasively modernist than the

simple instrumentality Code ascribes to feminist analyses of

gossip like Ayim's.

Surely it must be possible to imagine
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.

scheme of gossipy epistemology that leaves the zero-sum

model behind (such,

indeed,

will be my task in the third

chapter); couldn't it be so that gossip could be both

instrumental and chaotic,

in short,

chaotically purposive?

Couldn't our knowledge be rational and disorderly?

Why

isn't our knowledge -gathering idiosyncratic and organized?
The fact that Code cannot even conceive of or recognize

these as possibilities indicates the limitations with which
she sees gossip as valuable 21

.

And again, given her

implicit praising of science (sure, it can be located, but
not as much, not as inherently, as gossip)

,

it seems to me

that it is she who casts gossip on the outskirts of a

maintained Enlightenment epistemology.

Code's gossip can,

for all her provocative language in the beginning of her
book,

be nothing more than a creator of knowledge in lieu of

the real thing.

Unfortunately, Code has ample company in the

philosophical field in feigning praise of gossipy, chaotic
forms of knowledge -gathering while secretly holding back the
real rewards of Truth.

C.A.J. Coady is the most recent

Indeed, Code's final provocation comes when she sums up
her territory of gossip as "neither essentially good nor
essentially evil, essentially the province of women nor of
What
men, essentially private nor essentially public" (152)
is striking here is that she is willing to challenge so many
of the traditional dichotomies held to gossip (women's evil
private talk) but cleaves so resolutely to gossip's idleness:
clearly, idleness is unavoidably essential for Code to be able
shall challenge this presupposition
I
to cognize gossip.
further in Chapter 3
21

.

,
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example of this analysis.
Testimony:

Coady's highly praised book

Philosophical Study (1992)

A,

,

articulates

simple, potentially momentous philosophical argument

a

—

that

we must let go of the individualistic bias towards direct

knowledge, because most of our knowledge is indirectly

attained

(13)

Coady articulates an exciting agenda for his

.

consideration of indirect knowledge through testimony

--

rescuing its appropriate significant status in epistemic
theory.

He writes that

constitute an important,

"

[t]

he judgements of others

indeed perhaps the most important,

test of whether my own judgements reflect a reality

independent of subjectivity"

(12)

.

Not only does

interpersonal testimony not amount to substandard, purely

evaluative knowledge, he says, it is the only meaningful
escape we have from solipsism.

Coady's refreshingly

skeptical attitude towards professional epistemology is

apparent here as well

--

Zeno's paradox is less the problem

facing theorists of knowledge, his remark suggests, than our
own logically consistent and coherent, but hopelessly

microcosmic theories of knowledge.
then,

His task in this book,

becomes nothing less than to defend a recasting of

epistemology with indirect testimony as one (among many)
first priority ies
(

)

,

instead of

a

distant second cousin.

While this argument has potentially devastating consequences
for the bulk of modernist epistemology,

Coady ultimately

withdraws from all the serious implications of his
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argument

-

and more to the point, qualifies the argument so

that testimony itself maintains a lesser-order status in

knowledge
Coady does an impressive job of categorizing and

critiquing the contemporary literature on testimony.
Philosophic responses to testimony range from the puritan
(testimony exists, but only to demonstrate how rare real

knowledge is; Plato, Collingwood)

,

the reductive

(we are

only dependent on testimony because we check it so
rigorously, we are scientists of testimony; Mackie, Hume,
Russell, James), the fundamental

(testimony is a part of the

foundation of knowledge; Thomas Reid), to the end-of-

epistemology (because epistemology fails to provide an
adequate of knowledge, we must turn to psychological
accounts of why and how we believe, at which point fallible

testimony enters the picture; Quine, Popper [22-24]).

Coady

places himself nearest the obscure Scottish philosopher
Thomas Reid in this recounting of testimonials about
testimony, but nonetheless has some criticisms of Reid's
approach, as well as the rest.

In general,

Coady argues

that all the philosophers to one degree or another beg the

question about testimony; that they are all guilty of some
circularity.

Coady does an impressive job of documenting

the extent to which even to talk about testimony, the

philosophers must accept its existence and sensibility
(e.g.,

we trade and understand others'
226

testimony

[79,

117,

.

263-264]“.
argues,

But to be able to trade testimony, Coady

is to acknowledge the success of human language.

To

understand human language simply is to accept testimony (for
human communications to be traded continually means that
they are believed; the act of believing is nothing more than
an internal act of testimony:

"you say this").

Therefore,

the philosophers who attempt to accept the existence of

testimony and then try to problematize its epistemic value
we do it, but should we?)

(sure,

miss the point.

For Coady, exactly the error these philosophers make is
in trying to isolate testimony as one sort of epistemic

faculty

--

an independent faculty of the mind,

from perception or judgment or memory (133)

Coady puts perception,

Reid,

.

separable
Like Thomas

judgment, memory and testimony

on an equally fundamental footing.

Each is a central,

originating feature of human knowledge; none can hold
priority.

More to the point, Coady'

interpenetrating

--

s

foundation is

perceptions can be indirectly

transmitted, our memories can be judgmental

These two points

(146-147)

(the communality of knowledge and the non-

hierarchical nature of individual knowledge) are intertwined
for Coady; we can only do away with the fallacy of the

Autonomous Knower if we can acknowledge the breadth of its

Coady does an exhaustive amount of
More broadly,
documentation to establish the variety of commonplaces we
accept as fact that are nothing short of testimony -- indirect
knowledge (50-51)
22

.
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.

limitations, how little we operate according to autonomous

dictates

(either internally or externally, with ourselves or

with others)

23
.

However,

that internal /external distinction, which

see as tacit throughout Coady

the central problem

I

first make clear that

s

'

argument,

have with Coady
I

'

s

I

to me indicates

analysis.

Let me

agree with the bulk of Coady 's

criticism of much of epistemic theory

--

that it is far too

focused on an individual knower, and attempts to overisolate
how we form knowledge claims (this is a percpetional

statement only, and now

I

am making a judgment)

.

That said,

Coady 's prescription for the attitudes we should hold
towards knowledge more broadly understand is unsatisfactory.

Coady

1

s

argument,

in brief,

is that we should suspend our

judgment about truth or falsehood towards testimonial

propositions, and not rush to include or exclude them in our
webs of belief

basically takes

(107,
a

112-113)

.

He thinks this because he

pragmatist's approach towards truth --we

come to understand the truth or falsehood of our beliefs

over time, as they are tested and received by others.

Community knowledge is what matters, not individual holdings
Coady criticizes Hume in particular for holding to an
implied concept of an autonomous knower. For Hume's theory of
habitual, inductive acceptance or denial of testimony to work,
Coady says, we would have to be capable of isolating our
testimonials and according them high, low, or no degrees of
cridibility, or denying them outright on a propositional
We neither hear
This is simply unfeasible (85, 94)
basis.
an atomistic
in
us
give
people
nor evaluate reports other
fashion
23
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--

and we only arrive at our individual beliefs through the

community
Coady justifies this suspension of beliefs because he

believes in exactly an individual intelligence

--a

"controlling intelligence," he calls it, which sorts and

determines validity or invalidity of beliefs (again, through
a

complicated process of community interaction,

psychological habits, expectation [99-100]).
a

The notion of

controlling intelligence itself is nothing surprising

--

we all have selection mechanisms by which we choose to hear

or ignore beliefs,

avow or disabuse theories, register or

expunge facts or opinions.

But exactly what's curious about

Coady 's argument is that he has clearly held tacit standards
about what our sorting mechanisms should look like; what the
right and wrong ways are to interact with evidence and

opinion.

Coady

'

s

initially puzzling last chapter (about

expert testimony in courts) acts to illustrate his

previously unstated opinions about what evidence is really
believable or not.
To explain:

Coady makes it clear that what is special

about testimony (as distinguished from other kinds of

knowledge claims) is that we believe the fact because we
believe the witness; the

(disputed)

fact itself is less

important to our knowledge than the means by which we gather
it

(46)

.

He illustrates this corollary by pointing out that

from someone we consider to be a reliable witness, we will
229
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.

accept even astonising testimony; whereas from an unreliable

witness we will refuse to believe even the most banal
evidence.

But the way in which we determine a witness to be

believable or not, Coady clearly holds, is itself accessible
to universal standards of logic,

reason and objectivity.

Hence his unusual diatribe, with which he closes the book,
about the inadvisability of allowing expert testimony from

such "unscientific" sources as humanities professors and

psychologists,

into such "unscientific" territory as "moral

problems" or "human nature"

(287-303 24

this tendency, according to Coady,

The problem with

)

is that these fields are

so unremediably tainted with ideology and advocacy that

these experts cannot hope but to be subjective, and

dictatorial in their evidence-giving.

Indeed,

Coady neatly

contrasts these witnesses with experts from the hard
sciences, where he points out their expertise can be clearly

demonstrated, and presumably, where their investigations are

never tainted with the stain of ideology.
can guard themselves,

The hard sciences

Coady argues, easily able to

differentiate amongst the good and bad practitioners, and
the better and worse experts

(285)

.

By the way, there are other moments in the text where
this unusual bias creeps out. Coady argues strenuously early
on for the unreliability of testimony from children and the
mentally ill, based on their clear inabilities either to be
sincere or to distinguish fantasy from reality (35, 36) later
on in the final chapter, he also comments with profuse
asperity on the sad proliferation of "bogus" sciences and
their experts need to be read as the same kind of experts as
their more legitimate counterparts (287)
24

;

1
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Aside from the clear fact that Coady is suffering from
a

naively positivist faith in the impenetrability of hard

science by ideology (while he admits to reading Paul
Feyerabend, he only concedes to Feyerabend's claims about
the temporality of science,

and not to the fallibility of

experts themselves

I

itt

[286]

- -

guess Coady missed the passage

Against Method where Feyerabend documents that Galileo's

initial telescope generated widely varying reports from its
users,

and Galileo's subsequent invention of consistent,

impressive results
a clear

[Feyerabend 122-125]), he also is making

division here between real knowledge and lesser

knowledge.

Now,

admittedly, both kinds of knowledge can be

transmitted through testimony, so he's not arguing against
the validity of testimony per se, but the point here is that

he's arbitrarily restricting the range of testimony and

testifiers we will accept, based on rationalistic criteria
(whose knowledge is more viably demonstrable)

.

To do so is

to maintain a kind of faith not only in an Autonomous Knower
(it's our job to sort the right way),

but also in a

prioritization of truth over falsehood.

And that

prioritization is exactly the premise against whose validity
Coady has structured his whole book.

It seems to me,

then,

that in attempting to do away with our individualistic,

systemic theories of knowledge, Coady has succeeded only in
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replacing them with harder- to-detect
substitutes 26

,

but equivalent,

.

Another, perhaps more philosophically acceptable way of

phrasing this objection, proceeds like this:

If we are to

accept the basic premise of Coady's argument, that in

contrast to our essential presuppositions of contemporary
epistemology, the majority of what we call knowledge and

strong beliefs are not direct, autonomous, objectively

arrived-at propositions but indirectly assumed nuggets of
information, collected in a variety of ways, then clearly

there still remains an epistemic problem for philosophers.
If knowledge is so variantly collected and assumed,

how is

it that we decide we know something rather than simply

believe it?

In other words,

what exactly "knowledge" is

the old-fashioned problem of
(and when it rears its head in

lieu of faithful standby belief) reasserts itself in the

wake of Coady's analysis.

Clearly, Coady's sorting

mechanism is supposed to act as the answer for how we know
something to be knowledge versus simple belief; equally
clearly,
25

Coady's move is a reasonable one.

If we accept

In one sense, Coady's bias towards rational, orderly
(even through testimony) is evident throughout the

knowledge

For a work ostensibly concerned with indirect
book.
knowledge, with oral transmission of information, it is
nothing short of shocking that Coady's book fails to deal with
gossip at all, and only mentions rumor once (and that being a
rather sniffy mention of rumor's inevitably distorting
This attitude hardly inspires confidence in
qualities)
Coady's awareness of or respect for the broad array of what
testimonial information we commonly come to grapple with every
day of our lives.
.
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that information is pluralistically gathered, the means by

which we gather and sort this information must clearly take
on first importance in any sort of non- autonomous theory of

knowledge
Before

I

lodge my argument clearly,

important to note that Coady

'

s

I

think it's

alternative testimonial

theorists give really shallow weight to mental sorting
mechanisms.

Coady

'

s

end-of -epistemology adherents

(it's all

bunkum anyway, so let's just examine the psychological means
by which we apprehend and believe items in lieu of grappling

with outdated modernist concepts like knowledge) offer us
little in terms of how we as individual -yet - social knowers

should approach the body of items we consider our knowledge,
let along uncertain new prospects on the range.

point

(here comes my argument),

More to the

Coady 's own means by which

we assess and evaluate the information we hold to me seems a

bad fit to the variety of sources he's now acknowledging as
feeders into our mental hoppers.

Acknowledging that

testimony provides lots of what we take for knowledge means
that we're getting a lot of our information from

conversations with other people, from reading things more
and less casually,

from overhearing remarks, simply from

making the leap of interpretation (what
about the traffic accident

removed from the scene

I

I

I

think in my head

just witnessed is testimonially

just directly perceived)

.

As

should be transparently obvious, testimonial knowledge is
233

directly and necessarily steeped in frameworks of power,
preconception, assumption 26
accident:

someone

I

Regarding that traffic

.

what if either car is driven by a friend of mine?

despise?

a

car-phone wielding striver?

I

will

inevitably see nuances and resonances in even the most
mundane scenes that any random passerby would ignore;
similarly, they would have their own spins on this scene
that might never occur to me.

Theories of knowledge that

allow for this variety of information must similarly provide
for our ability to determine judgments:

when exactly do we

determine something to be knowledge?
At this point,

Coady's argument stumbles.

His let-it-

simmer attitude towards uncertain items, combined with his

presumptions that some kinds of knoweldge are generally more
plausible

(precisely those autonomous -knower biased,

rationalistic, neutrality- idealizing theories he so

furiously debunks early on in his book) guarantees that we
are left no closer towards actually understanding knowledge
in a pluralistic fashion.

It

seems peculiar to me that our

sorting mechanisms should be so at odds with our intake:
that while we collect our knowledge quite socially, we

evaluate and judge it in straitlaced, individualistic
fashion.

Social theories of knowledge, simply put,

0f course, pace Foucault, I think the entire enterprise
is duly steeped -- my point here is that
knowledge
of
testimonial information is most directly infused with these
relations, and therefore theories grounded in testimony need
most urgently to take these factors into account.
26
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dramatically widen the field of information we consider.
Items that before might seem outrageous or simply irrelevent
to a question at hand

(I

need an example here) can seriously

determine or affect how we regard beliefs in social theories
of knowledge.

Therefore,

it is all the more imperative that

these theories provide a means for us to evaluate and

consider the wide array of information we do in fact access,
and the means by which it is accessed.

In other words,

we

hear and produce testimony exactly because we are involved
in social and political relationships; testimony is by

definition

a

social act, embedded in these relationships.

Given that, it seems to be encumbent upon us to evaluate
testimonial information in light and in terms of those

relationships

--

only this sort of evaluation will properly

"place" testimony along with its fellow knowledge sources.

Coady's overly analytic means by which we are to evaluate

testimony (as simple, propositional knowledge claims, to be

weighed by preponderance of evidence) creates

a

"free

market" of knowledge creation which simply ensures that the

player with the most chips wins.
An alternative to this approach, which
in my third chapter,

is

I

will explore

(more straightforwardly)

the

informal approach --we accept that something called
"knowledge" exists but in fact has much less to do with
static, unassailable Truths than with social institutions:
in short,

knowledge is created both along and against
235

institutional power lines, knowledge simultaneously
"evolves" and resists itself.

"Knowledge claims" are

assessed and reassessed, in explicitly social terms.
other words,

it matters less what

say about the feasibility of

I

In

and formal logic have to

particular knowledge claim

a

than how this knowledge claim is created and its effects
felt throughout populaces.

have one coda for this argument, which may help both

I

as an example of the preceding analysis,

and as a

contextualization of the entire proceedings.

Throughout

this book, Coady's examples are highly characteristic of the

examples so favored by analytic philosophers

--

extremely

low-stakes claims it's hard to imagine someone getting

excited about their truth or falsehood ("there is mail for
you today," "it rained frogs in the 16 th century" "you were

born on this day in that year 27

)

;

these beliefs are hardly

27

know, properly trained analytic philosophers could
I
easily construct situations where someone would be excited
about the truth or falsehood of these situations -- if I am
awaiting word on whether or not the IRS is auditing me, or if
my particular brand of religiosity holds amphibian rainstorms
as incontrovertible evidence of the existence of God and the
imminent Rapture, or if the person uttering a statement of my
birthdate is a hostile official of Selective Service averring
that's
that yes, I will be expected to serve in the military)
Consistently using examples that universitynot the point.
trained Ph.D.s would have to work themselves into lathers in
order to find relevance for in my view demonstrates a lack of
interest in applying one's analysis to epistemically relevant
For an example of this, see
challenges we face daily.
Christopher Norris' book on the Gulf War, Uncritical Theory
where he points out that given the absence of reliable
1992
information about the war from the U.S. government, many
contemporary theorists adopted a quietistic stance of
nonbelief (and hence inaction) -- we simply couldn't know
;

(

)

,
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central to our webs of beliefs (for example, Coady doesn't
deal with claims that would be more contentious if only

available indirectly,

like whether or not gravity exists)

More to the point, exactly the sort of beliefs Coady doesn't
deal with are those that are centrally unsettled, and the

settling of which is highly relevant to
beliefs.

To explain:

at one point,

a

variety of

Coady analyzes Donald

Davidson's claim that we can only understand prior false
beliefs because of the degree of veracity they claim (in
other words, we only understand that people once believed
that the earth is flat because we can understand a number of

other true beliefs they had)
argument

Coady disagrees with that

.

(following Colin McGinn) because he thinks that we

only recognize false beliefs as such because of our
subsequent true

(superior) beliefs.

Davidson's point is

that we can only identify beliefs as such by locating them

within the pattern in which they initially occur --we may
be misreading not simply the individual belief but the

pattern itself

(e.g.,the ancients might actually have had a

different notion of "earth"

--

literally the surface only?

-

enough relevant details to make moral or epistemic claims
While I disagree
about the war, those intellectuals argued.
and what I take
argument,
Norris'
of
context
the
of
with much
to much of
argument
his
of
applications
over-broad
to be his
presents
analysis
his
theory,
intellectual
French
contemporary
(and
how
where
situation
pragmatic
of
kind
the
exactly
consequences,
serious
have
can
belief
determines
one
whether)
and to my mind exactly the sort of example Coady should work
with, if he wishes his analysis about testimony to have any
resonance with our lives, and how we think about directlyversus indirectly- received knowledge.
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-

than the one we inscribe upon them)

.

Coady disagrees with

that because he sees our positions as readers as important
-

-

we only identify false beliefs as such because we've come

to show them as so.

The content of this argument seems relatively trivial
to me, but what

I

example used

whether or not the earth is flat.

--

find interesting about it, again, is the
It seems

to me that if we replace the contention at hand with a

currently unstable contention, that suddenly what was merely
arcane becomes much more relevant.

--

Davidson's instinct

to look at the semantic and propositional parcel by which we

come to know things -- to me seems very important when we're

dealing with knowledge claims left unsettled.

When

I

think

of something like the debate surrounding The Bell Curve

the fact that,

,

and

simply by producing a book claiming to argue

for the systematic, genetic inferiority of intelligence

among African-Americans and poor Caucasian Americans, two
theorists have helped determine the direction around which
debates about merit, affirmative action, and school funding
will go for the next several years,

it becomes clear to me

that context is as important as content.

Critics of The Bell Curve
many,

,

of whom there have been

have generally focused on its implications for policy,

and its statistical claims

(e.g.,

does not amount to causation)

.
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statistical correlation

Left unaddressed (save by

.

Stephen Jay Gould and Howard Gardner 28
claims made by the book
"9"

--

(general intelligence)

like

intelligence"

)

are the conceptual

whether or not such

thing as

a

exists; whether or not a term

(or Murray and Herrnstein's more

duplicitous "cognitive ability") is

a

meaningful notion.

But the point here is that Murray and Herrnstein

1

s

book acts

as a placeholder -- its conception of intelligence as a

highly individualized feature that is immutable is now

relatively publicly accepted, even if the more openly
repugnant conclusions in the book have been stridently
refuted.

But it seems to me that these initial conceptions

of intelligence as individualized and unchangeable are

enough to guarantee the continued, covert holdings of

exactly those more repugnant beliefs.
To relate this back to the Davidson-Coady-McGinn spat,
it seems to me that Coady's advocacy of suspension of

judgment can only work in low-stakes epistemic battles (like
the contents of the mailbox)

,

another way of diminishing the

ultimate importance of indirect testimony or hearsay.
Because Coady says that we can simply not worry about making

epistemic decisions (and that indeed, we can assign equal
value to the truth or falsehood of indirectly reported
testimony!

[113]),

because time will bear out the truth or

fallacy of our conceptions; it seems to me that Coady
For their responses, as well as a variety of critical
responses, see both The Bell Curve Wars (1995) and The Bell
Curve Debate (1995)
28
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ultimately is arguing for
(again,

of.

a kind of

Christopher Norris).

epistemic quietism

And again, this can only

be a feasible position if the epistemic decisions we
are

making are of the regrettably individualistic kind.
simply say

I

pass" on the matter of The Bell Curve

leave it up to the experts!)

doesn
a

t

To
(or to

is to suggest that it really

matter that much if we re right or wrong in holding
'

certain conviction.

And

I

guess that while there is a

certain kind of philosophic appeal there (in breaking away
from a dichotomized notion of truth where we must get the
right result, right away), ultimately

I

find this

psychologically and epistemically unfeasible (to say nothing
of its contempt ibility)

and to others,

.

Because our beliefs matter, to us

it is important for us to be able to be

agents in our own epistemic constructs, and not simply wait
for "history" to tell us the answer.

Coady

'

s

passive

approach amounts to no epistemic progress at all.
At this point,

then,

we have two mildly different

philosophic takes on gossip and epistemology:

Code's theory

that gossip is only accidentally accurate and necessarily
idle,

and Coady's theory that gossip (implicitly)

contributes much to epistemology but only if we sternly,
rigorously,

individualist ically, logically keep it in check.

These two positions are compatible with each other:

it

is

all too easy to believe that if we think that gossip is

intrinsically purposeless but theoretically interesting, we
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might allow it some raw-material bonus points
(thanks for
the dirt
but constrict ourselves to adament analyses
!

of

)

any dubious information gossip provides.

Gilliam Teiman's dissertation on gossip in ladies'
magazines in the eighteenth century deals with similarly
trivial

topics; and like Sarah Miller in the previous

chapter, Teiman demonstrates how the apparent triviality of
the topics under discussion in her sources belies the actual

struggle that is taking place.
stated,

Teiman's argument, briefly

is that the progression of ladies'

magazines over

the eighteenth century (from the Female Tatler and Female

Spectator through the development of the genre of "women's
magazines") depicts the linear development of a unique
female voice,

typical of at the same time as resisting the

eight eenth- century ideals of modesty, silence, purity, and

domesticity.

Teiman is valiantly attempting to bridge the

gender gap of conversation; but she is only successful
insofar as the quietly erases risque, inappropriate,
'vicious'

voices.

chatter from the matrix she establishes of women's

Teiman does not bring woman-talk and man-talk to

a

mutual meeting-place, but instead argues that women are

fully capable of adapting to a preexisting masculine model
of rational,

logical,

substantive,

impersonal discourse.

Harmony is only possible in Teiman's model with
out of how we talk and what we say.
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a

flattening

The construction of Teiman's dissertation is the first

clue to the flattening aspects of the theory it contains.

Teiman just doesn't talk about men's speech, what it

is,

what it sounds like, what ideals it represents or resists.
The Tat ler

,

the Spectator and the Athenian Mercury aren't

really referred to, characterized or quoted from other than
a

few parenthetical remarks

(52-53,

57);

in fact,

the only

substantive usage of material from a men's magazine (the
Tat ler
89]),

'

s

development of the Jenny Bickerstaff character [82-

depicts how men's magazines talk about and for women,

but not how they are targeted and composed for men

themselves.

The absence of context here means that we're

working on assumptions of difference between men's talk and
women's talk

--

the men's magazines hover like unmentioned

and unmentionable standards against which women's magazines
are compared.

Even though men's magazines contained

articles for women, and Teiman makes it clear that women

often read them (in lieu of going out, which was unseemly),
there's no consideration of the significance of this point;
and more directly, there's no contemplation of either the

asymmetry of men being allowed to talk and write for women
but not the reverse, or the possibility that women wrote for
or read the men's magazines.

Talking about women's voice

for Teiman only means talking about women who write

exclusively, privately,

for themselves.

Teiman's linear

progression of the women's voice seems to spring up from
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nowhere; while she acknowledges that throughout the

eighteenth century increasing numbers of women were getting
educations and becoming writers, the lack of comparison

between women's magazines and men's magazines perpetuates
the impression that women were educated and put themselves
in the public eye in a vacuum -- women necessarily wrote
for,

to and about themselves, while men wrote for and to

everyone.

Teiman presupposes that women spoke

a

language

all their own.

This language,

as the rest of the dissertation makes

clear, has its origins in irrationality,

in intuition,

and

The dissertation depicts four women's voices.

in gossip.

We start with the Jenny Bickerstaff character,

by a man in the Tatler

[presumably]

.

composed

who develops

(thanks to

instruction from her elderly relative Mr. Bickerstaff) from

being an impetuous, argumentative (but often incorrect)

young single woman to

a modest,

married,

subservient matron.

From there we move to the first Female Tatler
is a "Mrs.

Crackenthorpe

,

"

,

whose voice

repeating gossip about those she

observes (with scrupulous standards of what she will and
won't repeat

[171]),

while at the same time decrying gossip,

and advocating women's place in men's after-dinner

converstaion

.

The first Tatler (apparently forced

temporarily to close after being sued for defamation of
someone's reputation)

is succeeded by a Tatler written by

the "Society of Ladies," who combine rational arguments for
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.

women's education and rights with the occasional gossip and

matrimonial discussion.
Spectator
time)

,

Finally, we have the Female

written by Eliza Heywood

(a

novelist of the

who writes both for women and men,

,

simply assuming

that the two share a conversational space of dignity and

rationality (and modesty)
From these periodicals, Teiman purports to advance

multilayered reading of the development of
in the eighteenth century.

a

a

women's voice

She sees the gradual inclusion

of women into the conversational space of men as not

entirely progress
are also contained

(17)
-

,

because as women are included they

they can no longer speak about certain

subjects or in a certain manner.

However,

I

don't see such

multiplicity in Teiman 's reading; returning to the primary
sources bears this out

.

Examining the Female Spectator

,

written by the most apparently standardly feminine author,
her introduction of herself reads as follows:
.My life, for some years, was a continued round
of what I then called pleasure, and my whole time
engrossed by a hurry of promiscuous diversions.
But whatever inconveneiences such a manner of
.

.

conduct has brought upon myself, I have this
consolation; to think that the public may reap
The company I kept was not,
some benefit from it.
indeed, always so well chosen as it ought to have
been, for the sake of my own interest or
education; but then it was general, and by
consequence furnished me, not only with a
knowledge of many occurrences, which otherwise I
had been ignorant of, but also enabled me, when
the too great vivacity of my nature became
tempered with reflection, to see into the secret
springs which gave rise to the actions I had
either heard or been witness of, to judge of the
various passions of the human mind and distinguish
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.

.

those imperceptible degrees by which they become
matter of the heart, and attain the dominion over
reason.

In short,

[Heywood {1929}

2]

Heywood does not regret an idle or vivacious past,

for it is this that teaches her more about the complexity of

human behavior.

Further, when she introduces the "method"

of her magazine,

it is through gossip --

"counterparts,

"

she has several

each of whom take turns relaying tales heard

or observed in society.

Heywood writes that she explicitly

prefers her "spy" system

(4)

And indeed, the bulk of the

Spectators consist of many reports about others' behavior,
both for good and ill.
clear,

Heywood

'

s

criticism,

let us be

is hardly restricted to women who transgress

acceptable gender norms of docility and passivity; she has
harsh criticisms for men are hypocritical with each other
(not simply for men who take advantage of women,

would have it
In sum,

as Teiman

)

it seems to me that both her construction of a

linear relationship of the women's voices (i.e., matching
the temporal development of the different periodicals to the

growing conformity of women to the male ideal so that they
can be allowed to speak)

,

and her lack of commentary on

men's voices and men's ideals support the notion the

construction of the modest woman's voice is historically
necessary.

More to the point, what

an artificial division

I

see as her creation of

(almost an opposition)

first and second Female Tatlers
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,

between the

her inability to read the

.

.

,

gossipy Mrs. Crackenthorpe as anything but an inconsistent
cipher, and her positing of the Female Spectator as

a

peak

of female rationality and civility speaks to Teiman's

internalization of the Enlightenment ideals of rationality,

consistency and order.
Other liteary theorists have the same reservations
about gossip and knowledge as does Teiman.
(1988)

,

Jan Gordon

who we heard from earlier in this chapter (writing

about gossip in Bronte as necessarily false and distortive)

,

regards gossip in Austen as a similarly inadequate

substitute for gainful knowledge.

Gordon at one point

outright denies the possibility of objective truth (27-28)
instead focusing on gossip as one of many ways by which
novels arrive at "experiential" truth.

Initially, she

speaks admiringly of gossipers' ability to adjust themselves
and their interpretations to the reactions and ideas of
others;
(13)

"gossips must listen while they speak," she writes
But her admiration is cautious; she begins by

pointing out that the careless reader might simply see
flexible gossip as "inconstant narrative"

(ibid)

.

But the

flexibility Gordon so appreciates in Austenian gossip has
its price; Gordon makes a point of noting how gossips in her

novels

(particularly Persuasion

)

make mistakes, and have no

claim to greater reliability than more authoritative

knowledge

(15)

Since this is hardly the assumption with

which most people proceed when talking about gossip in
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a

formal sense, one wonders why this is the item of particular
emphasis, rather than the converse

(that gossip is not less

reliable than the conventional knowledge the novel
reproduces)

More to the point, Gordon's main argument is

.

that gossip operates in Austen to suggest that the whole

story exists and is knowable
things lost in novels

[ibid]

--

)

but is just lost
In other words,

.

(like

the partial

reconstructions of truth that appear via novel's special
techniques

--

diaries,

letters, gossip -- can never hope to

recover the Whole True Story.
Far from recovering completeness in gossip, gossip can
in fact work at cross -purposes to more traditional

novelistic techniques (again, e.g. the letter).

Unlike more

"representative" forms of literary discourse, which

according to Gordon actually "represent something antecedent
to their inscription"

(21)

,

apparently gossip can not only

be simple exaggeration or interpretation of event but also

outright invention.

Given this, the danger unique to gossip

within novels is that of "exhaustion of textuality by
totalizing consumption"
gossip,

commentary,

(22).

In short,

a

everything becomes

interpretation piled upon

interpretation, at the ultimate, and lamentable, loss of

originating event (i.e. truth, substance).
maintains

a

This schematic

bipolar differentiation of truth and falsity

--

gossip's function in this formula becomes simply to
reemphasize the unbridgeable gap.
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In this formulation,

for

Gordon as well as for the other theorists in this section,
gossip clearly fails to have anything positive to contribute
to knowledge formation -- marking an absence of a strictly

valued positive falls severely short of full knowledge.

2.4

Archaeologists of Gossip
Within the humanities,

choosing to use what

I

I

am most intrigued by those

loosely term archaeological

approaches to gossip and rumor.

By this

I

simply mean that

these theorists do historical excavations of gossip and

rumor at particular moments or in certain formats, so as to

demonstrate how the language of gossip and rumor reveal

subterranean veins of belief and mores that go unrecognized
in "official",

aboveground treatises.

While ultimately

I

find these analyses limiting according to their one-way use
of archaeology

(gossip is only useful for looking back:

uncover the meaning and significance of gossip after it
happens)

,

which restricts it to being essentially an

academic tool; nonetheless these writers (like Latour and
Woolgar, Miller, DeBenedittis and Gluckman in the first
chapter)

are all worthy of attention simply for their

willingness to consider gossip and rumor not only through
social constructivist lenses, but as agents of positive
change, not simply rampant social destruction.

Most assertive with this agenda is Patricia Turner's

recent book

I

heard it Through the Grapevine
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(1993)

.

To

we

.

begin with, her methodology is refreshing

--

while she reads

exhaustively through the fields of rumor, and has lots of
historical documentation for the periods in which the rumors
she's using occur, her approach with the contemporary rumors
is simple.

She gathers all the rumors she hears about and

then focuses on those that 'work'
She investigates them simply

--

--

those that get spread.

talks to the people named or

implicated by the rumors, talks to those spreading the
rumors

(her "informants"),

and investigates the

circumstances surrounding the rumor (indeed, she amusingly
refers to her assiduous rumor-gathering self as an almost

round-the-clock field worker [6]).

Her thesis is simple:

that rumors can act as tools for resistance within the

African-American community

By personalizing

(xvi)

structural inequities (e.g. slavery, economic
discrimination, the difficulty surrounding the passage of
the Civil Rights Act)

into memorable, applicable personal

narratives (white slave owners eat their black slaves,
Church's Fried Chicken contains

men sterile, John
[32]

)

,

F.

a

chemical that turns black

Kennedy Jr. was assassinated by the FBI

African-Americans not only comfort themselves that

their unhappiness is shared (and not arbitrary, inhuman
inequity)

,

but motivate themselves to make practical changes
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9

.

in their surroundings

(economic boycotts,

widespread voter registration)

slave revolts,

29
.

As the previous list makes clear, Turner's examples are

varied in subject and historical moment (she follows
Shibutani here)

;

more directly, Turner also traces the

development of parallel rumors

--

for instance white slave

owners spread the rumor that their slaves were cannibals

concurrently to African-Americans' communal fear that their
slave owners planned to eat them (13 -20)
this feature

30
.

Turner uses

(occurring frequently in her history of rumor)

to illustrate what becomes central for her when defining
--

rumor

that content is not simply the issue, but more

broadly function and effect of rumor

(5)

While Turner

essentially agrees with the dictionary definition of rumor
(unsubstantiated report about some one or thing transmitted
orally)

,

she amends it to include the fact that rumors only

spread because of reasons external to the proposition itself
--

the dictionary notion of rumor is sadly limited to its

At this point, my summation of Turner might make her
sound surprisingly like Knopf, whom I criticize for exactly
that point (I consider her thesis of rumors' crystallization
As I see it,
of larger political structures as passive)
on
her emphasis:
strictly
Turner departs from Knopf's analysis
things
accomplishes
rumor
that
she repeatedly reminds us
-resistance,
foments
community
within the African-American
Rumor for Knopf is
directs anger, motivates boycotts.
-happens remotely
that
action
represents
it
symptomatic only
is action
Turner
for
Rumor
elsewhere)
(riots occurring
determines
-that
knowledge
of
construction
is
a
it
itself
future actions.
2

.

.

This observation of parallel rumors developing
politically opposed communities follows Knopf.
30
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in

,

material manifestations.

More directly, Turner argues that

rumors help us to construct narratives of our lives that
aren't simply passive stories of complication

(

pace Spacks)

but invigorating tales of disenfranchisement that can act to

motivate us, to spur us to action

--

refusing to buy

products whose companies are subjects of rumors, even simply
spreading the rumor is sometimes a critical action (letting

other people know about organized suspicions or analyses of

malfeasance

[96-97,

133,

151]).

Turner repeatedly reminds us that believers in rumor
are not, as their critics portray them,

under- inf ormed, gullible sorts

simple-minded,

(Turner quotes several

academics making this claim [109, 119]).

Rather,

she notes,

rumor believers are often capable of sophisticated political
analysis; their rumors act to synthesize a variety of facts

they observe in their social milieus.

As an example,

Turner's informants who believe or spread the rumor that
funded by the Klan, puts a chemical in their

Church's,

chicken that sterilizes African-American men, note pretty

uniformly when questioned about the feasibility of that task
(how could a chemical select out only African-American men

from the chicken-eating population?)

that Church's only

operate and advertise in predominantly African-American
areas

(

86

31
)

.

This "for blacks only" marketing strategy, which Turner
documents in many corporate rumor instances, manifests itself
Turner reminds us of R.J. Reynolds'
explicitly in one case.
31
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More pointedly, Turner directly contrasts the

patronizing academic attitude that rumor believers are
goalless idlers, using farfetched rumors to justify their
indolent statuses in life with several portraits of genuine

subscribers to rumor

--

people who are college-educated,

working, with developed plans for their futures
195)

.

Indeed,

(106,

194-

the scene Turner prepares for us throughout

her book (documenting the wide variety of themes present,

sometimes simultaneously,

in different rumors -- corporate

control over African-Americans, contamination of African-

American bodies, conspiracy theories), suggests that more
than anything else, rumor functions in the African-American

community to assimilate

a

wide variety of facts and

structures, most of which are hostile,

makes structural problems personal

in a way that both

(Church's enormous

corporate profits at the expense of African-Americans

becomes a literal instead of figurative assault)

motivates reactions.

,

and that

Rumors become the analytic tool by

which African Americans can read their situations

--

comparing facts, individual and institutional motives, and
histories
feasibly.

--

and assemble a narrative that covers the bases

As Turner puts it when describing her examples of

corporate rumors,

"a

perception [develops]

in the rumor-

telling public that the costs and risks associated with

abortive attempt to develop a cigarette brand,
explicitly marketed for African Americans (101)
.
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a

"Uptown",

)

,

particular product outweigh its usefulness to the consumer"
(175)

Rumors become simply the crystallization of well-

.

founded disbelief in corporate narratives of fulfillment

through consumption.

More to the point, the rumors Turner

documents are individually significantly more popular than
their correlatives in the mainstream press (e.g., Church's
denial that they are poisoning black men; Ronald Reagan's
denial that he encouraged the drug war); Turner's rumors
select out emphases or facts that mainstream accounts miss
(82-83)

.

Despite

(or perhaps because of)

their effectiveness at

organizing and explaining hostile circumstances, the rumors
Turner presents are vociferously denied by all of their
objects.

More to the point, corporate targets of rumor

frequently redraw the rumors as misinformation campaigns

waged by their enemies (i.e.,

a

Marlboro spokesperson chalks

up reports that Marlboro is Klan- financed to anti-tobacco

forces

[99]

a CIA

representative attributes the story that

the U.S. government developed the AIDS virus as genocidal

aggression against African-Americans to anti-U.S. propaganda
[156]

.

Most gruesomely,

after widespread rumors of

government involvement in the Atlanta child murders, local
law enforcement and FBI officials proceeded not only to

dismiss the possibility of government influence, but to deny
the existence of serial killings themselves -- murders were

attributed to some of the children's parents, and
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a local

.

African-American man was arrested for two of the murders
(81-

82,

126-127)

.

Given that 23 children were killed in

the space of a year and a half,

and that no arrests were

made in the other killings, continued cynicism towards
"official" explanations seems more than adequately

justified
To be sure,

there is some justification for corporate

and governmental suspicion towards rumors:
out that one rumor

Bottling,

Turner points

(that a small beverage company,

is funded by the Klan)

,

Brooklyn

could feasibly have been

started by drivers for rival bottling companies, anxious to

maintain their business

(129)

are still relevant for us,

nature.

But the denials themselves

.

first,

due to their extravagant

Not only are the rumors empirically wrong,

it seems

to be quite important to negate any legitimacy whatsoever to

the rumors

(i.e.,

the spokespeople have no interest

whatsoever in acknowledging that while the conclusion may
not have empirical legitimacy,

arrived at has relevance)

32
.

the context by which it is

To substantiate this, witness

that when one executive directly asks Turner how he might

defuse the effect of the rumor, and she suggests that his

company begin marketing more moderately-priced products (to
do away with the image that large conglomerates are
It's also important to note here that conspiracy theory
rumors themselves are stridently dismissed as absurd, whereas
there appears to be no similarly aggressive dismissals of
conspiracy theory responses to rumors, from appropriately
expert spokespeople.
32
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.

interested only in exploiting African-Americans for
their
hard-earned,
goods),

scarce dollars towards expensive consumer

this suggestion is instantly dismissed (214).

Given

this attitude, combined with the blindness to situations
that rumor-afflicted moguls show,

it isn't difficult to see

how and why rumors maintain their folk power.

It

is perhaps

more difficult to see why targets of rumor are so unwilling
to recognize the persistence,

and the legitimacy, of rumor.

Turner closes her book by recommending that rumors and
other

f olkloric

materials be studied along with their more

orthodox counterparts for accurate history

(219)

for several historians this is simply a given.

academics

Kathleen

(James C. Scott

Blee

M.

[1991]

[1990],

--

,

For these

rumor and gossip are

they reveal beliefs and

facts that are otherwise not transmissible.

matter in theoretical terms:

happily,

Ranajit Guha [1983], and

among them)

important historical resources

;

Scott puts the

gossip and rumor are efficient

means of transmitting information anonymously and safely
(without record, without author
a

[142]

)

.

Gossip then becomes

vital resource for communities without access to standard

venues of power (public forums like newspapers, radio or
television)

,

or for groups whose views are controversial

enough that public forums will remain always closed to them
(143)

.

Gossip and rumor 33 are the only safe ways to

According to Scott, only gossip is a means for
critiquing powerful people --we spread gossip about people,
and rumors about events or institutions (142)
33
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.

critique powerful people or institutions.

Their safety,

indeed, promotes the kind of elaboration and explanation

that Turner documents more fully in the book.

Because we

are free to spread our gossip and rumors without check, we

develop them to accord with already-felt but not publicly

expressible hopes and fears (145)

.

These features of rumors

and gossip, then, are hallmarks of political culture among
the dispossessed

Ranajit Guha

(151)
'

s

.

Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency

in Colonial India concretely foreshadows Scott's theoretical

conclusions.

Guha creatively analyzes "authoritative"

histories and governmental documents of colonial India,

dissecting the language and the absences of information to
substantiate his theories about how it is that rebellion

movements can gain ground and succeed.

What he finds, when

he analyzes how information is passed both with rebels and

with the colnists, is that the Indian and British
imperialists saw peasant communication as being like

a

plague on their country (220-221), infected by outsiders,

uncontrollably passed throughout the population, and surely
As we have seen previously, this metaphor has deep

fatal.

resonance
notes

--

[222]),

plagues are out of control

("irrational", Guha

disastrous, perhaps inevitable

('natural')

against the perpetuation of the natural order of things
(224)

--

ultimately, a plague is like a crime against

humanity
256

but

.

.

Guha calls attention to the features of peasant

rebellion that stymie historians

--

how seemingly

unconnected groups, or apparently trivial events, could
trigger significant and successful rebellions (223)
Indeed,

.

rather than acknowledge insurgent communicative and

interpretive strategies like gossip and rumor, official

historians bend over backward to concoct extravagant

explanations for rebellion, ultimately arriving at farflung

conspiracy theories involving omnipotent, Napoleonic
"influential individuals"

(2 2 6

34
)

.

To hold the line

against the disease of outside insurgency, colonial

governments banned such informal peasant communications as

gong-playing and the ritualistic circulation of
bread (231, 241)

.

a

local

But more relevantly, despite the

durability of rumors as

a counter-

insurrectionist medium in

India (252), while rumors are collected by the colonial
powers,

they are regularly discounted as a communicative and

political medium by those writing India's histories.
Repeatedly, colonial India's historians write off rumors as

occasions of mass hysteria, irrationality that is directed
away from the truth and towards alarmist distortions (254,
258,

268)

The only possibility obscure to the colonial

0f course, Guha also notes that the rebels themselves
The
were guilty of a similar brand of self-consciousness.
interventions
mystical
foreseeing
rumors
prophetic
rise of
an
to
attributes
Guha
structure,
colonial
the
into
their
acknowledge
rebels
to
of
the
part
the
on
unwillingness
34

own radical urges and analyses (277)
257

s

)

it seems,

.

is that disempowered people could

intelligently and imperceptibly

(to the colonists)

communicate with themselves, analyze

a

situation in

a

fashion that ran counter to official ideology, and compute
rational means by which to gain power.
But as Guha concisely explains, rumor is a vitally

important medium of communication for the largely illiterate
Indian peasantry, for whom official newspaper accounts, even
if accessible,

are not adequate as explanations for their

enduring poverty and diminished status (251, 254)

Rumormongering is not only necessary, Guha continues, it is
importantly unique as a method of communication and
analysis:

it is immediate and collective,

in a way that

simple transmission of news fails to be (261)

.

To miss this

distinction, as the "official" historians of India do (by

writing about rumor as "distorted", i.e. false, news), is to
fail to appreciate the particular circumstances by which

colonial rebels of India had to operate (259)

.

rumors are the special provenance of subalterns.

Indeed,

Rumors

become necessary in particular when there is a dominant

ideology or explanation that needs refuting; this refutation
is most feasible through lower-risk methods like rumor and

gossip (264

.

Of course,

the diminished risk inherent in rumors and

gossip means that they are effective tools not only for
resistance, but oppression.

Kathleen Blee
258

'

Women of the

,

.

Racism and Gender in the 1920s assiduously documents

:

the use of gossip and rumor as tactics of terrorism in
the

early 20th-century American South and Midwest.
of the Klan itself,

of course,

the reputation of gossip

costume)
cross)

,

,

ominous

—

The imagery

is immediately evocative of

anonymous (the hooded white

(the favorite Klan tactic of the burning

intrusively surveillant (the well -documented Klan

obsession with personal lives).

More particularly, Blee

1

s

book is a sophisticated accounting of the peculiar status of

women within the Klan

--

struggling for women's equality,

satisfying urges for political representation through the

maintenance of a subsidiary Klan, and the promotion of

a

mythic image of sanctified femininity and motherhood.

The

very real struggles for power between women and men in the
which Blee thoroughly explores (see especially her

Klan,

section on the Elizabeth Tyler-Edward Clarke revival of the
second Klan [17-23]), contextualize Blee

1

s

descriptions of

the Klanswomen's activities in support of their

organization
Those activities were simultaneously stereotypically
non- threatening

(at

women's Klan [klavern] meetings, women

would talk and play cards
effective.

[129]

)

and seriously politically

Blee crystallizes this fact:

"the political

power of gossip lay precisely in its apolitical character"
(14 9)

.

Through those channels of gossip, Klanswomen

organized votes for local, state and federal elections of
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sympathetic representatives, and indeed, boasted of
winning
otherwise unwinnable elections through their circles
of

gossiping women.

Vivian Wheatcraft,

a leader of the Indiana

KKK and a vice-chair of the Republican state committee,

boasted in 1926 after a successful re-election of

a Klan-

supportive senator that she had brought about a "victory of
gossip",

and that she could spread "any gossip across the

state in twelve hours"

(115)

35
.

Less dramatically but equally effective, gossip was

also the main channel by which women maintained the coercive

power of the Klan.

Circles of gossip ensured the success of

economic boycotts of business that were regarded as

sympathetic to African-Americans, or owned by Catholics or
While the initiative for the boycotts were

Jews.

comparatively overt (lists of suspect businesses would be
read off at one klavern's meetings, for example

the

[147]),

information itself was disseminated through the community
widely, and informally.

Operating not through the

newsletter of the Klan (which itself would be
source)

a suspect

but through informal conversations, women would

persuade their friends to alter their shopping allegiances
to accord with the women's Klan

At the time,

1

s

preset agenda (148-149).

the pattern of business failure or success was

obscure to the wider community; it is only through Blee

'

Unsurprisingly such immoderate boasting from a woman
could not go unchallenged; fellow committeemen demanded
Wheatcraft s removal from her position of power (ibid.).
35

,

'
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interpretation that the community manipulation becomes
apparent

(149)

failed to see

.

a

All of the sources interviewed by Blee

political theme running through the series

of business failues; business failures or sudden
dramatic

increases were discounted as inevitable, or owing to larger

market forces

--

even as a family member's Klan status was

simultaneously acknowledged (150)

.

In short,

people's

willingness to attribute face value to events, be they
business changes or apparently innocuous activities on the
part of the evidently disempowered, itself becomes an

important legitimizing tool for all sorts of communities.
It

is a lesson hard learned by communities in and out of

power
Gossip and rumor in these three previous examples are

used to revise popular accounts of history
the gossip,

--

if we look at

these historians tell us, we find vastly

different, more feasible explanations for political change

than standard theories give us.

Mickey Hellyer's

(1988)

accounting of Benjamin Franklin as adult educator, while
also revisionist history,

is somewhat different in focus --

his message is simply that we should notice the existence of
the gossip itself,

for that is the surprise within popular

accounts of Franklin.

Unfortunately, while Hellyer is

admirably successful at debunking popular accounts of
Franklin as a paragon of virtue and seriousness, he achieves
this aim only through a trivializing of gossip.
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Gossip's

value as an archaeological tool comes about only
through its
continued trivial status.

Hellyer begins by reminding us that the adult education
movement takes Benjamin Franklin as its founder and

paragon

-

Franklin exemplifies the virtues that any adult

educator should have of virtuous love of education for its
own sake, massive drive towards learning of any sort, self-

starter interested not only in self -benefits but the good of
others,

etc.

(12-13)

.

It

is Hellyer's contention that this

notion of adult education, this notion of Benjamin Franklin,
originates in

a

vacuous conception of history that takes

documents at their own words and fails to examine the

socioeconomic contexts in which they appear

(9).

Hellyer's

Franklin is a far different character than that portrayed by
the Autobiography

--

for example,

instead of Franklin being

solely or chiefly responsible for a number of civic

improvements to the city of Philadelphia (starting the first
library,

fire department,

discussion group,
17]

)

,

Penn State University, the Junto

a hospital,

advancing public safety [15-

as the Autobiography attests,

Franklin was one of

smaller and larger groups involved in these different
projects; and Franklin's role was often simply fundraising,
or some public speaking, or mere member participation (148152)

.

Hellyer's Philadelphia is also

a far

different

Philadelphia than what many other American historians
portray.

Franklin's placing of himself in the "middling
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.

sort" amounts to a freezing of eighteenth-century

Philadelphia into relatively static socioeconomic
classes,

which Hellyer argues was clearly not the case

(17)

.

Philadelphia at that point in time, Hellyer argues, was
filled with poor farmers, laborers, artisans, many of whom
were illiterate, many of whom were attempting to acquire
more profitable occupations

(19,

32)

Hellyer notes that

Franklin was quite distinctly part of this group; and in
fact,

that Franklin's love for learning and knowledge had

much more to do with Franklin's desire to acquire wealth and
status in Philadelphia than a generic seeking of knowledge
(32)

In particular,

Hellyer notes that wealthy merchants

were idolized by Franklin as paragons of educated men,

precisely because much of what they self-evidently knew was
practical

(128)

.

Franklin's own practicality, while clearly in evidence
in the Autobiography

Hellyer.

,

is also humorously highlighted by

Under several pen names, Franklin criticized

American women sharply for gossiping and scandalmongering,
among other things

(146).

Yet when it came to reaping the

benefits of scandal for his own profit, Franklin was

anything but timid.

His ability to print his own Almanac

was a direct result of his running his competitor out of
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town based on a series of anonymous attacks to his
rival's

credibility in another paper (192-193)

36
.

The bulk of Hellyer's analysis that repaints Franklin

comes when he analyzes the Junto, the "Franklin-originated"

discussion group that met from 1717-1732.

Hellyer notes

that the idyllic reputation the Junto has as the original

education group is based mainly on Franklin's

sdiilt

Autobiography
Junto.

,

given that no formal minutes exist for the

Given the dubious accuracy the Autobiography has

already established for many of Franklin's activities, the
Junto deserves closer examination.

Upon examining the

member rolls (the initial 12, expanded to more), Hellyer
discovers that the Juntoites were a series of small
businessmen,

farmers and artisans, attempting to work up the

economic ladder, with no particular talent for or interest
in the arts or sciences

(194-206)

.

Indeed,

the stories

Hellyer turns up about the Juntoites stress their joviality
and fondness for drinking more than anything else (ibid.).
The few written proceedings of the Junto that do exist

only underscore this impression.

Early meetings of the

36

printed an article
In brief, the rival (Samuel Keimer)
abortion
(taken
from
an
encyclopedia)
in his paper (he
about
was moving through the encyclopedia, one article a day)
Franklin and a friend wrote an enraged response as two modest,
along with Franklin's
This article,
offended females.
continual publication of the anonymous "Busybody Papers"
attacking Keimer, threatened his financing to the point where
he had to flee town under cover of darkness, at which point
his shop and pressworks were sold (cheaply) to Franklin (192;

193)

.
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;

,

Junto,
[sic]

Hellyer notes, were held at the Conestoga Waggon
Tavern (237)

;

and one of the procedures for initiation

into the Junto consisted of asking candidates to answer
four
questions, each question and answer followed by
wine.

a

glass of

This procedure was followed by a new rule to continue

the four queries the next night,

finished in one (236)

.

if they all couldn't be

The other procedure that gets

significant attention from Hellyer is the list of 24 queries

meetings were opened with.

Only one of the 24

(the first)

has anything to do with the general knowledge topics that
are typically supposed to be the foundations of adult

education ("history, morality, poetry, physic, travel,
mechanic or other parts of knowledge"

[237]

)

of the

remaining 23, 16 are distinctly gossipy in nature ("what new
story have you lately heard agreeable for telling in
conversation?" "what unhappy effects of intemperance have
you lately observed or heard? of imprudence? of passion? or

any other vice or folly?" "Have you lately heard any

member's character attacked, and how have you defended it?"
[237-239]

)

While Hellyer and

.

I

clearly disagree on the

extent of gossip at Junto meetings that the questions

invited (he only regards
nature
Junto

[240]
--

)

4

of the 24 questions as gossipy in

we agree on the general frivolity of the

he notes that singing became a main activity of

Junto meetings, particularly near their ending (243), and
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that the penalty for missing meetings became buying
a pint
of wine for each fellow Juntoite

(255)

Hellyer points out that Franklin wrote the

Autobiography over several years; beginning it well before
the American Revolution and not finishing it until after the

Revolution

Given that, Hellyer argues, it's plausible

(37)

(and many scholars agree with him)

more importantly,

rewrote

--

that Franklin wrote

(and

significant revisions and

deletions are in evidence in the manuscript over its 20-year
composition)

the Autobiography to be used as a piece of

political propaganda

-

in other words,

explicitly aware of

the need for new ideological and political foundations for
the new society,

and creating an "American persona" that

would satisfy those needs (137)
that Franklin,
U.S.

.

Those scholars contend

in trying to promote popular support for the

cause against Britain and continuing emigration to the

States, portrays the U.S.

"as a Utopia for common folks,

virtual Mecca of opportunity and freedom"

(138).

a

What's

ultimately interesting to me about Hellyer 's dissertation is
that he doesn't seem to think that these facts about

Franklin should in any way dim the luster of his genuine

contributions towards knowledge and politics

-

his

activities as ambassador to France, his discovery of
electricity.

Quite explicitly, he points out at several

times that he doesn't think we should regard as internally

inconsistent or morally outrageous Franklin's clearly
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dominant drive for success or his ambitious rewriting of
his
past to drum up support for the fledgling Republic.

Hellyer

For

the more complete portrait of Franklin (as the

,

gossipy boozer trying to get an advantage on his business
rivals,

as the cranky Teutonophobe defying the Western

Pennsylvanians' claim on the state's resources, as the aging

propagandist resentful of his friends of youth's potential
to disrupt his advertising efforts on behalf of himself and

the U.S.)

is simply the truer Franklin.

He points out that

most people take on goals for selfish interests as well as

selfless

(19)

and,

more to the point, that we lose sight of

the ability to appropriately characterize our own age if we

always are casting ourselves in impossibly inferior

positions to ridiculously rose-colored previous ages.
Regrettably, Hellyer undercuts his own argument.
Hellyer'

s

argument that the warts-and-all Franklin is the

truer Franklin shows rather starkly against his own rather

rose-hued final remarks about the Franklin of the Junto.

After pointing out that Franklin lost interest in the Junto
after the initial five or six years, and that Franklin
rewrote its proceedings and minutes to try to give it more

legitimacy (253-254), Hellyer closes by noting that "the
Junto appears to have been somewhat less of a factor in the
lives of its members than previously assumed.

Membership

did not necessarily bring success, for many who belonged

never achieved it.

Those like Franklin, who made their
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mark,

went on to gain social and economic prominence in

other areas and by other means"

(271)

.

in a backhanded way,

this passage attempts to restore prominence to Franklin, by

suggesting that his participation in the Junto was simple

frivolity

,

and shouldn

of his character.

the Junto,

1

t

be taken seriously as a real part

Franklin saw through the nonsubstance of

runs Hellyer's subterranean argument, he rewrote

the Junto for posterity,

and then he really settled down and

did the work for which we revere him.

More subtly, what

I

see as a stronger subliminal thread through Hellyer's

closing here is a fundamental restoration of primacy to
categories of earnestness, diligence and gravity to

education

--

while you can learn for selfish goals, you can

only be learning if you are actually talking directly and

didactically about "history, morality, poetry, physic,
travel, mechanic" knowledge; these are the only inquiries

Hellyer finally slots in as about "adult education"

(238)

Defenders would argue this is

-

a

true strong reading

for

doesn't Hellyer himself say that adult education can be
about anything at all,

that it is the process, that it

defines itself, when he introduces the topic in his first
chapter?

Doubtless this is the case --my point in raising

this issue is only that Hellyer's concluding by dismissing
the Junto as a significant impact on Franklin's life

(no

doubt with the credible intentions of freeing adult

education up from its canonical restraints)
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,

I

think,

does

the historical disservice of exactly restoring canonical
pir i 02f i t i 0 s

to whst W 6 should

k)0

doincj.

If w0

3.1T0

still to

hold Franklin in some esteem, as Hellyer explicitly argues,
then clearly part of the reason is because the Junto is

dissociated from Franklin's real accomplishments.

Conclusion
In what sense are the lessons these humanists teach us

any different from those within the previous chapter?

many ways, they have the same message to convey

--

In

gossip

and rumor are negative contagions that can strike otherwise

epistemically peaceful communities at will, spreading
falsehoods and damaging feuds wildly in their wake.

Gossip

and rumor encourage division, obscure facts, and undermine

rationality.
before,

These sound like the same ills witnessed

in reading Bergmann,

new here?

I

Haviland et al

.

But what is

would argue that first, the theorists in this

chapter generally represent an advance over the theories and
methods within the last chapter.

Remember that

overwhelmingly, the constraint within the last chapter was
that social scientists would apply overly rigid and

reductive methods to what is inherently complicated, hard to

appreciate (or even distinguish) phenomenon.
save for the few exceptions

I

The result,

noted, was predictable:

social science analyses of gossip overwhelmingly do little

more than confirm the prejudicial definition with which it
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is historically encumbered

about personal lives

--

(it

is trivial,

it wastes time)

negative chatter

While it is

.

certainly clear that for many of the writers

I

document in

this chapter, gossip and rumor still have a substandard

status

(they are still less than truthful,

less than ideal,

less than positive means of conveying information)

;

it is

important to note that the freedom of method by which

humanists work generally enables them to grant somewhat more

autonomy to gossip.
What do

I

mean by this?

Several things.

First,

I

think it's worth noticing that none of the theorists writing
here are so clearly advocating morality thinly disguised as

science as does Jorg Bergmann in the previous chapter.

That

in itself represents an advance of sorts -- the agendas,

whatever they may be, are simultaneously more openly

presented and less antagonistic.
generally,

I

Secondly and more

also think that the humanists in this chapter

(even the tropesters of the first section)

kind of content to gossip
a

--

attribute some

even if they think it is merely

passive phenomenon that represents, the representations

the theorists document carry with them some weight.

the most pedantic of the writers on gossip here
Bok)

Even

(Spacks and

allow that gossip provides uniquely available

information,

information that can be relevant to our

understanding of other people.

Indeed,

I

think of the

methodological divide between the writers of the last
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chapter and those of this one as representable by two

opposed trajectories.

Most of the social scientists

I

reviewed start with their highly rational methodology,

determined to uncover the truth about gossip.

Their

orderliness and methodological reductiveness reveal only the
most stereotypical facets of gossip.

In somewhat of a

contrast are the humanists of this chapter, who generally
start with less orderly methods, and frequently openly cite
the randomness of gossip and rumor as being defining

features of their study (cf. Code, Turner, Spacks)
Consequently, their studies are generally less trivializing
of gossip,

because they at least get at some feature of why

we do in fact gossip -- because it matters to us,

it has

impact for us.

Humanists can discern some impact to gossip in part

would say to their training.

I

Notice that when the theorists

of the last chapter referred to gossip as narrative

(Haviland,

Bergmann principally)

,

it was always with a

reduced notion of what constitutes narrative
story, you politely listen.

--

I

very

tell you a

Quite to the contrary, the

writers in this chapter who invoke notions of narrative to

ground their analyses of gossip almost universally have

a

more collective understanding of narrative --we tell

stories together, we each contribute information, analysis,
interpretation, speculation.

The story the group produces

is not only quite different from that any one of its members
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would produce, but definitely not reducible to the totality
of facts that the individuals possess.

The group dynamic

itself is responsible for the production of the story.
Miller, Latour and Woolgar,

and Gluckman (1963)

Only

from the

last chapter seem to possess any substantial notion of how

collective minds can exist and operate in fashions

significantly different from individuals.
This is not to say, of course, that our analysis of

gossip can rest with the job done by the humanists.

While

it is true that they are less judgmental and trivializing in

their approaches to gossip than the social scientists, there
still appears in their work the stain of dismissal.

Perhaps

the downside to the humanists' acute approach to gossip as

narrative is their ultimate inability to regard gossip and
rumor as anything else other than entertaining stories.
this

I

By

mean that while the humanists generally are willing

to admit some kind of relevance and content to the stories
of gossip and rumor,

it is so in a diminished sense -- while

our gossip may have some kind of truth value,
are never too central or very risky.

what fundamentally matters to us

intimate nature

final chapter then,
--

We don't gossip about

our gossip is always of an

;

(that is to say, personal,

derivative from Serious Truth)

I

.

its subjects

subjective,

see my project in the

as constructing a new approach to gossip

demonstrating that telling stories is not just

entertaining campfire work but

a
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very serious way we have of

.

making truth.

The archaeological talents writers in the

previous chapters have demonstrated (Miller, Latour and
Woolgar, Gluckman

Hellyer

)

Turner, Scott, Guha, Blee,

[1963],

will gain resonance and relevance with a new

understanding of what gossip is

:

how gossip is not simply a

social artifact to be measured, an oral historical document
to be uncovered,

our authorities.

an alternative narrative to combine with

My hope is to show how much of our

"rational" work, our methodical behavior, our "serious"

thought is nothing more than gossip, and that gossip in its
turn is thinking at its most engaged,
most challenging.

Gossip,

in short,

its most active,
is necessarily and

ineluctably intertwined with our mental functions
one resource among many,

simultaneously.

If

I

its

--

it is

all of which we rely upon

can realize this project successfully,

my rather backbiting analyses of previous gossipists will be

productive
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CHAPTER

3

WHY GOSSIP IS ALMOST ALWAYS RIGHT; TOWARDS
A GOSSIPY EPISTEMOLOGY

Theories of gossip are always, no matter with what
intentions their composers begin, zero-sum equations.
is to say,

That

no matter how sincerely social scientists and

humanists tackle the concepts of gossip and rumor with the
of eradicating particular dichotomies we use in our

Sfoel

lives

for social science, gossip is a way of

(e.g.,

undermining social rankings previously thought rigid

--

society becomes both more knowable and more intimate; for
humanists gossip is a means by which obscure human emotions
can be expressed, a channel for otherwise impermissible

authorial meaning)

,

they only achieve their marks of lifting

gossip's status in one or another arena by lowering
correlat ively

,

in another.

My first two chapters lay this

move out clearly, curious though it is.

theorists

I

it,

Most gossip

cite enthusiastically embrace and defend the

study of gossip on their pages xx and xxii, only to

shamefacedly confess, by the time they get to their page
200s,

that they really are of course only studying something

that is indicative of social dynamics or interaction,

that

has little to do with knowledge.

Notice that the emphasis of where gossip departs from

knowledge possibility is different depending upon the
discipline; for the social scientists, gossip is powerful
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but ultimately irrational,

an expression of individual

social hostility or anxiety, or a titration of
complicated
social rules
can have

a

(thou shalt not...).

For the humanists, gossip

kind of coherence (their emphasis on narrative

means that gossip can make a lot of sense on its face,

doesn

'

t

have to be explained purely in terms of what it

represents)

,

but ultimately has little relevance outside a

very narrow situation or group, and often has significance
only for an individual gossiper.
This state of affairs means that ultimately,

instead of

working to undermine social categories, gossip in academic
work serves to underscore them (to return to our examples,

ethnographic gossip research, rather than strictly

undermining the notion of social rank, describes it rather
as an infinitely divisible yet still all-important function;

humanist gossip writing, by placing gossip's narrative
content in stereotypically emotional gossip categories
[gossip is always about personal jealousy, anger, cattiness]

renders gossip simply another, not -that -different literary
trope)

.

More broadly, the net result of these analyses of

gossip is that we learn nothing about gossip that we
couldn't already have easily guessed about ourselves

--

these analyses teach us nothing about gossip that isn't
f ormulaically

true.

In particular,

explanations can really offer

a

none of these

substantial explanation for

the occurrence of gossip as a unique social phenomenon.
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In

other words,

if gossip really is nothing more than just

another form of social ranking, or alternatively a further

opportunity to express personal emotions, why would humans
gossip as we so enthusiastically and perennially do?
bother to gossip,

Why

if there are more straightforward ways of

measuring social rank, or expressing personal emotions, and
if

many gossipists still believe) the act carries

(as so

with it irremediable social stigma?

(And of course,

why

bother to write academic study after study of gossip, if it
is so apparently uninstruct ive?

)

In attempting to answer

these questions, to ascertain more clearly what gossip is
and why we do it
import)

,

I

(and why gossip can be of philosophic

seek here to dig beneath the stereotype and to

capture more of the instructive flavor of gossip.
Let me make this critique more particular, by iterating
the various dichotomies

gossip and rumor,

have observed academic writers on

from all disciplinary backgrounds,

endlessly repeating.
in its motivation,

I

Gossip is either entirely individual

or entirely social; gossip bonds, or

gossip attacks; gossip is either entirely idle or fully
purposive; controlling or uncontrollable; public or private;

inventing truth or distorting it
lie)

it is not an outright

This entire set of dichotomies itself seems false to

.

me:

(if

a

contrived collection of fictions designed to make us

fit gossip with a totalizing value -- either it is good or

evil.

What

I

want to explore here are the ways in which
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gossip can genuinely be on both sides of these dichotomies;
in short,

how these dichotomies ultimately must fail to

capture the character of gossip

1
.

These dichotomies fail, of course, because the truth of
the matter is that we never live within dichotomies -- they

are simply convenient constructs that allow us momentary

identification-points when the complicated character of life
threatens to overwhelm us.

It seems to me that gossip is

one of the more straightforward examples of how it is we do
not in fact live by categories while simultaneously

pretending that we do

.

I

have spent the last two chapters

debunking the illusion of categories in academic writing,
and how the strict maintenance of epistemic and social

categories capsizes academic writing on gossip; here

I

must

trace out some of the ways in which gossip reveals our

between-category status, and the philosophic implications
this revelation entails.

To get this analysis off the

Paul Hirst and Penny Woolley (1982) suggest mechanisms
by which similar dichotomies might be straddled in their
novel, and under-appreciated work on Social Relations and
They begin by noting that they will not be
Human Attributes
using the word "society" throughout their book, as they
inappropriately suggests a
it
consider it a misnomer:
unifying character to social relations and
totalizing,
behaviors that cannot be described or aetiologized from any
Analogously, my purpose
one particular tradition (vii-viii)
here is to suggest how both "gossip" and "epistemology" fill
similar categories -- gossip does not have consistent
functions and markers, nor does the work of epistemology
present itself equally clearly and straightforwardly for our
divination
1

.

.
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ground, however, we must begin very truly at the beginning

with a new understanding of gossip.
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3

.

1

Its Definition

the preceding two chapters have made overwhelmingly
clear,

central to my discomfort with the extant academic

literature on gossip is its inability to define gossip in
such a way as to allow for a reasonably complicated

discussion of its presence and effects.

At its worst,

gossip is def init ionally and metaphorically the

conversational equivalent of napalm:

vindictive and

pointed, gossip and rumor carelessly or with deadly purpose

destroy lives, institutions, careers, marriages, families.
At its best, gossip is a harmless addiction of which we

cannot rid ourselves:

necessarily idle talk, implicitly

purposeless and vacuous, but entertaining.

These

definitional strands which have previously limited any
lively understanding of gossip

(it

is always personal talk

about the absent; it is either entirely idle or else it is

malicious and/or sordid),

I

believe,

force the analyses

which follow them along similarly warped and distorted
paths
The academics who consider gossip regularly acknowledge

that gossip's etymology is rather far removed from its more
recent, notorious reputation; but both how this removal

occurred and whether or not it accurately reflects the
practice of gossip is far less regularly remarked upon.

The

word "gossip" derives from old English's "god sibb" or "godrelated,

"

a

relative or close friend of the family, someone
279

who could act in

a

parental or guiding role, should the

parents die (there is a similar Old Norse origin)
short, originally,

confidant,

In

.

to be a gossip was simply to be a

someone who was a trusted close companion

2
.

This usage of the word lasted at least into the fourteenth
century; Boccaccio's Decameron several times invokes the
'gossip" as simply a close family friend, who acts as a

parent or relative.

While the inscription of gossip into a

word with vicious and idle did not officially occur until
the eighteenth century (Johnson's dictionary), even one or

two centuries before the dictionary definition gossip had

acquired a sufficiently questionable reputation to be

satisfactory evidence to convict someone of witchcraft.

But

notice that while this transvaluation of gossip is regularly
noticed, not one academic has offered an explanation for its

occurrence

3
.

More pointedly, without being able to explain

why it is that gossip rather suddenly and completely
It is true that even at this point "rumor" did not enjoy
quite so sterling a reputation; in the Aeniad Virgil writes of
rumor powerfully destroying both Dido and Aenias.
However,
even there rumor is hardly malicious or pointed, simply
naturally destructive. My thanks to Bill Hills for alerting
me to this allusion.
2

Happily, some academics are making inroads towards
explaining the transvaluation. Susie Phillips (1996) argues
that medieval male novelists and ministers use the tactics of
gossip both to undermine gossip as an immoral activity and to
Phillips supplies
fix it as primarily the work of women.
evidence that medieval women used gossip explicitly to
undermine male sexual confidence. While this explanation is
not fully persuasive to me (I still wonder why it is that the
Phillips has moved the
transvaluation occurred when it did)
debate significantly forward.
3

,
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acquires a reputation of viciousness, academics still hold

rather tightly to this newer conception of gossip.

As

I

have exhaustively demonstrated in the previous chapters,

even those academics who claim to "rescue" gossip from the

clutches of condemnation (Spacks' phrase) themselves only

slightly more subtly condemn it on similar terms.
What

I

suggest here is not my own explanation for why

the transvaluation occurred when it did, but simply a

challenge to its legitimacy.

Let me offer an example to

demonstrate the feasibility of alternative views in this
debate.

In On the Genealogy of Morals

us with a simple lesson:

.

Nietzsche presents

in presocratic times,

we operated

by different value tables, those of good and bad (e.g.

noble/beautiful/productive vs. lowly/ugly/useless) rather
than the contemporary, Judeo-Christian good and evil

(e.g.

humble/other-serving/unselfish vs. arrogant /self -serving/
selfish)

.

While initially these more modern values may have

had revolutionary status, Nietzsche argues that there is no
logical reason for us still to be compelled by these values

with which we currently live; indeed, all these values serve
to do is to constrain us from acting on what might otherwise

be enormously creative and invigorating impulses.

Why not

reverse the value tables, Nietzsche asks his readers; why
not believe and live by an older notion of good and bad,

instead of a newer, more limiting theory of good and evil?
Nietzsche, rather than propounding logical arguments
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criticizing modern morality, challenges his readers to come
up with an alternative morality that is superior.
Such,

on a dramatically reduced scale, would be my goal

in this section.

Gossip's very character, intent and effect

has been inverted and distorted by centuries of writers and

moralists.

In so doing,

once simply good and pure

they have taken what was surely not
(for who can say that any social

manifestation is all goodness?)

,

but rather complicated,

reduced it to sheer vindictiveness,

avoided at all costs.

While

I

a

and

venial sin to be

have certainly attempted to

exhaustively demonstrate the comparative weakness of most
standard writing on gossip,

I

would similarly challenge

readers to come up with superior theories of gossip,

theories that explain more of social and intellectual
interaction.

Why not return gossip to its original roots

and meanings; why not reconceive gossip in terms of what it
can do, rather than what some people consider it as failing
to do?

What,

would an etymologically truer definition of

then,

gossip look like?

word

--

simply,

a

First,

let us consider the origin of the

person in an intimate relation to another.

That vague definition is far from the conditional, precise

definition philosophers so enjoy; however,

I

think that that

kind of vague definitional work might be more appropriate to
a

concept that is so social in nature.

problems

I

One of the main

have with the tidy definitions that the social
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scientists and humanists use is that they reduce gossip to
series of conditions.

If

A and

B and C,

testimony or hearsay or rumor or...).

a

then gossip (or

These conditions,

because they themselves are overwhelmingly static and
restrictive (e.g. an easily identifiable category of talk,

occurring between kinds or numbers of people, with

particular emphasis on the content of the talk), don't
really capture what

quality of gossip.

think is the fundamentally amorphous

I

Max Gluckman astutely notes that it is

often difficult to discern when

a

conversation is and is not

gossip; the arena of gossip is difficult to circumnavigate.

Social scientists and humanists, by making the border

mechanistically easy to identify, have succeeded only in
dramatically reducing the domain of gossip.
really only

a

There are

very few kind of conversations those gossip

researchers will even hear or think of as gossip.

More

particularly, they'll miss the flavor of how gossip happens.
Conversely,
I

I

seek to expand the field of gossip.

find Gluckman 's argument for gossip's fluid nature

far more persuasive than most gossip research because

think it captures what

I

see as the three essential,

I

and

essentially vague, tendencies or characteristics of gossip:
It is informal,

comparatively intimate, and evaluative (or

speculative/investigative) conversation
Let me give a brief initial explanation of each

characteristic.

First,

by calling gossip "informal"
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I

mean

to suggest that gossip conversat ions aren't highly patterned

or regulated

--we can't identify gossip conversations

the conversational path they take

(

by

contra Bergmann, who

argues for a specific conversational path to gossip; who

similarly only sees gossip as occurring when one person
tells a nasty story to one or more essentially passive
auditors)

So "informal" first means something like not

.

governable, chaotic, unruly.

But secondly,

and more

importantly, by "informal" we might easily assume that
gossip,

"real" gossip,

be oral.

I

cannot be written down

--

it can only

do not think that that is necessarily so.

The

second and third characteristics will flesh out more clearly
where

draw my vague distinctions between what written

I

chatter is gossip and what is not, but it is certainly true
that we can converse informally with others through writing
(letters,

email,

this definition,
(

People

,

"chat" rooms on the internet)

.

However, by

"gossip" magazines and television shows

National Enquirer

,

The Gossip Show

,

Walter

Winchell's television and radio broadcasts) are not

necessarily gossip.
In what ways can gossip be intimate?

Bergmann, and

many other gossipists, would place an extreme value on
intimacy

--

because they attribute a high degree of social

suspicion towards gossip, they assume that only pretty close
friends would gossip with each other, and then only in

relative secret, or while doing various "disguising"
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activities

pretending to work)

(e.g.

.

I

think that this

emphasis is overexaggerated, but nonetheless,

I

do think

that gossip is intimate to the extent that we do not gossip

with complete strangers.
not know very well

We may gossip with people we do

(new coworkers,

new neighbors, or new

friends can ask for and receive the "dirt" on the workplace,

neighborhood, or social circle)

,

but we do have some

established social relationship with those with whom we
choose to gossip.

Perhaps the most significant of those conditions for me
is the last:

gossip is investigative, evaluative or

speculative.

I

use these words both as another way of

suggesting purpose (for

I

directly wish to challenge most

gossipists' habit of considering gossip necessarily idle
conversation)
purpose.

and as a more particular way of discussing

,

"purpose" often gets reduced

It seems to me that

to something like "agenda".

While these two words seem on

the face of it pretty similar,

connotations;
"agenda".

I

think they have different

"purpose" can be used more loosely than

Meetings have agendas that can be written down in

numbered items and either followed or ignored; but
can be so loose

education)

a

purpose

(my purpose in going to school is to get an

that it permits an infinite number of particular

consequences

(for how many different kinds of "educations"

do students,

faculty,

staff,

administrators, and community

members get around and outside of UMASS?)
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This is the sense of "purpose" that
so often ignore.

In other words,

can have purposes,

I

think gossipists

if gossipy conversations

in the gossipology they can typically be

nothing more than very particular, and destructive (e.g.,

destroying some one person's reputation).
though,

It seems to me,

that gossip, because it is necessarily intimate and

informal,

can have a wider range of purposes than are ever

offered it.

Further,

those purposes can be both conscious

and unconscious, multiple for one conversation, personal and
impersonal.

An example that might make this clearer:

central to the debate in the pages of Man over the function
of gossip was determining its exact function/origin:

individualistic, purely social, performative.

Obviously, a

perspective that went unnoticed by the theorists is that
gossip can be all of those things at once, and none of them

necessarily or essentially.
To spell this out more concretely:

I

might discuss the

possible nomination (and eventual ascension) of William
Bulger to the presidency of the University of Massachusetts

with friends for personal reasons

(we are

affiliated with

the University; we may speculate on possible changes in our
jobs, pay levels,

social reasons

student enrollment as a result)

(we are

,

for

trying to measure or take account of

the University's status in the public -- how prestigious or

degrading might it be if William Bulger will be president?
How relevant is this for non-UMASS people?), and of course
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for performative reasons

(for surely the appointment

inspires sarcastic speculation on follow-up appointments

—

Whitey Bulger as Vice-Chancellor for Administration and
Finance?).

More to the point, in each of these capacities

of gossip we can see crossover and interstices -- Whitey

Bulger jokes are not simply performative, but themselves

measures of social status and commentary on political
situations,

just as analysis of the Bulger appointment and

its repercussions is both personal and social

("how will my

job change" is clearly both a personal and social question)
In short,

what we think of as "purpose" cannot be reduced to

the narrower "agenda,

for in so doing we dramatically

"

reduce the context and nuance implicit within conversation
-

-

this reduction produces similarly straitened analysis.

Correlat ively

,

I

reject definitions of gossip as

necessarily idle, which many gossip theorists favor, because
they are both too strong, and too universal in their

characterization.

Look:

no doubt some talk we might think

of as gossip is idle in a loose sense,

in the sense that it

might not be guided by a well-defined agenda.

Think of John

Beard Haviland "fishing" for gossip on town luminaries in
his Gossip, Reputation,

and Knowledge

:

he simply asked

people to tell him stories about particular people, with no
clue as to what he might hear.

Further,

it might be easy

for us to hear some gossip as particularly idle, because we
are outsiders to the conversation; we cannot imagine a
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purpose to this storytelling.

Recall Sarah Miller's

descriptions of women telling pointed fables to each other
in her dissertation;

to the stranger,

these stories might

have no purpose other than entertainment or humor (the only

purpose usually ascribed to "idle" gossip)

,

but as Miller

deftly demonstrates, those stories were indirect arguments
for or against particular marital matches -- negotiating

sessions in addition to and through entertainment.
The problem with calling gossip necessarily "idle" is

that it rules out any significant motive or direction behind
the talk -- it a priori renders the gossip trivial and

uninteresting.
investigative,

Exactly why

I

like the looser categories of

speculative, and evaluative is that

I

think

they both allow for the breadth of motives one might
encounter, and more importantly, they invite the auditor to

dig into the context and layers of the conversation, rather

than to reduce it to simplistic readings.

Finally,

they do

not prohibit the necessary degree of casualness and fun that
I

think is generally intrinsic to gossip, while not robbing

gossip of possible functions and purposes.

Think again of

the introduction to Sarah Miller's dissertation, where she

confesses herself unwilling to "commit violence" to the

conversations she overhears by assigning them narrow
content-categories, as that would reduce complicated and

lengthy conversations to simplistic and inaccurate
narratives.

The thick-descriptiveness that Geertzian social
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science aims for, to my mind, demands these more adaptive,
less directive,

kinds of definitions.

If we reject reductive definitions of gossip,

then,

I

must be able to defend my particular broad definition of

gossip as informal,

intimate, and evaluative/speculative/

investigative conversation.

What these three conditions

capture to me is the essence of gossip:

conversation of friendship.

gossip is the

Friendships are informal; we

don't need to stand on ceremony with those we know well and
who know us.

Similarly, because we are with people with

whom we are comfortable, we can venture out of familiar

conversational territory

--

we can investigate ideas we

might not believe in, discuss people or events we are

curious about but might otherwise be unwilling to reveal
those curiosities, explore riskier lines of thought and

belief 4

.

Friendship is not universal

with everyone we encounter

--

--

we're not friends

but by the same token it's not

necessarily prohibitive or exclusive.

We don't always, or

even often settle ourselves into snug corners or Cones of

Silence to trade scandalous stories --we run into

colleagues or casual friends or neighbors, and as we talk
about filing papers or town developments or lawn-mowing, we

also weave in and out of gossip (and the gossip, let me make

am hardly the first person to suggest this; but most
explicitly, Susan Hutson points out that "informality in
behaviour implies equality, familiarity with and knowledge of
the other person" (in Bailey, Gifts and Poison 44)
4

I
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clear, may overtly or covertly be about the filing papers or

town developments or lawn-mowing, or anything else)

.

The

gossip is intrinsically connected to, springs from, and is

related to, the general conversations we have within and

between communities.

Also,

the combination of "intimate"

and "informal" suggests the playful, not entirely serious

tenor that conversations between friends can take on (which
acts as a nice counterweight to the condition of purpose)

When talking to a familiar, trusted intimate,
be playful even as

I

.

am free to

I

explore potentially threatening,

depressing or frightening possibilities (might

I

be fired?

might my new neighbor be a harassingly loud bore with a

vigilante attitude towards street pets?)
Now obviously,

"the conversation of friendship" is an

enormous conversational category, and could rightly be

called too hopelessly vague and enormous to be of any

philosophic merit.

But hear me out; more importantly,

reflect for a moment on the kinds of conversations you have

with your friends.
(from childhood,

Depending on how you know your friends

school, work, politics, hobbies,

neighborhood), how long you've known your friends, how well
you know them, you can talk about a wide or narrow variety
of topics with them.

More particularly, there are no doubt

some topics you can discuss with some friends but not

others
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The point of all of this is not to suggest the high

categorizability of friendships, but ultimately how
impossible friendships themselves are to categorize or to
order (for example,
listed,

for each of these categories

I

have just

surely it is not too difficult to think of friends

who have breached the categories; friendships that have been

enduring but shallow, friendships that once involved much

conversational territory but now are limited to

a

narrow

range, workplace friends with whom you can discuss anything

but work-related topics, etc.)

In short,

friendship itself

cannot be reduced to a series of content-conditions; less so
can the conversations that mark it.

anything marks
boundaries.

a

It seems to me that if

friendship it is the comparative lack of

Within

a

friendship, one can discuss topics

that one cannot discuss elsewhere

(or perhaps,

cannot

discuss in the same informal manner), true; but that does
not mean that only those conversations mark friendship, or

only those conversations are relevant.

Those idiosyncratic

and intimate conversations happen in the midst of banal

conversations, may stem from hostile conversations, or
relate to other conversations.

It is the very fact that

friendships are both intimate and informal that they can
carry with them such wildly varying conversational themes,
contents,

styles, manners.

themes, many topics,

"Conversations" have many

and many threads.

To isolate the

stereotypically gossipy moments out of the conversations
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within

a

friendship and say that these and these alone mark

the friendship is absurd.

Now that

I

have established some of the reach of gossip

(what it includes)

limits to gossip.
don't)

,

let me at least preliminarily draw some

First,

and most importantly, where do (or

rumor and gossip overlap?

As

I

have suggested in

earlier chapters, some theorists (most notably Brison) use
the terms so loosely that they are clearly interchangeable;
(most clearly Scott)

still others

arrive at arbitrary

distinctions between gossip and rumor (gossip is about
people; rumors are about events)

I

.

myself between these extremes; while

would like to position
I

think that in

general, rumor and gossip are roughly coexistent

(both are

unruly social formations, both are evaluative/investigative/
speculative)

,

I

think that rumors tend to display these

characteristics more weakly.
passed

(I

Rumors can be very informally

could spread a rumor to

a

virtual stranger

did

you hear 50 % of the student body is sick with the flu?"

relatively unknown TAs have said to me, and
standing in line for the xerox machine)
shows,

.

I

have to them,

As this example

rumors can be more general - interest than gossip; we

their
can spread rumors to comparative strangers because

topics can be less located, less tied to a community
knowledge to
(someone might not need to have too much local

understand or be interested in

a rumor)
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More importantly, rumors are less necessarily tied to

conversations, and conditions of conversation.

easily imagine spreading

a

We can

rumor to another person quickly,

without a surrounding conversation (the flu example above is
a

clear demonstration)

;

however,

it is harder to imagine

just stopping and gossiping with someone without surrounding

This is so because gossip, while

layers of communication.

not more dangerous than rumor,

is more intimate; we gossip

with people because we know or suspect that they might be
interested or have

a

perspective we want to hear.

While

I

have general reservations about the social transactive

analysis so many writers wish to ascribe to gossip (where

gossip simply becomes an item of social currency to be
exchanged)

It is easier for me to imagine passing that flu

gossip.
rumor,

rumors come closer to fitting that analysis than

,

without too much discussion, to all sorts of

audiences

(undergraduates, graduates, staff,

townspeople)

;

whereas in

a

faculty,

gossip situation an initial

"item" might begin an entirely different frame of discussion

that travels a variety of topics and evaluative paths,
ing on the group,

their interests, their backgrounds,

their intentions.

A second limitation, which
above,

As

I

I

only briefly addressed

gossip.
is the distinction between printed and spoken

said earlier, some written forms of gossip such as

different from
email and Internet chat rooms are clearly no
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verbal gossip conversations other than in their

inscriptiveness, and therefore should be treated similarly.
The fact that the conversation is printed on screens rather

than directly oral changes little about the flavor of the

conversation

5
.

But more troubling are gossip magazines and

television shows, where no apparent community of friendship
exists.

It is true that in all of these other situations,

kind of intimacy is being presumed

--

a

many gossip

commentators have observed the "insider" assumption gossip
magazines make about their readers, that of course readers
know background information about the story at hand.
However, what does distinguish gossip magazines,

television shows and colums in particular from these other
forms of gossip is their one-sidedness; here the more

general definition of gossip as conversation becomes
paramount.

Conversations are necessarily social --at least

two people must talk with each other.

While Bergmann

regards gossip as little else than one person telling a tale
to at least one intrinsically passive listener,

if we

consider gossip genuine conversations, then we must allow
for genuine back-and-forth contribution between

Certainly, written conversation is absent the facial
contortions and vocal intonations that mark conversations
(hence Bergmann s energetic attempt to capture all the extraBut,
linguistic qualities of his taped gossip-conversations)
letters,
capitalizing
attest,
as any email habitue will
creative punctuation, and those annoying typographical facial
still
if
can contribute much,
;-)]
[e.g.
expressions
conversation.
simulated
artificially, towards a
5

'

.
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participants.

Contribution is more possible in electronic

than in essentially fixed gossip media

fora,

magazines, television shows)

While,

.

earlier, audiences can (and do)

variety of fashions with

a

as

I

(columns,

have argued

interpret the material in a

variety of attitudes, their

intimate connection to the material is more selective.
short,

In

of the 20 or so articles in a recent issue of People

.

only one may be of real interest to me (say, the speculative
piece about Jodie Foster's sexual orientation)

The piece

.

interests me because it resonates with the immediate world

around me; as such, it becomes material for my

interpretation of myself and my surroundings

(I

am trying to

establish my own beliefs about the propriety of "outing").
Because of the context of my set of background beliefs, my
current interest in the topic,

differently than

I

be more attentive.

I

will read this article

will read others in that issue
As such,

or another in the life

I

I

will

will be in a position to

I

"talk back" to the article --

--

I

lead.

will use the article one way

Because

having bearing on me, even though

I

I

see the article as

do not really know any

of the principals in the piece or its author,

and have no

way of determining whether or not the article has any claim
to veracity,

I

will use it as gossip in a way

6
use the other pieces in the magazine

.

I

would not

Further, others

I

me note that even this mild example of readers
most
thinking about gossip critically seems beyond even the
In
readership.
advanced work on gossip magazines and their
6

Let
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know may have read or will read this article, and we might
share our differing or overlapping perspectives.

In this

sense, while my individual reaction may have no resonance

with the principals or the author,

I

as a member of a

community will affect and determine the reception of this
kind of material 7

So,

.

items in gossip columns and

magazines, and on gossip television shows, may indeed

function as gossip, but they are audience-specific (and
audience-dependent)

in a way that makes them even harder to

distinguish as gossip than conversational gossip, and which
for our purposes makes them difficult as research resources.
Let us return to the objective of this section:

challenging the current orthodoxy of gossip
Even after all of these defenses and

conceptualization.

Joke Hermes does
(1995)
her Reading Women's Magazines
mags "seriously"
gossip
who
read
those
between
differentiate
a
differentiation
her
is
not
only
but
"campily"
(121)
and
never
may
readings
camp
and
(serious
bifurcation
her use of "serious" is a misnomer, selfinterpenetrate)
Hermes'
consciously borrowed from Patricia Meyer Spacks
"an
and
pleasure,
to
limited
seems
seriousness
readers'
In short,
imaginary sense of power" (123-124, emphasis mine)
we can't do much with gossip other than distract ourselves
The idea of a
from the outside world, and delusionally
gossip reader using gossip critically, even as s/he—enjoys
herself gossiping escapes Hermes' ken.
,

,

,

.

.

.

,

Perhaps a more orthodox philosophical defense of this
position would be to invoke Derrida' s attack of the artificial
division (and privileging) of speech over the written word,
which hypothesizes not only an absolute and essential
difference between the two, but to each an absolutely
referential relationship to an always-existent always outside
See his Dissemination especially 164-168.
Truth.
7

,

,
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explications of my definition, some readers might still
challenge my attempt to contradict the bulk of the
literature on gossip.

To return to the etymological

argument for a moment,

I

would ask readers to examine how

"gossip" gets expressed in different languages.

In his

dissertation, Ori Bet Or presents definitions of gossip in
12 different languages

German, Hebrew,

English,

(Arabic,

Italian,

Portuguese,

French,

Filipino,

Polish, Russian,

Spanish [314-322]); in her research, Miller discusses the
word's Nepalese meaning (345)

In general,

there are no

strictly positive words for gossip (in many languages there
is no direct cognate)

,

in many languages all the words for

gossip are more and less negative in connotation, and often,
there is no one word for gossip (i.e., several of the

Romance languages have two or three words for gossip, in

a

sliding scale of moral severity, including variations on
'defamation'

What strikes me as

and 'calumny').

Bergmannesque about other gossipists' caving in to
linguistic tyranny is that there's this assumption again
that the vox populi is both easily readable, and a

mandate
Now before this simply sounds confused (i.e.,

I'm

writing about gossip, and how gossip makes truth, and yet

I

want to say that what people actually say doesn't have

anything to do with truth)

I

think that words people use to

express concepts are simply necessarily loose, and don
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fit

particularly well the ideas or things we are trying to
Simply looking at the evidence

describe.

presented will demonstrate this fact.

As

I

just quickly

I

have shown, many

writers on gossip and rumor use those words interchangeably;
more particularly,

"gossip" doesn't have one meaning across

the world -- indeed,

in most non-English languages, people

more directly describe their talk according to its tone than
to the simple constructions of how many people are there and

whether or not it has truth (the standard gossip evaluators
use to identify gossip's presence)

.

Consider as an analogue

the fact that our modern 'wimp' derives originally from
'wimple'

At this point,

.

"wimp" has its own independent

connotations; we don't think about nunnish headdresses when
we contemplate someone's alleged wimpiness.

But at least

one point to etymology can be to show that words are not

necessarily good fits to what they describe.

Similarly,

I

would argue that our "official" understanding of gossip
doesn't match what many people colloquially understand by
the term;

I

think it is time to bring the academic

literature up to date.

Depending on the language you

examine, what we may consider to be "gossip" has many

linguistic origins
chat,

slander.

-

ties of friendship or kinship, spying,

If there are origins both good and bad,

connotations both womanly and manly (i.e. god sibbs weren
a

particular gender, but as of the 18 th century gossip

became identified as a woman's activity), why do we hold
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narrowly to some of the definitions or linguistic
genealogies rather than others?

More to the point, why do

gossip writers in English tend to combine all of the

derogatory analyses of gossip in their understandings of
what it is and how it functions, collapsing away many of the
fine distinctions non-English definitions of gossip observe?
It

is clear that gossip,

the English word has until

relatively recently had both positive and negative
connotations, but that the emphasis since the eighteenth
century,

negative.

in the academic writing,

has become simply

That doesn't mean that we must stay slave to

linguistic tradition and order (hermeneutic delay on a
linguistic level)

.

Again, as the evidence of many cultures'

evident comfort with and reliance upon gossip for social

sustenance and vital information makes clear

(cf.

the

conversations reported in Brison, Miller, Haviland)

,

for

academics to invert the gossip definition away from this

punitive trend would not be

a

rebellion against the common

tongue, but rather a realignment of analysis to current

informal linguistic and social practice.
In other words,

"the conversations of friendship,"

while being minimally qualified (again, conversations that
are comparatively intimate,

informal,

and investigative,

speculative or evaluative), should necessarily remain our
amorphous boundary of gossip, and is adequate as it stands
-

to construct a more rigid boundary is to suggest an
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artificial changing of tone, attitude and purpose to

conversations where we cannot necessarily mark one, and
ultimately,

to suggest a legitimacy and a historical

necessity to an arbitrary moral agenda.

3.2

Why (and How) Epistemology Might Be Informal
Why ought we reconceive gossip; why might it be

important to throw out conventional definitions of gossip
for a newer, vaguer notion?

gossip is

a lens

Most pertinently, reconceiving

by which we can come to a thicker

description of conversation; conversations should not be as
typified as theorists so generally wish

8
.

Rethinking

conversation, of course, has resonance within the field of

epistemology; if how we behave when we chat with each other
is not so easily recognizable as truthful or false,

or idle,

serious

than how it is we come to "know" something through

conversation may be more complicated than theorists of
knowledge might have us believe.

Throughout this dissertation,

suggested what

I

I

have repeatedly

consider to be the simple fact that

contemporary epistemology has no means with which to

Even advanced conversation theorists such as Erving
"backGoffman, in his distinction between ''front -stage" and
Everyday
in
Sel
of
ation
f
stage" performance in The Present
can only conceive of two possibilities^ for social
Life (1959)
behavior (though these may be inter-mediated, and differently
received by audiences, as the theatrical metaphor suggests)
considered
In short, conversation is still too conventionally
that)
at
dialectic
dialectically (and a closed
8

_

.

,
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evaluate or even recognize informal knowledge, such as that

reached through casual conversation, chatter, gossip.
knowledge

--

That

understandings we reach about people,

institutions, objects, events, via series of casual

conversations and investigations

--

informs to

a

much

greater degree our real-world behaviors, mores, and
principles than do the carefully-deliberated philosophic
axioms and definitions so prevalent in today's technical
journals.

It

is in part because no academic contemplates

the very real possibility that we come to know things

informally that so much of the ethnographic and humanist
gossip research is so limited in scope; researchers can only
come up with trivializing explanations for gossip simply

because they cannot imagine more substantive alternatives.
To expand the possibilities for social science and

humanistic research, epistemology itself must broaden in
scope.

Informal knowledge, conversational knowledge, must

be reckoned with;

it cannot be ignored,

as if North American

philosophers were actually a cluster of socialites at

a

cocktail party, and gossip the polyester-clad intruder with
severe halitosis and attenuated social skills.
Of course,

to make such a claim is to beg the

philosophic response.

Certainly, we get some sort of

information from gossip, rumor and other informal channels,
my elite interlocutor might say; and indeed, many people
might even go so far as to call it knowledge (as his nose
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turns up).

But surely we professionals shouldn't actually

confuse such addled, scattershot, illogical, petty, or mean-

spirited doggerel that is gossip with Actual, Authoritative
Theatrical asides we exchange over coffee cannot be

Truth.

the same as Justified True Belief.
the Politics

,

As Aristotle argues in

even though we know there's moral goodness to

be had in both the political and the contemplative life, the

reason why we must figure out which has priority is so that
we can choose the one true life,

the best life.

Similarly,

even though there might be claims to knowledge in gossip and
rumor, we still must determine which is closer to truth,

chatter or rigorous philosophic argument.
my hypothetical interlocutor would say,
choice at all

--

And that choice,

is of course no

the answer is clear, only rigorous argument

can have any substantive connection to truth.

Only rigorous

argument can actually meaningfully consider possibilities,

rationally evaluate them, and

(as

calmly select the best among them.
in random speculation,

Aristotle would so admire)
Gossip simply consists

or vengeful agenda-promoting.

This isn't simply a thought-exercise on my part

(although it is of course that first;

product of my training)
what

I

.

I

am nothing if not

a

My point here is to illustrate

think is the overwhelming, hard to ignore reaction to

any comparison of gossip and (real) knowledge.

Whenever

have discussed the topic of gossip with friends or

acquaintances, and its relation to knowledge, even those
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;

people most sympathetic to such a project are inclined to
voice their sympathy in a very noncommittal way.

It is as

if gossip can occasionally be coincidentally related to

knowledge (you just happen to uncover a juicy, true,
personal or institutional scandal; you just happen to
evaluate someone's motivations for doing something

inexplicable correctly; you just happen to be able to
forecast what might happen next in a particular situation)
but that only the rational pursuit of knowledge can

systematically, reliably produce truth.

Even gossip's most

empathetic advocates (e.g. Code) are guilty of this
assumption.

Gossip is at best the accidental cause of

knowledge, philosophy its essential cause.
I

think that this particular fact points to a more

general failing (and perhaps, an inevitable one) within
epistemology, one that has been tidily expressed by Jacques

Ranciere in The Ignorant Schoolmaster (1991)

.

In short,

when we are trying to determine something, we are still
caught up in the Enlightenment mindset of seeing only the
goal of truth -- both while we progress towards that goal

and afterwards as we rewrite the story of our progress, we

regard the goal as the defining object that characterizes
and organizes our endeavors

--

errors along the way are

simply wiped from the slape of group memory, as if they

never occurred.

Hence it becomes easy to speak in

retrospect of rigorous

(not to say rigid)
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philosophical

.

thinking as the "essential" cause of truth.
modest observation

9

is that this linear,

.

Ranciere's

narrat ivizing

approach isn't what's happening when the process of

knowledge-seeking is occurring

(it can't be)

We don't know

what it is we'll find where we're looking to figure out
--

something

enquiries into the nature of existence may lead

one to a scrupulous study of calculus -- and that we're not

wholeheartedly dismissing our searching as it continues.
Just because

I

spend two years of my life in an extensive

study of much of the literature on gossip and rumor only to

decide that it's deeply flawed doesn't mean that
say that

I

wasted my time, or that

(neither of which,

of course,

I

I

I

should

learned nothing

would say anyway)

that is, on balance, how we treat our attempts.

.

And yet

We look

only for certitude, or ambiguity that is provocative because
we just know that somewhere in its nest certitude is

resting, passively awaiting our acute detection.
The error I'm seeing professional knowledge-gatherers

make is simply ordering (and re-ordering) what we do and

think and believe and try according to a straightforward
(not to say reductive)

10
test of "does/did it hold true?"

that is echoed
Hermeneutic Delay" (1989)
9

0ne

by

Bob

Ackermann

in

his

"On

.

“Fervent defenders of the integrity of contemporary
analytic epistemology (none of whom, perhaps, sit on this
dissertation committee) would disagree with this formulation
toward Harvey Siegel (1995)
I would direct their attention
epistemology against
"traditional"
who in his defense of
replaces that
epistemology
"naturalized"
Quine's argument for
,
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This is not to say that we need to become

(equally

reductively) warm embracers of "errors" of all sorts, that
since a little truth is in everything we should just do as
we please and believe what we will.

Such an attitude is

naive and delusive (as well as frankly impractical)

.

The

point is simply that we do ourselves no favors when we

pretend that errors have no point in figuring out truth, and
that those things that are portentous of truth are somehow

easy to determine in advance.

Indeed, by sharply

discounting the value of half the dichotomy we are trying to
live with we show that we can't even handle dichotomies

(we

can't see or acknowledge a relation between truth and
falsity, yet rely on the existence of the second to buttress

our belief in the first)

.

Surely this should suggest that

at least some of our convictions in knowledge are misplaced

and inappropriate.
To hypothesize as to why this deep antipathy towards

gossip (and more particularly towards that which is not

easily ascertainable as true) exists,

I

would begin by

observing the more general discomfort philosophers have
expressed towards conversation as
knowledge.

a

productive channel of

On the face of it, this might seem a surprising

standard "justified true belief" chestnut with only slightly
"epistemic justif cation, criteria o
vaquer conditions:
Even
justification. .and the possibility of knowledge" (49)
reformulate
only
allies
epistemology's
traditional
truth; they do not reconceive
towards
attitudes
ional
irmat
conf
them
.

.
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claim:

after all, philosophy has at least part of its

origin in Plato's dialogue (conversational) form, and indeed
dialogues and conversation remain a fecund topic for more

contemporary philosophers.

And certainly, some philosophers

present themselves as defenders of conversation as the road
However,

to truth.

I

would contend that philosophers are

only comfortable with the notion of oral knowledge to the
extent that they minutely parse up conversation into the

important versus the trivial; the purposive contra the idle;
and needless to say, men's important discussions against

women's nonsensical nattering.
This suspicion is borne out in the philosophic

literature on knowledge through conversation.
Heidegger, who in Being and Time

(1962)

Martin

presents an

extensive argument for the existential, not essential,

character of speech [Sprache]

(203),

must still make a

distinction between speech that can more perfectly reveal
Being (difficult speech, struggling, speech, rational
speech)

,

and "fallen" or "thrown" speech, which can only

reveal Being by presenting an (always-receding) possibility
of its existence

(214)

Importantly, Heidegger has three

illustrations of fallen or thrown speech:
[Gerede,

idle talk

later synonymous with gossip], curiosity, and

ambiguity.

Even more importantly,

idle talk is clearly

privileged among the three examples.

Heidegger sees the

need to begin only the section on idle talk with
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a

:

.

disclaimer as to his intentions ("The expression 'idle talk'
is not to be used here in a
[211]

)

,

'disparaging'

signification"

suggesting that only here are his intentions harder

to ascertain by his prose.

the three examples,

Further, when Heidegger sums up

it is clear that only idle talk has an

effective claim upon the other two channels that far
surpasses those the other two have on him ("idle talk

controls even the ways in which one may be curious"

[216]

)

And sure enough, it would be difficult to read his arguments
in this section as anything other than disparaging.

For

even though he repeats the importance of "fallen" or
"thrown" speech for revealing "everyday" Dasein (i.e. Dasein
as we experience it in our non-contemplat ive lives)

he ascribes little value to that Dasein.

,

surely

Witness this

remark
...The average understanding of the reader will
never be able to decide what has been drawn from
primordial sources with a struggle and how much is
The average understanding,
just (sic) gossip.
moreover, will not want any such distinction, and
does not need it, because, of course, it

understands everything.

[212]

Heidegger demonstrates that the "average" understanding
works only "superficially" and "approximately"

(ibid)

.

So

while Heidegger apparently thinks that certainly, idle talk,

curiosity and ambiguity are of use to the everyday
understanding, the everyday understanding itself is to be as

deprivileged as possible.

Heidegger describes the general
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atmosphere created when we operate with idle talk, curiosity
and ambiguity as one in which
.everyone is acquainted with what is up for
discussion and what occurs, and everyone discusses
it; but everyone also knows already how to talk
about what has to happen first -- about what is
not yet up for discussion but 'really' must be
Already everyone has surmised and scented
done.
out in advance what Others have also surmised and
This Being-on- the-Scent is of course
scented out.
based upon hearsay, for if anyone is genuinely 'on
the scent' of anything, he does not speak about
.

.

[217]

it.

Gossip flavors everyday understanding, and a thin, weak
flavor it is; those in search of genuine understanding had

better avoid those natterers and focus on deep internal
reverie.

All of this, of course,

is within the domain of

not being "disparaging"

Heidegger's dismissal of language generally, and gossip
most particularly, as uninstruct ive of anything more than
"everyday" Dasein is extreme, but linked to the more general

dismissals of gossip found throughout the philosophic
literature.

Kierkegaard,

in his The Pr esent Age,

describes

talkativeness as "the doing away with the vital distinction

between talking and keeping silent," and that "mere gossip
anticipates real talk, and to express what is still in
thought weakens action by forestalling it"

(49)

.

Talkativeness and gossip, in short, are conversation about
because
nothing; they perpetuate themselves incessantly
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silence reveals only the emptiness of the surrounding

chatter

(

50

11
.

Friedrich Nietzsche alludes to some sort of power to
gossip when he writes in The Gay Science that
What we know about ourselves and remember is not
so decisive for the happiness of our life as
people suppose
One day that which others know
about us (or think they know) assaults us -- and
then we realize that this is more powerful.
It is
easier to cope with a bad conscience than to cope
with a bad reputation.
[115]
.

While this comment might at first seem at least

a bit

supportive of gossip (remembering Nietzsche's sustained
argument against a notion of an absolute, removed truth, one
might infer that he could actually be praising gossip as as

good a route as any towards individual subversion of

constricting social mores)

,

closer reading makes it clear

a

that Nietzsche is contemptuous of idle chatter.

First,

Nietzsche's comment that others "think they know" about us
is at least partly a clear reference to his own anguish at

his writings being misrepresented and ignored throughout his

lifetime.

Nietzsche believes quite clearly that some people

(free spirits)

of herd folk;

can never be properly understood by the mass

Thus Spoke Zarathustra is nothing if not

a

“Of course, the enormous irony throughout Kierkegaard's
writings that bear directly or indirectly on gossip is the
It is a
striking contrast they present with his own life.
his
of
most
did
he
that
biography
his
commonplace of
his
spend
to
preferring
night
at
late
philosophic writing
gossiping
cafes,
in
sitting
or
town
the
around
days strolling
Kirmmse s Encounters
away with friends and people-watching.
evidence in this
plentiful
provides
with Kierkegaard (1996)
regard (see especially 89-98)
,

'

.
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Therefore,

long jeremiad against such perpetual confusion.

Nietzsche's evaluation of reputation-talk as perpetually
Further,

incorrect must be read as corrosively disdainful.

the terms of the fragment demonstrate that in this passage
he is not making a value distinction between

conscience and

a

a good

good reputation; Nietzsche dismisses both

(he is describing how one might "cope" with both a bad

conscience and

a bad reputation;

wants to be writing for
need for "coping")

12

I

.

—

clearly, the "us" Nietzsche

—

Ubermenschen

would have no

bring up this triad of popular

Continental writers 13 in large part because they are chiefly
fragment
Skept ics should consult Nietzsche's HjTBn AIJ JE&JAnBp.
tact not
in
is
others
about
562, which rakes it quite clear that gossip
those
attacking
accurately
even about its ostensive objects, let alone
12

others
as

of conversation
The fact remains that even the original prcnoter
Wtat kinds of
about
cations
f
qua
the road to truth, Plato, clearly has
knowl ^9 e
J"
conversation produce genuine versus unjustified
both to deff ine
Gorges
sophist
Socrates challenges the
rVtmias
practice rhetoric). After
nrofess ion and to justify it (why should we
™ch bantering, Gargias challenges Socks'
p'r^em
Socrates abstract ions pre^ni
irritatingly pointing out that in short,
of the world and othe s
him from achieving9 a rreaningful understanding
(544). Socrates a^ires Gargias'

13

i

I

i

.

i

^

.

s'^absmSs

*^

of the dialogue net era ng
disavow the rebuke, and continues on the restknowledge.
ndeed tow rds
the lust oursuit of rhetoric as a path to true
be
icles are debating hew best
ilose of the dialogue Socrates and Cal
u^.
and bo^warldly re^Jlat^ aHects
truth iray be ascertain in disputes
I

,

I

^'fr^^nTacrard'i^ tolblvSS'.V
an eye towards

justice
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i

it

WW
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naked souls"
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,

false, report ions,
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responsible for so much of the shifting in our attitudes
towards truth; each of these three philosophers has

differently and complementarily challenged
fixed, and absolute truth.

a

notion of

More particularly, each writer

influences contemporary intellectual trends such as

deconstruction in part by promoting (more and less directly)
an agenda of perpetual interpretation; if absolute truth

does not exist and what is left is merely eternal

signification, it is in our interests as philosophers to
"God
promote more and more challenging signification (e.g.
is dead")

.

In addition, each writer differently challenges

rationality as
the predominant philosophic privileging of
together, these are
the absolute tool to knowledge. Taken
do philosophy,
powerful challenges to the ways in which we
thinkers are still being
and indeed, the effects of these
outside the
played out in myriad ways both inside and

philosophical canon.

truth, we
If we cannot have an eternal

must at least have creativity.
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The problem with this seductive argumentation is that,
just as we have seen in the first two chapters, eternal

interpretation is only possible when some interpretations
are a little more equal than others, and that equality is

To flesh this out:

predetermined.

it is a truism that

subjects make decisions between competing interpretations of
almost any event

(both consciously and unconsciously)

,

and

that of course we constantly reject interpretations either

completely or partially.

The difficulty with these three

Eurochallenges to how we do or don't choose to believe ideas
is that the ground is fixed -- if we think some thing

because we heard it from someone else than of course it must
be idle, vicious and no doubt false, Heidegger, Nietzsche,

and Kierkegaard would whisper conspiratorily in our ears.
The implication is that we can only choose some freedoms in

interpretation; parameters of plausibility and reasonability
still exist 14

.

Granted there has been at least one recent attempt to
challenge this kind of reading of at least Kierkegaard as
his
Peter Fenves,
straightforwardly anti-chatter.
of
analysis
complicated
and
sophisticated
remarkably
3
as
himself
presents
(1993),
Chatter
Kierkegaard that is
be
can
'itself'
"chatter
that
arguing
defender of idle talk,
it
clarified only if emptiness and idleness command respect,
arguing
and
they are treated as traits of language..." (4),
epistemic
allows
that
language
of
loosening
approvingly for a
Incidentally,
merits to concepts like rumor and hearsay (14)
and gossip are not
it's important to note here that chatter
points out
synonymous concepts for Fenves; in a footnote, he resistance)
or
that gossip can have a purpose (social control
As the bulk of his analysis
that chatter cannot (253-254)
import to chatte
makes clear, Fenves' Kierkegaard grants
as caesur a
failure, idleness because of their function
^
seriously failing
undercut the whole notion of seriousness by
14

,

m

'

_

.

.

,
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The philosophic literature on conversation, then,

mirrors the larger tendency within epistemology that

I

would

Given that, the purpose of my analysis

like to challenge.

and definition of gossip,

is to demonstrate one of the ways

in which our knowledge -gathering may be both less orderly

than we might otherwise have supposed, but still no less
reliable; correlat ively

,

if we acknowledge the great extent

to which people colloquially rely on gossip, hearsay,

rumor

and testimony when developing beliefs and conceptions, my

challenge to the formality of existing theories of knowledge
is further underscored.

Let me return briefly to those authors whose work on

gossip and rumor

I

surveyed in my previous two chapters.

The vast majority of writers attribute no meaningful

epistemic content or function to gossip

--

either it is

strictly false or so distorted as to be epistemically
We can only
to make failures, idleness, chat, significant.
but this
asserts;
think of talk as teleological, Fenves
language
but
criticism,
teleology is not a reasoned move of
and
idleness
values
In short, Fenves
talking about itself.
reemphasis
the
somehow
chatter for their very frivolity, and
dialectic
seriousness- idleness
the
of
half
one
of
itself,
dialectic
the
of
fundamentally undermines the notion
does
me,
to
clear
seems
it
and both its terms. This reading,
the
reify
indirectly)
(albeit
nothing if not further
of
notion
a
displace
indeed
importance of seriousness (and
a
always
-is
language
if
plane
seriousness onto an ethereal
because
so
be
only
can
it
site of failure of seriousness,
not humanly
there does indeed exist a more distant seriousness
than the
more
be
never
can
chatter
Because
attainable)
break,
the
signifies
(chatter
stepping-stone to seriousness
for
way
the
up
opens
chatter
the failure of communication,
itself
chatter
silence which is what is truly communicative)
conversation
all
of
absence
-the
only
cannot be serious
.

,

(

44

)

.

313

useless, or else the knowledge it could convey is of so

subjective a nature that it doesn't relevantly challenge
"major" epistemic issues,

truth context.

and writers don't portray it in a

While some authors attribute a social

constructivist power to gossip, it is clearly power of

a

very secondary nature; "real", purer knowledge that is less

assailable by common opinion still exists in the world, and

gossip is simply the (not entirely satisfactory) substitute.
It is relevant to reintroduce this line of thinking

here because the philosophers, sadly, fall into that last

category

--

both Code and Coady from the last chapter can

only lend an attenuated epistemic power to gossip.

Code

insists that gossip can only be productive of knowledge to
the extent that it is chaotic and therefore defiant of

rationality; Coady allows knowledge power towards testimony,
but only with the proviso that it is strictly regulated, to
cull out the questionable third-party information.

The

qualifications to their theories undermine the central
discomfort philosophers have with
influential of knowledge:

a

notion of gossip as

that gossip can be unruly,

difficult to control or predict.
Of course,

if we pause for a moment and reflect upon

that characteristic,

it should immediately become clear that

it is no
while it can certainly be true of gossip and rumor,

more
less true of conversation in general, and still
elections,
generally scientific experiments, political
314
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academic conferences,

"straight" news reporting, and other

standard social constructs we now regularly attribute as
creative of knowledge.

unrulier

(at

Theories of knowledge grow ever

least, most theories of knowledge)

;

however, as

with the Continental triad, modest unruliness is permissible
only because some boundaries of knowledge remain
tacitly)

impermeable.

(at least

Epistemic brinksmanship remains the

order of the day, even within social constructivism.

Analyzing gossip and assessing its epistemic merit
challenges our notions of orderly knowledge on

a more

fundamental level
One example might demonstrate this more concretely.

Both analytic and Continental philosophers of knowledge
spend much of their professional time arguing about what it
is that knowledge is,

and presenting and defeating wildly

various conditions or lack thereof for knowledge.

What

gossip fundamentally demonstrates is the ways in which

people individually and anarcho-collect ively can choose to
read words differently than the professionals.

Harvey Siegel
accomplishes:

'

s

Return to

claim for what it is that epistemology

ascertaining epistemic justification, through

criteria of justification and ratification, and determining
the possibility of knowledge.

This seems little more than a

straightforward definition of epistemology.

But when we

combine it with Siegel's other contention, that epistemology
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can be independent of the particular framework from which it

seeks to comment on, analytic slippage occurs.
Here is where an example

becomes relevant.

(albeit a slightly nutty one)

An epistemologist commenting on popular

acceptance of the thesis that Lee Harvey Oswald worked with
others in his assassination of John

Kennedy might argue

F.

that belief in this thesis is misplaced, given the

alternative hypothesis produced by the Warren Commission and
the murky evidentiary waters that surround this historical

Hypotheses might be infinite but certainty in this

tessara.

area is infinitesimal.

Of course, while such an argument

might persuade fellow epistemologists

,

it would have no

purchase with the not insubstantial number of Americans who
believe some version of a conspiracy theory.
here, which

I

The problem

think it would be fair to say that Siegel

would not regard as

a

problem,

is that

"knowledge,"

"certitude," and "justification" themselves are communitydependent.

Theories about the JFK assassination do indeed

abound, and the "evidence" produced to support them is

similarly variant.
is cumulative,

But the point is that "knowledge'

not propositional.

here

Many people believe some

form of conspiracy theory in part because they disbelieve

lone-killer
the evidence presented them to justify the
theory.

Their knowledge might not so much be the

with
accumulation of positive, direct proof (say, interviews
to say
those involved, physical or forensic evidence,
316

nothing of the veritable smoking gun) but rather the
aggregate of indirect nonproof of alternatives, the

seriously suspicious nature of official denials (the

blatantly silly "magic bullet" theory), and indeed the
entire social context during and since the assassination
(secret and not-so-secret wars thinly justified as the

defeat of communism, lying and dissembling government
officials, martial interferences in local communities and on

college campuses)

.

I

think it's fair to say that at the

very least, if this kind of evidence doesn't establish one
or another particular conspiracy theory as reasonable,

certainly suggests the viability of maintaining

it

a strict

skepticism regarding the lone-gunman theory.
As a professional,

Siegel could (and no doubt would)

simply stand aside, independence personified, and aver that
we might have belief here but justification is nonexistent.
But exactly what an example like the JFK assassination mess

shows is that popular conceptions of belief and knowledge do
not follow professional standards, and that professional

standards are a hopelessly wrong fit in any knowledge

decision that is less than straightforward (in other words,
in most knowledge decisions we care about making)

.

The fit

this sort of
is wrong because the professional assessment of

situation (which no doubt would ride on the fact that so
much of the "information" people use in their assessments

would be unverified, perhaps unverif iable
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,

and not coming

.

from transparently "reliable" sources, and hence

juridically

--

inadmissible)

--

quasi-

simply disregards the vast

majority of information that has vast significance for many
citizens,

and from which they may draw a wide of variety of

conclusions.

Siegel

(like Coady before him),

for relative certainty,

in his quest

simply asserts the continuing

validity of professional standards, without allowing for the

possibility that the standards themselves may evolve,
transform, or that communities outgrow different standards
or languages.

In short,

Siegel fails to raise the

possibility here that epistemological definitions themselves
(what

"knowledge",

"belief",

"ratification",

"criteria for

justification" could mean) might not be static, independent
of their grounding framework,

or fallible 15

.

In his attack on the sense-data distinction,

J.L.

Austin's Sense and Sensibility offers a linguistic analysis
for such a community-dependent theory.

While Austin, in his

attack on Ayer and sense-data theory, still holds to
refutation of the justified true
In
this analysis perfectly.
fits
belief theory of knowledge
in
not
does
A
that
argues
Gettier
his first counterexample,
from
heard
he
though
even
raise,
a
fact know that B is getting
hence is
C that someone in the room was getting a raise (and
A and
since
raise,
a
getting
was
B
that
justified in believing
is
statement
C's
though
even
and
together),
B are in the room
(which
argument
Gettier's
raise)
a
gets
true (as A in fact
rests upon a necessary vagueness with what we think we know
a
and what we conclude from what we know) only presents
make
to
knowledge mistake if how we operate in knowledge is
vague
very
from
conclusions
knowledge
precise
very
examples
information, and ignores all other less particular
come, to accurate
(or more blatantly, the idea that we might
information)
if vacrue -- conclusions from accurately vague
15

Ed Gettier's

(1963)

.
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analytic biases that in fact seem to directly contradict

Nietzshean irrationalism (e.g., Austin thinks we clearly
couldn't accept that waking thought and experience can be

dreamlike

[49]

and he wants to hold to the notion that

there are things to be empirically described by science
[4]),

at the base of Austin's provocative book are the clear

notions that there is no one conception of reality, that

ordinary language makes the subtlest distinctions in
observing and recording experience, and hence, that ordinary
language in all its subtlety is far more appropriate for

reality-pondering than philosophy- talk with all its
dichotomies.

Austin argues that fans of sense-data pose

sense-data and material things as an absolute dichotomy,

which simply isn't supportable.

"Why shouldn't we say that

material things are much spryer than we've been giving them
credit for

--

constantly busy, from moment to moment, in

changing their real shapes, colours, temperatures, sizes,
and everything else?" Austin argues

(58).

His point here is

that the dichotomy isn't justified; that there's no reason
to bifurcate sharply everything into apparent versus real,

and that our ordinary terms suggest much more complexity and

continuity in our perceptions that such
convey.

a

dichotomy can ever

Therefore, why should we move from a more complex

to a less complex system,

if in particular the less complex

system doesn't bring us any additional understanding?

Austin makes this point plainly:
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s

.

.there will sometimes be no one right way of
saying what is seen, for the additional reason
that there may be no one right way of seeing it
.

.

[

For Austin,

101

]

this kind of epistemological pluralism is as

close as we can get to foundationalism.

Ordinary language

is quite capable of articulating the fine distinctions

between concepts, subjects, beliefs; creating conceptual
dichotomies or triads merely obfuscates what was formerly
clear
This variety of arguments against epistemic

brinksmanship
challenge.

,

of course,

sets us up for a serious

If we accept that distinctions between knowledge

and belief are community-dependent, that certitude,

justification, and truth are such hopelessly murky and

abstract concepts that they can have no bearing on knowledge
claims outside a particular context, then we are left with
the significant difficulty of explaining how it is we do

come to make knowledge decisions, and more importantly, how
we can defend those decisions from community to community.
In short,
I

how do we escape absolute epistemic relativism?

am hardly the first to make the critique of epistemic

brinksmanship that precedes this difficulty

--

Coady

'

careful treatment of testimony is simply the fullest

analytic treatment of this issue.
5ig5iin

is why

I

The problem, and this

consider so many of these criticisms to be

simple brinksmanship,

is that the majority of the critics
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.

.

have read here 16 simply sidestep the clearly unsettling
issue of epistemic relativism, uncertainty, or aporia by

reendorsing

a

removed notion of absoluteness, certitude,

inf allibilty

Let me begin to address this issue by asserting, no

doubt troublingly to some readers, that in fact

I

think that this is

By this

a

"problem" to be "solved."

do not
I

mean that if we genuinely accept that argument that notions
certitude, and justification are community-

of knowledge,

dependent

(which

I

think several of the anthropological

works discussed in Chapter One have persuasively
established)

we must resign ourselves to a necessarily

,

looser theory of knowledge, and a certain amount of "give"
in our differing opinions on what it is that we know

(whomever "we" might be)

Community-dependent knowledge

means that to some extent our knowledge

(s)

is (are)

17
there can be many truths to one situation

pluralistic;

To get specific, I would include Coady,
Siegel, and Cherniak in this group.
16

Code,

.

Fenves,

point .some readers might accuse me of
other words, am I not simply further
brinksmanship
of certitude by affirming a removed
notion
the
displacing
My
community certitudes)?
certitudes,
(many
certitude
think
I
that
be
would
criticism
this
to
response
epistemological pluralism changes our notion of certitude
itself; since "community" itself is such a provisional and
loose term (how many communities would any one person claim
ethnic,
familial,
professional,
local,
in?
membership
these
of
any
are
religious, gender, etc. etc. and how stable
think,
I
certitude,
the notion of
communities in turn?)
becomes such a localized and temporalized idea that in fact
no
new language is needed, because community certitude can
longer itself be so certain.
17

At

this
;

in

,

;

,

321

The job of epistemology, then, becomes in my mind more

ethnographic in nature

--

ascertaining who believes what

under what sort of social, psychological, political, and
economic conditions

--

and determining what sorts of forces

are more knowledge- inf luential in different sorts of

situations.

The goal of this analysis can hardly be to

establish new "standards" of knowledge, for clearly this

ethnography can be of limited predictive use.
I

In contrast,

think the goal of looser epistemology is simply to

establish frames of reference and comparison for new
knowledge situations.
This might sound like a simple Foucauldian genealogical

approach to knowledge; in other words, that all "truths"
are equally externally constructed (in other words, even

those things we think of as so straightforwardly abstract
ideas -- "truth," say, or less controversially,

"triangle")

are determined for us by external forces that serve, to
(we accept

greater and lesser extent, to constrain us
categorization)

.

Indeed,

I

accept the bulk of this

analysis, and think that Foucault's genealogical approach is
a

necessary counterweight to orthodox,

of history.

"great man" theories

Foucault demonstrates both with his practical

analyses (see Discipline and Punish [1977]

theoretical works

(

The Order of Things

)

and his more

The Archaeology of Knowledge
[1970])

[1972]

and

that an intellectual's job is in
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part to ascertain the history of concepts

--

how they arise,

achieve discursive power and become naturalized.
But it is central to the thesis of this section that

Foucault ultimately stands with his more analytic
compatriots,

in that the sources he relies upon for his

genealogical work are strictly authoritative, and his
analysis is too individuated.
the same error of analysis

epistemology

--

I

Foucault commits

In short,

find peppering the history of

an assumption that knowledge-construction is

defined more by positive, documented steps than by the
casual misstep, the offchance, the unattributed remark.

Foucault

'

s

very power and competency as

a

historian

(exhaustively researching and documenting our changing

attitudes towards punishment, sexuality, madness) end up, in
their aggregate, suggesting that already-empowered

communities

(consciously and subconsciously)

construct or

define social norms; that the people who don't make the
papers,

in short,

don't utilize, conform, or modify terms

for their own usage

(or do not do so "meaningfully");

that

the "audience" of social construction is composed of
18
generally passive receptors of structural wisdom

.

This analysis resonates with Jacques Ranciere's critique
of current trends in history in his The Names of History
Ranciere astutely notes that the modern fashion of
(1994)
writing history in the name of the voiceless ("the people"),
is simply another means of writing standard narrative history,
of
f ict ionalizat ion
we cannot escape the narratization,
its
and
history, and that that indeed is both its allure
and see my
I agree with this,
disciplinary strength (36-38)
analysis of gossip as an application of this thesis. Gossip
18

.
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Gossip,

I

think,

is an explicit and concrete means for

us to understand the chaotic,

social acquisition of

knowledge, the ways in which knowledge is constructed not

simply by transparently "empowered" communities but by the
disempowered, both individually and organizationally; it

provides us with a(nother), critically important tool to do
this sort of ethnographic work.

either

a

Without gossip, we risk

uselessly abstract conception of gossip (the range

of analytic epistemology)

or a one-sidedly materialist

notion (social constructivism as it currently stands)

.

It

seems to me that no philosopher working today has yet to
give a satisfactory account of what knowledge -gather ing

really operates like:
social aspects,

in short,

accounting for both its

its chaotic aspects,

and yet describing the

ways in which we do in fact produce knowledges that we

assess as more and less secure, that we do not simply wallow
in a linguistic/semiotic swamp.

3.3

How Informal Epistemology is Inherently Gossipy
What is gossipy about informal epistemology?

fundamentally an investigative activity.
topic,

its setting,

motivations

Gossip is

No matter what its

or its external or additional

(psychological,

financial, political,

shows us that we can tell all sorts of stories; history,
philosophy, and science, should be written in a variety of
of
tone
omnipresent
the
simply
than
rather
voices,
rationality
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interpersonal, professional, several of the above), what to
me seems clear is that we undertake the activity of gossip

because we are trying to make sense out of something.

What

that "thing" might be is not

I

relevant

(yet)

-

but what

think is relevant is that this impulse to understand doesn't
come out of nowhere.

Gossip originates from dissonance.

We

need to gossip because facts we're getting, or perceptions
we're having, aren't making sense

-

we can't tell a story

Gossip is quite literally us telling

from the world.

stories about the world.
Obviously, and as Ranciere's analysis of history
suggests, we tell stories through and as particular

communities

--

a group,

no matter how big or small, how

loosely or tightly constructed, wants to make sense of what
it sees as a particular string of events,

problems, goals.
informal,

causes, effects,

If we grant the epistemology is more

in the sense that it is more community-dependent

than otherwise analyzed, the tactcs of community should be
more foregrounded in our understanding of knowledge.
Gossip,

as an essentially communitarian activity

(for what

is the conversation of friendship if not at least a

community-maintainer
dissolver]

?)

,

[as

well as occasionally a community-

is a critically important part of how

communities tell their stories about the world.
What's surprising about this locution, of course, is
how close it comes to the humanists
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usage of gossip

I

so

decry.

But what makes this phrasing to me more powerful is

simply the emphasis I'm placing on the stories themselves.

Gossipists of all stripes paint those stories as necessarily
false

(or at best

malicious,

only accidentally true)

fanciful, outright invented.

--

distorted,

They're sharply

opposed from the truth, which is sought in an objective,
rational fashion.

Exactly what I'm trying to say is that

those processes are one and the same

when we gossip we are

-

simply more concretely, more particularly (and sometimes
less concretely and particularly)

trying to come up with a

cohesive explanation for the world.

If informal

epistemology grants us some freedom in sourcing and
evaluating our knowledge, it is only reasonable to conclude
that folk knowledge like gossip, rumor, hearsay and folklore

would each be relevant contributors to community and
individual knowledge explanations.
A comparison

I

think is worth setting up

--

what is the

distinction between gossip at the knowledge point and gossip
that gets left behind?

In other words,

if we take as a

starting point that gossip can create knowledge instead of

being an aberration from it, and we further assume that not

everything that is said as gossip just gets swallowed up as
knowledge

(a

difference?

not unreasonable claim)
I

,

how do we tell the

would (imperfectly) phrase it this way

difference is in the appellation itself.

-

When gossip

attains the status of knowledge, we don't refer to it as
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the

.

gossip anymore

.

--

.

it's simply a fact.

(Naturally,

stealing from Laboratory Life here 19 .)

much more interestingly to me,

I

I'm

Correlat ively

,

and

think that gossip that has

yet to, or definitely will not attain the status of

knowledge is precisely that which is forcefully referred to
as "gossip" 20

.

Since gossip is still

(for Americans at least),

discounting something as

a

perjorative term

it's clear that one way of
a

truth claim is to call it gossip:

"it's just gossip," we say and hear, as a means of

comforting someone (this can't be true), or de-emphasizing
something (no one can take this seriously, this idea isn't

going anywhere)
Gossip, because it is both public and private, because
it is cementing and critiquing of social relations,

because

19

And, of course, from Shibutani (1966), who points out
that "when an unverified report turns out to be true, no one
notices its obscure source. When subsequent events reveal a
report to have been unfounded, the item is dismissed as having
been 'only a rumor'" (3)

While it should be obvious, let me make it clear that
these distinctions only apply to the American usage of the
term. Clearly, as much of the anthropological work I'm citing
demonstrates, much of the world takes gossip far more
and already lends it knowledge status, than
seriously,
Americans. If it's not transparent at this point, I'm writing
for an American audience - for it seems to me that only
Americans at this point are still so Puritanically obsessed
with propriety and virtue in speech (while happily violating
and that only Americans are similarly so
it all the while)
obsessed with empirical, verifiable definitions of truth and
While most of my anthropological sources are in
falsehood.
Latin America or Asia, anyone who wonders if the Europeans are
as Puritanical about speech or knowledge need only refer to
the acceptance and mainstreaming of gossip magazines in Spain,
France, Italy and England (Meiser)
20

,
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it is both idle and purposive shows the ways in which our

knowledge doesn't come "either" from external sense

perception or internal abstract ideas, the ways in which
gossip is neither simply descriptive or normative.
is all these things at once

(I

Gossip

sound like an advertisement),

because knowledge is all of these things at once.

We always

turn around on our knowledge-constructions after they have

already been made, and try to sort out the different
components of them

(ok,

here's where the evaluative mistake

was made -- if we can just not do that the next time we'll

have a much more rigorous equation of ethical euthanasia)
But gossip to me is a marker of the ways in which our

knowledge-gathering is hopelessly chaotic, and how that's
not a bad thing,

it's an inevitable thing.

The bad thing is

not so much when we try to make rational, teleological order
out of the disorder

(for that seems to be the inevitable

philosophic, if not human impulse), but when we in turn try
to inscribe inevitability to the teleological order we've

just put forth.

How does gossip straddle these categories:

how does

gossip show our knowledge-gathering to be chaotically

purposive?
select

Gossip's functions are twofold:

first,

to

(fast-track to decide what avenues to pursue, and

which to discard)

,

second,

to synthesize

(in gossiping we

can make connections, draw conclusions more freely than we
can in other arenas, we can put facts and possibilities
328

together that we might otherwise not think about)
in short,

is a kind of playing field for the mind

bets are off, and we can act with whimsy.
a

Gossip,

.

kind of playing field,

--

many

But if gossip is

it is only so not because so much

of other knowledge -work is so distinctly opposite

because other knowledge-work is so related
"orthodox" knowledge is a playground:

--

,

but

in short, more

more organized and

rigid than the kind of play that might take place on a big
field,

but nonetheless, pretty sloppy and unpredictable.

I

think the problem is that we think of easy opposites; it's

initially alluring to imagine gossip as some sort of daring
subversive agent to oppressive aboveground, controlling,
dictatorial, disciplinary information, but

I

think the fact

is that control and dictatorship are neither so

straightforward nor so defined.
case,

Surely,

if that were the

they'd be much easier to detect and resist.
Gossip,

then,

fulfills these two particular functions

that are essential in knowledge-gathering, but not

uniquely
a

--

for surely we select hypotheses for knowledge in

variety of social behaviors, to say nothing of

synthesizing ideas.

The point is that we do so differently

when we gossip, we do so (even) more freely in gossip than
when we, for example, theorize in seminars, debate
opponents, or argue with colleagues or employers.
a

community tool for exploration and evaluation;
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Gossip is
a not-

directly traceable one, to be sure, but one whose resonances
can be inferred from even "authoritative" texts.

Nota Bene:

I

the following one,

concretely.

I

now proceed, both in this section and in
to give examples of how gossip works

very deliberately choose two examples that

are contrary to each other; one very traditional accounting
of gossip

(in science,

using documented sources), one very

nontraditional accounting
item,

very authentic oral gossip

(a

very authentically undocumented)

.

Even though the

first example consists in textual readings, it is important
to observe at the outset that both of these examples cannot

be considered "proof" in the typically philosophically

rigorous fashion; for after all, what defines gossip is

nothing if not its untraceableness
inherently oral character.

,

its unruliness,

its

In neither example could we say

that we "know" the gossip; that the "knowledge" of gossip
has been definitively proven.

I

would say, perhaps

paradoxically, that this lack of traditional rigor cannot be

considered

a

failure of proof but rather its evidence.

For

indeed, gossipy conclusions and inferences in even

authoritative texts demonstrate alternate readings and
theses; further, as the second section demonstrates, gossipy

anecdotes demonstrate the inadequacy of traditional

narrative to supply complete, sensible accounts of beliefs
and their justifications.

With that, let me dish some dirt.
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3.4

How Gossip Selects
"Consciousness,

from our natal day,

is of a teeming

multiplicity of objects and relations, and what we call
simple sensations are results of discriminative attention,

pushed often to

a

very high degree"

(Vol

1:224).

.

William

James'

statement, here from The Principles of Psychology

(1918)

is a conviction that we shape the world;

that our

perceptions are more than simple passive receptors of data
(sense-data enthusiasts aside)

Indeed,

.

a little

further

James writes that "what are our very senses themselves but

organs of selection"

(Vol.

in turn from David Hume,

1:284)

.

James'

thesis, adapted

is that the phenomenal world as

such does not really exist in any knowable sense; that human

agents shape the world according to their individual
perceptions, which are determined by categories.
think,

is a more particular,

Gossip,

I

more field-specific means of

this selection.
In The Double Helix

(1969)

,

James Watson briefly and

clearly tells the story of his discovery, along with Francis
Crick,

of the structure of DNA

.

Watson,

to his credit,

attempts nothing less than an entirely honest depiction of
the events of 1951-1953; not only does he present very

complicated genetic and biochemical theory simply for the
lay person,
vice.

he freely admits to professional and personal

Not only does Watson almost eagerly attest to

freguent bouts of laziness and distraction from work with
331

some of the more lurid attractions of London, but more

seriously, he acknowledges his sexist and condescending

attitude towards Rosalind Franklin, a crystallographer in

another laboratory.

In part due to this

(naive)

unself consciousness from Watson, considerable controversy
has arisen over The Double Helix

,

and more significantly the

discovery of the structure of DNA itself.
(Lwoff,

Sayre)

Several authors

have charged that Watson and Crick

underattributed the contributions of others (namely Maurice
Wilkins and Rosalind Franklin) to their discovery.

Correlatively

,

others have responded (Bernstein, Olby) that

the credit of DNA rests appropriately with Watson and Crick.

While the detail of this spat is interesting to me,
what is more relevant to us here is the methodology these

various sources reveal about the creation of science.

Watson opens his book by quickly describing the morass of
genetic theory in 1951

--

how widely different hypotheses

and methods of study were proposed as paths to the discovery
of the structure of DNA

(22-23)

.

More particularly, Watson

describes the ways in which particular rumors in the
scientific community

--

casual chat passed between different

lab workers -- served to focus attention on one particular

method or another.

One key rumor was that Linus Pauling had

discovered the structure of proteins
(30).

--

the alpha-helix

While Pauling's structure could not be directly

applied to DNA structures, his model influenced the path DNA
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)

research took (Pauling used

a

helical structure, DNA

researchers focused on possible helical structures for DNA)
More generally, the environment of scientific research
in the immediately postwar Western world was highly

competitive.

The scientific community is a small one, and

one that contains a lot of interdiscussion about each

other's professional and personal behavior.

Labs in the

and the U.K. competed against each other for national

U.S.

credit,

and lab credit,

for making significant discoveries.

Pauling's son Peter came to work for Watson and Crick's lab
at Cavendish during this struggle,

and Watson details a

letter Pauling sent to his son making mention of DNA

discoveries he was on the verge of, but giving no details
(93)

.

Similarly, when Watson and Crick are on the verge of

unraveling the DNA structure (in point of fact they are

pursuing an incorrect model, but one that is closely related
to the correct model), Watson writes a long letter to his

friend Delbriick bragging about his impending success, and

similarly

--

and no doubt

(insert 10-15)

.

f rustrat

(Of course,

ingly -- avoiding detail

as Watson himself notes,

in

retrospect it is fortunate he did that, saving himself

embarrassment

.

When Watson and Crick are in the thick of unraveling

DNA structure, they make a point of pumping Peter Pauling
for dirt on the goings-on in his father's lab
f rustrat

ingly

,

(101);

they again get vague ideas from Peter but no
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detailed information (ibid,

99)

But at each moment of this

stage, what is clear is that Watson and Crick are using

their casual relationship with Peter (for Watson's book does

nothing if not exhaustively demonstrate his extensive and
attentive socializing with his coworkers, Peter Pauling

especially

[99,

111,

for insight and direction into

114]),

further research on DNA

--

Watson and Crick look to the

world-reknowned "expert" for correlation or correction to
their hypotheses, they count on reputation leading to

accurate scientific process.
More precisely,

informal chatter is the necessary

channel by which they can get the confirmation or

disconf irmation they want.

Formal professional enounters

with Pauling senior are pretty much limited to conference
papers and publications; they rely on their back-channel of
Peter Pauling to find out the direction of future research,

rather than what has already been done.

In addition,

as

Watson's frequent allusions to rumors in the science world
attest,

the speed of scientific publication and conference

paper delivery cannot hope to keep up with the actual

research trajectories in laboratories.
is crucial towards doing accurate

research)

;

Following the gossip

(read community-accepted

even though Watson and Crick think they are

headed in the right direction, gossip on alternative
approaches is enough to throw them off onto another scent.
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,

This analysis should recall my precis of Laboratory
Life;

I

certainly see

a

parallel between these different

accountings of how science is done.
demonstrate definitively that
the composition of TRF

(H)

a

Latour and Woolgar

virtually accurate thesis of

can only be accepted when it is

presented by an "expert"; in short, someone with the right

disciplinary qualifications, who has self-consciously
redefined the field and conditions of research, who has

established

a

reputation as the authority.

Reputations'

informal negotiation help determine which hypotheses get

pursued and which are left behind.

Correlat ively

,

we can

speculate that at least part of the reason Watson and Crick
ignore Rosalind Franklin's

virtually accurate)

(again,

thesis about the structure of DNA is due not simply to

sexism (though that certainly plays

a role)

of an established reputation in this field
if not Crick,

,

but to her lack

(she,

like Watson

is a comparative newcomer to gene research)

and her failure to negotiate actively a reputation with

colleagues (her outsider, loner status

--

which of course

must be also partly due to her position as

researcher in a virtually all-male field)

Woolgar themselves say in Laboratory Life

.

,

a

woman
As Latour and

this analysis

does not delegitimate the status of fact that the structure
of DNA or TRF

(H)

have,

it contextualizes them -- looking

back at the gossip, we can tell why information became

viable as knowledge when it did.
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More particularly, the

gossip was the channel by which information was able to
become foregrounded to the point where it could more widely
be accepted.

3

.

5

In these ways,

gossip selects.

How Gossip Synthesizes
I

see gossip's functions as synthesizing and selecting

knowledge to be highly complementary of each other.
Earlier,

I

used the example of

a

playground versus

a

large

field when talking about how gossip works to synthesize
knowledge.

The gloss is simple:

when we are trying to

figure something out, we typically follow preordained routes
of analysis and deduction,

depending on the kind of

operation we are carrying out.

If

I

am a historian, trying

to ascertain what Indianans thought of the Treaty of

Versailles, my discipline and training will lead me down a

reduced number of paths.

might look at national

I

newspapers and magazines for some national context (looking
only at the articles on the treaty)

,

and then dig more

deeply into the locality, examining not only local

publications but private writings (letters, diaries) that
might discuss the Treaty.

I

no doubt will explore

ethnographic data (the population, their ethnic, religious,
national, economic backgrounds).

More pointedly,

I

will not

probably look at entries and accounts of events other than
the treaty for analysis of the treaty itself; while

consider

a

contemporaneous event for "context,"
336

I

I

might

would not

s

for the text itself.

In other words,

I

might look at the

rise of the second Klu Klux Klan in Indiana to compare

awareness of the respective events (for example, the number
of articles devoted to the treaty versus the number of

articles devoted to local elections where Klan influence was

widely suspected or assumed)

,

but

I

most probably would not

look to reporting on the Klan to explain the reception of
the treaty,

or vice versa.

The rules of the game of doing

history, where connections must be easily established and

where artif actual, documentary evidence is mandatory for
credibility, prohibit otherwise.
This is the sense in which doing history, as with most

investigative activities, is like playing on a playground.
There are particular apparati you may choose to use, and
there are definitely modest ways in which you can adapt the

apparatus in question to your own ends.

For example, a

child might stand facing inward at the top of

a slide and

run in place against the slant of the slide, trying to

maintain balance for as long as possible and not fall down
the slide

(painfully)

instead of simply sliding down

,

21
according to the design of the equipment

.

Similarly,

more daring historians might invoke some non-textual

speculation to make theoretical inroads in the game of
history; Kathleen Blee

women's Klan discusses
21

'

history of the development of the
"whispering campaigns," which she

Thanks to Kimberly Adkins for demonstrating this point.
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can only partly document,

to explain the Klan's power.

But

just as a child on play equipment may not be too free in her

adaptations of the equipment without violating the tacit
rules of acceptable playground behavior (for example, if

a

child is using the slide in this way, another child cannot

simultaneously try to walk up the slide bottom-end first,
which might unlodge the first child from her precarious
balance)

,

there are only so many professional rules one can

bend, break or adapt at any one time.

Contorting or

ignoring too many at once causes one to be drummed out of
one's professional ranks; one is no longer "doing history,"
but writing a novel, or interpreting a social theory 22

By contrast, when we play on

a

.

large field, rules of

play may still develop, but much more randomly, and more
negotiably.

For instance, we may begin by deciding to play

a simple game of Tag,

but quickly adapt it to Freeze Tag, or

invent new rules all our own (Calvin and Hobbes' elaborate

and constantly evolving games amuse us precisely because

they are so remindful of how children do play with each
other)

.

The play is not entirely anarchic, but the set of

rules governing it cannot be totally iterable; neither will
it remain the same nor evolve in predictable ways.

This is

While this last year has brought with it a spate of
genre -bending theoretical works (Callaso's Ruin of Kasch
which have indeed received
Demos' The Unredeemed Captive
favorable reviews, the reviews themselves are marked by a
decided unwillingness to categorize. Historians are not fully
interested (yet) in taking these hybrid works in as history
per se
22

,

)

,

.
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how we gossip because this is how we come to know things;
this is the way in which gossip synthesizes.

Depending on

the "terrain" of the field (in short, everything we may be

talking about in the conversation)

we may adapt our

,

conversation one particular way or another, may make some
connections rather than others, but importantly, the

connections we make aren't strictly bound by rules of

investigation or operation

--

credibility does not prohibit

us from considering particular kind of information or

speculating in different directions.

Similarly, gossip's

synthetic power is important here precisely because it
allows us to make connections we might be forbidden to
otherwise.

If professional courtesy,

prohibits us from speculating on

a

or the burden of proof

peculiar combination of

events or behaviors, gossip permits us to indulge the
speculation, with others, and quite possibly to further it
in meaningful ways
I

present this lengthy analysis and illustration so

that my example of gossip synthesizing information might

have more resonance.

Michael Hooker (himself a Ph.D. from

the Five Colleges in philosophy) was named to the presidency
of the University of Massachusetts system in 1994.

Hooker

was effusive about his excitement at returning to his alma
mater,

and spoke grandly about big plans for transforming

the budget -bedraggled University into a "Harvard with a

subsidy."

About six months after his ascension, while
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I

was

.

chatting with a friend of mine, he mentioned that he had
heard from a friend of his that Michael Hooker was

interviewing for a job as president of some other
university.

Needless to say, we were both surprised.

started circulating this item in the gossip hopper

I

--

passing it along to numerous friends of mine, one of whom
happened to work as

a

lobbyist for one of campus

constituencies
While we

(and others,

no doubt)

serially discussed the

possibility that this might be true, we did so by evaluating
what we knew of Michael Hooker.

Each person had different

information or impressions of Hooker to offer

--

one person

reminded me that Hooker's sole achievement during his short
tenure at Bennington had been to sell the campus buildings
off to rich alumni; others discussed his George Bush-like

history of multiple two- or three-year terms at
universities; one friend recounted Hooker's aggressive

behavior towards his dissertation committee while

a

doctoral

condidate in philosophy; still another recalled Hooker's
self -description in the campus newspaper of his career as a

faculty member at Harvard, hands behind his head and feet
atop desk, yet still feeling dissatisfied with his

achievements.

Different events and impressions were

compared and analyzed, with the purpose being to discover
what kinds of actions would be believable.

More than

anything else, what emerged from these discussions was that
340

Michael Hooker was profoundly motivated by ambition, and

willing to disregard quite

a few social

conventions in the

process of getting where he thought he might like to be, and
that clearly,

a

land-grant university like UMASS, with its

perennially controversial national reputation and uncertain
state funding, could not be Hooker's ultimate aim.
Two years later (early spring of 1995)

,

shortly after

Hooker released a ten-year plan for the university, gossip
about Michael Hooker's imminent departure from the UMASS

presidency again began to circulate.
borne out by the facts

--

This time,

it was

Michael Hooker left to assume the

chancellorship of the more prestigious University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
The point here,

a la Turner,

is that we do not know if

in fact Michael Hooker had interviewed for that other job so

shortly after his arrival.

would do so, however, had

The belief that he certainly
a wide

variety of reasonable

evidence to justify it, and indeed, his later actions

exactly proved the accuracy of those initial suppositions.
Does this make the earlier gossip untrue?

This point is

impossible to resolve -- the history simply doesn't exist on
this issue.

What is does demonstrate is the ability of

gossip to construe plausible and viable theses where other,
more traditionally reliable channels might fail"

3
.

when the new Hooker
A relevant historical note here:
that of^ the people
noticed
I
information began to circulate,
gossiping about
been
hadn't
I
talked to, those with whom
I
23
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.

Why did it make sense for those of us who had heard the

earlier rumor to believe that Hooker was indeed not long for
the UMASS presidency?

An initial hot rumor sparked

lengthier, more drawn-out, more reflective analyses of
Hooker,

from a wide variety of perspectives.

Analytic

philosophers would say that at no point did we gossipers
know that Hooker would leave UMASS; we could not, because
the knowledge could not be usefully verified, or because our

justifications were pathetically unrelated to the matter at
hand (who cares if Hooker sold off Bennington buildings to
alumni?

Harvey Siegel might say)

.

But the point is that

these stories of gossip, the bulk of which were largely

unavailable through standard media (newspaper accounts of
Hooker did not reflect on his erratic administrative career;
the earlier rumor of outside interviewing appeared nowhere)

were the sole channel by which

a

plausible account of Hooker

could be constructed, a story that resonated with both past
and future events
In other words,

gossip's synthetic function works in

part to link analytic categories of justification and belief

together

--

they are importantly psychological states, and

this earlier leave-taking possibility were floored (albeit
by the hearsay, unlike those of us who had
relieved)
To
previously considered the likelihood of this occurrance
leaders
student
be precise, when I took part along with other
in an interview with a prospective administrator, and I
mentioned Hooker's announcement of his leaving UMASS (as it
one student in
had been on the radio earlier that morning)
involved with
actively
particular, whom I knew to be very
the news.
by
so)
campus politics, was shocked (delightedly
.

,
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not simply philosophical conditions.

But the point is that

they each, separately and together, can contribute to us

having positions we would consider to be knowledge that
simple issues of truth and falsity could never cover (to say

nothing of logical analyses of conjunctions or
disjunctions)

Gossip, by selecting from fields of

.

possibilities and allowing freer combinations of ideas and
speculations,

shows the ways in which we construct knowledge

in unorthodox,

3

.

6

community-dependent, provisional ways.

Applications of Analysis and Conclusion
What would be my practical recommendations for gossip?

I

don't think, a la Gluckman, that we ought have schools for

scandal, nor do

I

think we should loosen up libel laws, or

recreate Centers for Rumor Control (or create correlates for
gossip,

CGCs)

the first is

.

[at

The problem with these suggestions

least partly]

tongue-in-cheek)

(even if

is that they

all suggest that gossip can somehow be reduced,

eliminated,

defused or controlled by public confrontation.

In short,

they all follow Felix Frankfurter's dictum that "sunlight is
the best disinfectant."

"Disinfectant" is indeed the

appropriate image here, for again gossip retains its tainted

character under these various prescriptions.

(How do we

disempower gossip?)
Rather,

if we look at examples like those Turner

inovokes, where she suggests that companies facing rumors
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try to analyze them according to their possible structural

causes and remedy for those

hire more minorities in

(e.g.,

positions of authority, market products in

a less

racially

targeted fashion, lower the prices of some products)
purpose here
powerful.

--

well,

,

the

is exactly to make gossip less

Her intuition is that the rumor is grounded

structurally, and if you change the structural conditions,
the rumor will simply fade away

--no

at stake in spreading it anymore.

one will have anything

That may be true for

particular rumors (even allowing for the fact that those
with ostensive power in these situations are interested in
changing structural conditions, which as Turner's exegesis
shows is generally not the case)

rumor itself.

,

but it cannot be true for

(The same is true for gossip.)

We can

attempt to attack particular rumors or particular gossip
items that we think unfair, or unwanted (regardless of their

truth value!), but we cannot control the channel itself
is a necessity,

and a valuable one.

fundamentally community tool,

a

-

it

If gossip is a

bottom-up tool that serves

at least locally to challenge orthodox readings and

theories,

than no amount of structural alteration can

eliminate the tool, simply because communities, while always

shifting and realigning, will always exist.
Turner's other recommendation is more useful for my

concluding purposes

.

She suggests that it is important for

historians to take into account less orthodox sources of
344

s

information,

like rumor,

folklore and myth, when they

construct historical accounts of events and time periods.
have a correlative suggestion for knowledge workers.

seriously gossip, considering it as

a

I

Taking

valid source of

knowledge, means simply that we recognize that how we go

about deciding we know something is more complicated than

professional epistemologists would have us believe.

While

analytic argumentation about knowledge is certainly sound
and valid,

it is not at all the means by which most of us go

about deciding whether or not we believe something.
does it inspire me to change the ways by which

I

Nor

make my

epistemic decisions.
And ultimately, this is my goal here.

directly

I

While most

would like it if social scientists began to

approach the concept and definition of gossip with more

sophistication and more opened ears, ultimately it seems to
me that there are popular applications for this analysis.

One way in which someone could attack this line of thinking
is by arguing

proposed

--

(as has

been frequently and enthusiastically

see the Harper

'

forum [1986])

that there are

only a surfeit of gossip and rumor when people have no faith
in institutional channels.

Gossip and rumor have been

increasing linearly over the years because of

a

deepening

cynicism over trust and honesty from institutions (e.g.

post-Watergate "malaise”); their increasing presence doesn't

345

mean they're true or truer, or that this is something to
permit or applaud.
But of course,

Hellyer)

shows,

as the various historical work

(notably

it's not the gossip and rumor themselves

that are increasing,

it's our notice of them.

Gossip and

rumor are persistent and omnipresent features of society;
they are some of our tools of communication and

understanding.

More to the point, the very construction of

the above argument suggests that it is proper and sensible

for people to have faith in institutional channels, that

gossip and rumor are unnecessary and detrimental sidetracks
by nature.
first,

There are two avenues for exploration here --

that people's faith in institutional channels is

declining for

a

reason, because institutional channels are

less trustworthy, people do have
non- institutional channels.

(eminently less shocking,

had absolute or total

I

(rational)

reasons to trust

The second possibility
think)

is that people have never

(or even simply

'high levels of')

faith in institutional channels; information is always

pluralistically attained and critically evaluated from
diverse and divers collection of sources.

a

as Shibutani

Or,

more succinctly suggests, the very existence of

institutional channels necessarily suggests an important

augmentation of subterranean grapevines.
Gossip and rumor aren't necessarily superfluous, selfindulgent, reductive,

transparent, or wrong
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we just choose

.

to read them that way.

not fully in cheek,

In 1963,

Max Gluckman, with tongue

advocated the establishment of "schools

for scandal," where youths would be taught how to gossip
(which,

by his analysis of gossip, meant teaching people

awareness of social distinctions and how they are made)
I'd take this argument further -- we need to learn to read

our gossip and rumor,

in all of their

frivolous, benign and malicious)

(seemingly serious and

forms, not simply to figure

out social orderings but more basically to understand

ourselves

--

what do

(the different)

we

(s)

know and believe?

What makes us think we know something instead of merely

believing it?

(These basic issues of epistemology are

simply phrased, but

I

do believe gossip and rumor have

purchase on the answers of these questions.)

epistemology needs to take

If

part of that turn

I

a

more ethnographic turn,

think must be to acknowledge the more
This

subterranean channels by which knowledge develops.
means,

as

I

have tried to suggest in the last few sections,

letting go of more transparently documentarian impulses in
hard and soft science; but doing so does not leave us in
f reef all

of epistemic relativism.

substitute)

If we supplement

(not

"harder" information with the "softer"

information of gossip (for surely, as the Hooker anecdote
reveals, that is exactly what gossip consists in)

then we

can arrive at more complete stories of why it is things
happen.

More particularly, taking gossip seriously means
347

a

taking communities seriously, taking individuals seriously,
and taking non- seriousness seriously.

If we accept that

different groups might have different understandings of why
it is something happened,

stories

--

we open ourselves up for gossip-

for gossip can be frank, humorous,

strident, and

even acidically critical in ways in which traditional soft
science cannot.
surveys'

To take an obvious example,

charts of

results of a group's opinions on some subject may

demonstrate a range from Strongly Disagreeing to Strongly
Agreeing, but even if the range leans heavily towards one
side,

the content

(and even the range)

of those categories

will be unclear without more microscopic, more informal
analysis.

And more particularly, a respondent to a survey

might be more self-conscious, more judicious, more strategic
in filling out her Scantron than if she is freely evaluting

the survey's topics with friends.

All this is not to say that the knowledge of social
science, or hard science, or even philosophy is completely

irrelevent.

At a minimum,

tells partial stories only.

however,

it is incomplete;

The stories of gossip,

it

though

they might seem wildly divergent from "conventional"

understandings, and wildly unjustified, if unpacked, can

demonstrate plentiful justification and import, and indeed,

348

.

contradictions for "aboveground,
knowledge

"

more authoritative

APPENDIX

A MODEL GOSSIP 24

The material contained in the appendix was judged too
scandalous by the dissertation committee for its inclusion, in
library copy; those interested in this archival material
and commentary should make application to the author.
24

350

.

.

.

.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abrahams, Roger D. 1970.
A Performance-centred Approach to
Gossip. Man (NS)
5(2)
290-301.
,

.

Ackermann, Bob.
1989.
On Hermeneutic Delay.
University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

Lecture,

Adkins, Karen.
1996.
Poison Pens: Gossip's Viral
Knowledge.
Dirt:
An Interdisciplinary Conference
Center for Literary and Cultural Studies, Harvard

.

University
Agassi, Joseph.
1977.
The Zeitgeist and Professor Feuer.
Philosophy of Social Science 1_, 251-253.
.

Alexander, Doris.
1990.
Dickens and the Fake True Story.
88-92.
The Dickensian 86(2)
,

,

Allport, Gordon W. and Leo Postman. 1947.
Rumor
New York:
Henry Holt.

The Psychology of

Andrews, W.L. 1972.
Gossip About Book Collecting
York:
Gordon Press Publishers.

Aristides, Nikolai.

1990.

Entre Nous.

.

New

American Spectator

7-16.

59,

Ashton, John.

1968.

Victoria's Reicrn

.

Gossip in the First Decade of
Omnigraphics.
London:

Sense and Sensibilia
Austin, J.L. 1962a.
Clarendon Press.

Oxford:

.

1962b How to Do Things with Words
Cambridge University Press.
.

.

Cambridge:

Knowledge through the Grapevine:
1994.
Ayim, Maryann.
In Goodman and Ben-Ze'ev, eds
Gossip as Inquiry.
Good Gossip
Baier, Annette.
231-260

.

1986.

Trust and Antitrust.

Ethics 96(2):

.

Bailey,

F.G.

Gifts and Poison:
New York: Schocken.

1971.

Reputation
1977.

.

Morality and Expediency

Politics of

.

London: Basil

Blackwell
Idle Chatter -- The Prerequisite to
Any Philosophy Whatsoever. Unpublished paper.

Barris, Jeremy.

1991.

351

.

.

Beaton, M.C.
Books

Death of a Gossip

1988.

Benjamin, Walter.
1978.
Reflections
New York:
Schocken.
Benn,

S.I. and G.F. Gaus
eds
in Social Life
New York:
.

,

.

1983.
St.

.

.

New York:
Tr

Ivy

Edmund Jephcott

.

Public and Private
Martin's Press.

Bennett, Gillian, and Paul Smith, eds. 1988. Monsters with
Iron Teeth Sheffield:
Sheffield Academic. pp.239240
.

.

Beresford, John D. 1968.
Gossip of the Seventeenth
Eighteenth Centuries
Ayer Company Publishers.

&

.

Bergmann, Jorg R.
1993.
Discreet Indiscretions:
The
Social Organization of Gossip
Hawthorne, NY:
Aldine de Gruyter.
.

Bernstein, Jeremy.
Basic Books.

1978.

Experiencing Science

New York:

.

Gossip in a Small Kibbutz Community
Bet Or, Ori
1989.
Doctoral dissertation, Pennsylvania State University.
.

Biale,

.

David.

History

.

Power and Powerlessness in Jewish
1986.
New York: Schocken Books.

Hearsay Handbook
Binder, David F. 1991.
Shepard's McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Bird,

2nd ed.

,

For Enquiring Minds:
S. Elizabeth. 1992.
Knoxville:
Study of Supermarket Tabloids
University of Tennessee Press.

A Cultural

.

Blau,

Exchange and Power in Social Life
1964.
P.M.
York: John Wiley.

Blee

Women of the Klan: Racism and
1991.
Kathleen.
Berkeley: University of
Gender in the 1920s
California Press.

,

.

New

.

Small-Town Stuff
1932.
Blumenthal, Albert.
University of Chicago Press.
.

1937.

Research,

22.,

Chicago:

.

The Nature of Gossip. Sociology & Social
31-37.

The Decameron
1931.
Boccaccio, Giovanni.
Library.
The Modern
New York:
352

.

Tr

.

John Payne.

0

Bok,

Sissela
1983.
Secrets:
Concealment and Revelation
.

.

:

On the Ethics of
New York: Vintage.

Borch- Jacobsen, Mikkel
1991.
Lacan:
The Absolute Master
Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
.

.

Boyer,

Paul and Stephen Nissenbaum.
1974.
Salem
Possessed Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
.

Boyles, Denis. 1989.
African Lives: White Lies. Tropical
Truth, Darkest Gossip and Rumblings of Rumor from Chinese Gordon to Bervl Markham and Bevond
New York:
Ballantine Books.
.

Brandt, Allan M.
1991.
AIDS and Metaphor: Toward the
Social Meaning of Epidemic Disease.
In Mack, In
Time of Plaque
.

Brenneis, Donald, 1988.
Telling Troubles: Narrative,
Conflict and Experience. Anthropological
279-291.
Linguistics 30(34)
,

,

Brison, Karen J.
1992.
Just Talk:
Gossip, Meetings and
Power in a Papua New Guinea Village
Berkeley:
University of California Press.
.

Village
Gossip, Innuendo, and Sorcery:
1988.
Politics Among the Kwanga East Sepik Province,
University of
Dissertation,
Papua New Guinea
California - San Diego.
.

,

.

Brown, Homer.

1977.

Genre

1

.

Television and Women's
1990.
Brown, Mary Ellen, ed.
London
The Politics of the Pupular
Culture:
Sage 183 - 98
.

.

.

Crowds and Power
1984.
Canetti, Elias.
Farrar, Straus, Giroux.

.

New York:

A Blazing World and Other
1994.
Cavendish, Margaret.
Penguin.
New York:
Writings
.

Cherniak, Christopher.
MIT Press.

1982.

Minimal Rationality

.

Boston:

From Rhetoric to Corporate
1990.
Christensen, Jerome.
Populism: A Romantic Critique of the Academy in an
438Critical Inquiry 16(2)
Age of High Gossip.
,

465

.

353

.

Coady

:

C.A.J.
1992.
Testimony: A Philosophical Study
Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
,

.

Coombe, Rosemary J. 1993.
Tactics of Appropriation and the
Politics of Recognition in Late Modern
Democracies.
Political Theory 21(3):
411-433.
Cooper, Jeff.
1989.
Gunsite Press.

The Gargantuan Qunsite Gossip

.

Davis, T.J. 1990.
A Rumor of Revolt: The 'Great Negro
Plot
in Colonial New York
Amherst:
University
of Massachusetts Press.
1

.

DeBeneditt is Peter.
1993.
Guam's Trial of the Century:
News, Hegemony and Rumor in an American Colony
Westport, CT
Praeger.
,

.

:

deBord, Guy.
1983.
Society of the Spectacle
Black & Red Press.

Nonorganic Life.
1992.
DeLanda, Manuel.
New York:
Incorporations
Zone.

.

Detroit:

In Zone

6

.

Johnson's Dictionary and the
1986.
DeMaria, Robert.
University
Chapel Hill:
Language of Learning
of North Carolina Press.
.

Cinders.
Tr Ned Lukacher.
1991.
Derrida, Jacques.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
.

Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on
1973.
Northwestern
Evanston:
Husserl's Theory of Signs
University Press.
.

.

.

Chicago:
.

Tr
Margins of Philosophy
Press.
University of Chicago

1982.

.

Diamond, Edwin.
MIT Press.

.

1978.

Good News

Dickinson, Charles. 1991.
Morrow
Dijk,

Alan Bass.

Tr. Barbara Johnson.
Dissemination
Press.
Chicago
University of

1981.

Chicago:

.

Teun A. Van, ed.
London: Academic.

,

Bad News

Rumor Has It

1985.

.

.

Cambridge:

New York:

Discourse and Dialogue

354

William

.

.

Doubt,

.

Keith.

1990.
A Theoretical Note on Simmel s Concept
Acquaintance.
Journal for the Theory of
Social Behavior 263-276.
'

of

.

Dougherty, Richard.
Goodbye, Mr, Christian
Account of McGovern's Rise and Fall.
Downing, Kenneth L.
1993.
Publishing Corp

Holy Gossip

a Personal

.-

Distinctive

.

Ellmann, Richard.
1976.
The New Oxford Book of American
Verse New York:
Oxford University Press.
.

Farber, Seth. 1993.
Madness, Heresy, and the Rumor of
Angels:
The Revolt Against the Mental Health
System
London:
Open Court Publishing Company.
.

Farge, Arlette

1993.
Vanishing Children of Paris:
Politics Before the French Revolution
Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.

Faris,

.

Anthopologica

L.

Federman, Raymond. 1976.
in Either Direction
Fenves,

Rumor

.

&

Peter.

(NS)

.

8:

235-248.

Rumor Transmissible Ad Infinitum
Assembling Press.

Chatter:
Language and History in
Stanford:
Stanford University Press.

1993.

Kierkegaard

.

Feyerabend, Paul. 1975.

Against Method

.

London:

Verso.

Mach's Theory of Research and Its
1984.
Studies in the History of
Relation to Einstein.
the Philosophy of Science 15:1-22.
.

1990. 'The Tittle-Tattle of
Finch, Casey and Peter Bowen.
Gossip and the Free Indirect Style in
Highbury'
Emma Representations 31:1-18.
:

.

Fine,

Social Components of Children's
Gary Alan. 1977.
Gossip. Journal of Communication 27:181-185.

Fiske, John.

1987.

Television Culture

.

New York:

Routledge
1972.
Foucault, Michel.
Pantheon.
York:

The Archaeology of Knowledge

.

An Archaeology of
The Order of Things:
Vintage.
York:
New
the Human Sciences.
.

1970.

355

New

..

.

.

Discipline and Punish:
New York: Vintage.

1977.

•

Prison

.

:

.

The Birth of the

Francis, Huw W.S. 1982.
Of Gossips, Eavesdropers
and
Peeping Toms.
Journal of Medical Ethics 8:134-143.
,

.

Freud,

Sigmund.
1960.
Jokes and Their Relation to the
Unconscious
New York:
Norton.
.

Fuller, George.
Canada

1980. Gossip

.

Toronto:

Playwrights

Gabler, Neal. 1994.
Winchell:
Gossip, Power and the
Culture of Celebrity
New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
.

Garrett, Laurie.
1994.
The Coming Plague:
Newly Emerging
Diseases in a World out of Balance
New York:
Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
.

Gaventa, John.

1980.
Power and Powerlessness
University of Illinois Press.

Urbana

.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973.
The Interpretation of Cultures
New York: Basic Books.

.

Gossip: an Eighteenth-Century Case.
Gelles, Edith B. 1989.
Journal of Social History 22 (4 667- 83
)

Gerber, Alain. 1987.
Mercury House.

Gilbert, Margaret.
Routledge

:

A Rumor of an Elephant
1989.

On Social Facts

.

.

New York:
New York:

Psychological, Sociological, and
1968.
Gluckman, Max.
Anthropological Explanations of Witchcraft and Gossip:
A Clarification. Man 3(1): 20-35.

Closed systems and Open Minds
,ed. 1964.
Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.
.

Gossip and Scandal. Man

1963.

4 (3 ):

.

307-316

The Presentation of Self in
1959.
Goffman, Erving.
New York: Anchor.
Everyday Life
.

Essays on the Social Situation
Asylums:
New York:
of Mental Patients and Other Inmates
Anchor
.

1961.

.

Good
Goodman, Robert and Aaron Ben Ze'ev, eds 1994.
Press.
Kansas
University of
Lawrence:
Gossip
.

.

356

.

.

.

.

Goodwin, Marjorie Harness. 1980.
He-said-she-said:
Cultural Procedures for the Construction of a
Gossip Dispute Activity. American Ethnologist
7 (4) 674-696

Formal
.

:

Gordon, Jan B. 1988.
A-filiative Families and Subversive
Reproductions: Gossip in Jane Austen.
Genre
21(1) 5-46
:

.

Gossip, Diary, Letter, Text: Anne Bronte's
1984.
Narrative Tenant and the Problematic of the Gothic
Sequel.
English Literary History 51(4): 719-745.
.

Gosse, Edmund W.
1991.
Scholarly Press.

Gossip in

a

Library

.

New York:

Greimas, Algirdas J. and Fontanille, Jacques.
1993.
The
Semiotics of
Passion:
From States of Affairs to
States of Feelings Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
.

Paul. 1989.
Studies in the Wav of Words
Harvard University Press.

Grice,

.

Cambridge

Gross, Larry. 1993.
Contested Closets: The Politics and
Ethics of Outing
Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press
.

Knowledge and Human Interests
Habermas, Jurgen. 1971.
Boston:
Beacon Press.

.

Unbraiding Women's
Hafen, Susan and Ram, Anjali 1995.
Gossip: A Feminist Justification for "Idle Talk."
Unpublished manuscript, Ohio University.
Gossip, Networds, and Culture in a
Hannerz, Ulf. 1967.
Ethnos 32:35-60.
Black American Ghetto.
1991.
The Role of Trust in Knowledge.
Hardwig, John.
Journal of Philosophy 88 (12) 693-708
:

.

1985.

Philosophy

Epistemic Dependence.
82 (7) 335-349

Journal of

:

1977.
Haviland, John Beard.
Zinacantan
Knowledge in
Chicago Press.

.

Gossip, Reputation and,..
University of
Chicago:

Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm. 1967.
Clarendon Press.
Right Oxford:
.

357

The Ph ilosophy of

..

.

.

.

.

Heidegger, Martin.
1962.
Being and Time
Tr John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper
& Row
.

.

Hellyer Mickey R.
1988.
A Marxist Analysis of the
Contributions of Beniamin Franklin and the Junto
to Adult Education:
A Dialectical Approach
Doctoral dissertation,
Northern Illinois
University
,

.

Heppenstall M A 1971.
Reputation, Criticism and
Information in an Austrian Village.
In Bailey,
Gifts and Poison
,

.

.

.

Hermes, Joke.
1995.
Polity Press

Reading Women's Magazines

.

Cambridge:

Heywood, Eliza.
1929 The Famel Spectator; Being Selections
from Mrs. Eliza Hevwood s Periodical (1744-1746)
Ed. Mary Priestley.
London:
John Lane, The
Bodley Head, Ltd.
'

.

Hinde, Thomas.
1988.
Tales from the Pump Room:
Nine
Hundred Years of Bath: The Place. Its People, and
Its Gossip
Gollancz, England:
Trafalgar
Square
.

Paul and Woolley, Penny.
Human Attributes
London:

Hirst,

.

1982.
Social Relations and
Tavistock.

Swearing:
A Social History of Foul
Hughes, Geoffrey. 1991.
Oxford:
Language, Oaths and Profanity in English
Blackwell Publishers.
.

Hutson, Susan. 1971. Social Ranking in a French Alpine
In Bailey, Gifts and Poison
Community.
.

Isaacson, Walter.
House
Jain,

Kissinger

1992.

.

New York:

Random

Sociology of Corruption in the
Ravindra K. 1979.
Developing Societies: Morality in Theory and
Philosophy of Social Activity 5:33-48.
Practice.

History and Gossip in Mother Goose
Harlo Press.

Johnson, Mason P. 1983.
New York:
Rhymes
.

Social Structure and Process in
Johnson, R.M. 1977.
in C.F. Fischer, et al
Choice"
Friendship
Social Relations in the
Networks and Places
Free Press.
New York:
Urban Setting
:

.

358

Jones, Walter B.

1993.

The Other Side of Congress
Washington Publications.

Washington:
Kant,

.

Immanuel. 1974.
Anthropology from a Pragmatic View
Tr Mary J. Gregor.
The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff.

.

.

Kapferer, Jean-Noel
1990.
Rumors:
Uses, Interpretations,
and Images New Brunswick:
Transaction Publishers.
.

.

Keller, Wayne H. 1982.
Ministry 13:34.

Kierkegaard,
Lowrie

.

Fighting Those Rumors.

Christian

Soren
1940.
The Present Age
Tr
London:
Oxford University Press.
.

.

.

Walter

Kirmmse, Bruce H.
ed.
1996.
Encounters with Kierkegaard:
A Life As Seen by His Contemporaries
Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
,

.

Kodish, Debora G. 1980.
Moving Towards the Everyday:
Some
Thoughts on Gossip and Visiting as Secular
Procession. Folklore Papers of University Folklore
Association 9: 93-104.
Koenig, Frederick. 1985.
Rumor in the Marketplace:
the
Social Psychology of Commercial Hearsay
Dover,
MA:
Auburn House Publishing Co.
.

1975.
Terry Ann.
Rumors, Race and Riots
Brunswick: Transaction Books.

Knopf,

Hegemony

Laclau, Ernest.
1985.
London: Verso.

&

.

New

Socialist Strategy

We Have Never Been Modern
Latour, Bruno.
1993.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

.

.

Laboratory Life:
Latour, Bruno and Steve Woolgar. 1986.
Princeton:
The Construction of Scientific Facts
Princeton University Press.
.

Levin, Jack and Arnold Arluke 1987.
Plenum Press.
Scoop New York:
.

Gossip:

the Inside

.

Jack and Allan
Media Small Talk.
27 169-175

Levin,

:

J.

Gossip Columns:
Krimel 1977.
Journal of Communication
.

.

Levin, Jack, Anita Mody-Desbareau and Arnold Arluke.
The Gossip Tabloid as Agent of Social Control.
Journalism Quarterly 65:514-517.
359

1985.

.

!

!

.

:

Lewontin, R.C., Steven Rose, and Leon J. Kamin.
1985.
in Our Genes:
Biology, Ideolocrv, and Human
Nature
New York: Pantheon.

Not

.

Lwoff, Andre.

Scientific American 219(1) :133.

1968.

Mack, Arlen,

ed.
1991.
In Time of Plaque:
The History of
Social Consequences of Lethal Epidemic Disease
New York: NYU Press.
.

Martin, Michael M. 1988.
Basic Problems of Evidence 6th
ed. American Law Institute & American Bar
Association Committee on Professional Education.
New York: American Bar Association.
.

Meiser, Stanley 1990.
Lives of Rich, Famous Keep Spain
Enthralled.
Los Angeles Times
November 6: H2
.

Miller, Sarah Elizabeth.
1992.
Twice-Born Tales from
Kathmandu:
Stories that Tell People
Doctoral
dissertation, Cornell University.
.

Montaigne, Michel de
York:
Penguin.

.

1993.

Morgan, Hal and Kerry Tucker.
Penguin
.

Morin,

Rumor

1984.

The Essays:

More Rumor

1988.

New York:

.

.

New

New York:

Penguin.

Edgar, with Bernard Paillard. 1971.
New York:
Tr Peter Green.

Orleans

A Selection

.

Rumor in
Pantheon.

The Structure of
'Mending Wall
Morrissey, L.J. 1988.
English Language Notes 25 (3) :58-63.
Gossip.
1

:

,

Munroe, Robert L. and Ruth H. Munroe
Zyqon 11(3): 212-214.
Ethics.

.

Altruistic

1976.

Media Sense
Bowling

1986.
Narvaez, Peter, and Martin Laba, eds
Continuum
Culture
Popular
Folklore
The
Popular.
Green, OH:
pp. 19-30.
.

.

The Gay Science
1974.
Nietzsche, Friedrich.
Vintage.
New York:
Kaufmann.

.

Tr

.

Walter

Tr Marion Faber.
Human, All Too Human
1984.
University of Nebraska Press.
Lincoln:
.

.

360

.

.

.

Norris, Christopher.
1992.
Uncritical Theory:
Postmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War
Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press.

Norton,

William and Mary Quarterly 44:3-39.

1987.

Olden, Marc.

.

1979.

Paine, Robert.
285

Gossip

1967.

New York:

.

Fawcett Book Group.

What is Gossip About? Man

(NS)

2:278-

.

Pauling, Peter.
Scientist
Pavel, Thomas.

1978.

Disposit io
Pepinsky, Harold

Democracy

.

DNA

1973.

-

The Race That Never Was.

New

May 31.

:

Literary Criticism and Methodology.

3

1991.
The Geometry of Violence and
Bloomington:
Indiana University Press.
E.

Philadelphia Institute for Research in Human Relations.
The Effect of a Threatening Rumor on a
1958.
Washington, D.C.:
Disaster- Stricken Community
NAS-NRC.
.

Blabbing and Gabbing, or, a Brief
1996.
Phillips, Susie.
Dirt:
an
(Pre-) History of Gossip.
Center for Literary
Interdisciplinary Conference
and Cultural Studies, Harvard University.
.

People of the Sierra
1977.
Pitt-Rivers, Julian.
University of Chicago Press.
The Dialogues of Plato Volume
1920.
Plato.
Random House.
New York:
Jowett

Tr

1.

,

Chicago

.

.

B.

.

Business and Professional Ethics
Jack Nusan. 1990.
An Oxymoron? Bridges 107-112.

Porter,

The Ideology of the Great Fear:
Ramsay, Clay. 1992.
Johns Hopkins
Baltimore:
Soissonais in 1789
University Press.

The

.

The Names of History
1994.
Ranciere, Jacques.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
The Ignorant Schoolmaster
Stanford University Press.
.

1991.

361

.

Stanford:

,

,

.

.

.

Rosaldo, Michelle Zimbalist and Louise Lamphere, eds
Women, Culture and Society Stanford:
Stanford
University Press.

.

1974

.

.

Rosenbaum, Jean B. and Mayer Subrin. 1963.
The Psychology
of Gossip. Journal of the American Psychological
Association 11 (4 817 - 831
:

)

Rosenthal, Tom. 1993.
Strange Bedfellows: How Television
and the Presidential Candidates Changed Politics.
1992
New York: Hyperion.
.

Ross, Andrew.

Culture

.

1989.
No Respect:
Intellectuals and Popular
New York:
Routledge.

Rosnow, Ralph L. 1977.
Gossip and Marketplace Psychology.
Journal of Communication 27:158-163.

Rosnow, Ralph and Fine, Gary.
1976.
Rumor and Gossip:
the
Social Psychology of Hearsay
New York:
Elsevier.
.

Rousseau, Jean- Jacques
Viking Penguin.

.

Confessions

1953.

.

New York:

Media Virus
Rushkoff, Douglas.
1994.
Hidden Agendas in
New York: Ballantine.
Popular Culture
!

.

How the 'Gossip' Becomes a Woman.
Rysman, Alexander, 1977.
Journal of Communication 27:176-180.

Moralities of Everyday
Sabini, John and Maury Silver. 1982.
Oxford University Press.
Life Oxford:
.

Sayre, Anne.

Rosalind Franklin and DNA

1975.

New York:

.

Norton
Journal of Abnormal and Social

Schachter and Burdick. 1955.
Psychology 50:363-371.

Domination and the Arts of
James C. 1990.
New Haven: Yale
Resistance: Hidden Transcripts
University Press.

Scott,

.

Shibutani, Tamotsu.
Study of Rumor

Improvised News; a Sociological
Bobbs-Merrill
Indianapolis:

1966.
.

Naturalized Epistemology and 'First'
1995.
Siegel, Harvey.
Metaphilosophv 26(1-2).
Philosophy.
Signorile, Michelangelo. 1993.
Anchor Doubleday.
362

Queer in America

.

New York:

)

.

.

Skousgaard, Stephen.
1974.
Genuine Speech vs. Chatter:
Socratic Problematic.
Kinesis 6:87-94.

A

Slack, Paul.
1991.
Responses to Plague in Early Modern
Europe: The Implications of Public Health.
In
Mack, In Time of Plaque
.

Sontag, Susan.
1978.
Illness as Metaphor
Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.
Spacks, Patricia Meyer.
of Chicago Press.

1985.

Gossip

Spielberg, Peter.
1992.
Hearsay
Collective Two, Inc.

.

New York:

.

Chicago: University

.

New York:

Fiction

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1988.
In Other Worlds:
in Cultural Politics
New York: Rout ledge.

Essays

.

Stirling.
Suls,

Social Forces 34:262-267.

1956.

Jerry M. 1977.
Gossip as Social Comparison. Journal
of Communication 27:164-168.
John F. 1966.
Gossip, Drinking and Social Control:
Consensus and Communication in a Newfoundland
Parish. Ethnology 5 4 434 -44 1

Szwed,

(

:

Rumor Has It: A Curio of Lies,
Tamarkin, Bob. 1993.
Prentice Hall General
Hoaxes, and Hearsay
Travel.
&
Reference
.

You Just Don't Understand: Women
Tannen, Deborah. 1990.
Ballantine Books.
New York:
and Men in Conversation
.

Tang,

Truong Nhu
Vintage

.

1986.

Vietcong Memoir

.

New York:

Words That Hurt, Words That Heal:
1996.
Telushkin Joseph.
New York:
How to Choose Words Wisely and Well
William Morrow.
,

.

Studies in Communication:
ed. 1990.
Communication and Culture: Language Performance,
225Ablex.
Norwood, NJ
Technology, and Media

Thomas, Sari,

:

.

235

.

I Heard It Through the Grapevine
Turner, Patricia A. 1993.
Berkeley:
Rumor in African-American Culture
University of California Press.
.

363

..

.

Watson, James D.
Penguin
West,

The Double Helix

1969.

James. 1945.
Plainville USA
University Press.

Whicher, George Frisbie
Mrs. Eliza Hevwood
Press

.

.

1915.

.

.

New York:

New York:

Columbia

The Life and Romances of

New York:

Columbia University

White, Theodore H. 1973.
The Making of the President.
New York: Atheneum Publishers.

1972

Wilson, Peter J. 1974.
Filcher of Good Names: an Enquiry
into Anthropology and Gossip. Man (NS) 9(1):93-102.
Wylen, Stephen M.

1993.

Gossip:

The Power of the Tongue,
Ktav Publishing

Jewish Wisdom for Human Relations
House

.

Yerkovich, Sally. 1977.
Gossiping as a Way of Speaking.
Journal of Communication 27:192-196.

Virtuous Citizens, Disruptive
Yngvesson, Barbara. 1993.
Subjects: Order and Complaint in a New England
New York:
Rout ledge.
Court.
1991.
The Development and Testing
Zaner, Marie Friestad.
of a Model for Introducing Organization-Wide
Doctoral dissertation,
Administrative Change
.

Arizona State University.

364

.

